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CONTENTS

15 August 1991

CHINA

Reports, Commentaries on Moscow Summit, START	1
Treaty Limitations Stressed [Zhang Qixin; RENMIN RIBAO 30 Jul]	1
Treaty Signing Reported [XINHUA 31 Jul]	1
UN Chief Cited on Significance [XINHUA 31 Jul]	1
'Roundup' on Summit [Sheng Shiliang; XINHUA 2 Aug]	2
DPRK's Korean NFZ Proposal, Foreign Response Reported	2
Statement Cited [XINHUA 31 Jul]	2
Seoul Rejects Proposal [XINHUA 1 Aug]	2
Soviet Spokesman Voices Support [XINHUA 1 Aug]	2
Vietnamese Spokeswoman Backs Proposal [XINHUA 1 Aug]	3

EAST ASIA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Pacific Nations To Renew Criticism of French Nuclear Tests [Hong Kong AFP 27 Jul]	4
---	---

AUSTRALIA

Foreign Minister Lauds START, Urges Further Arms Cuts [AFP 6 Aug]	4
---	---

JAPAN

Cautious Response to DPRK Denuclearization Plan [KYODO 30 Jul]	4
Hiroshima, Nagasaki Host Antinuclear Conferences [KYODO 1 Aug]	4
Officials Welcome U.S.-Soviet START Treaty	5
Prime Minister Kaifu Comments [KYODO 1 Aug]	5
Statement by Foreign Minister [KYODO 31 Jul]	5

NORTH KOREA

Daily Urges Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons [Pyongyang Radio 27 Jul]	5
Foreign Ministry on Nuclear-Free Zone Proposal	7
Text of Statement [Pyongyang Radio 29 Jul]	7
Charge d'Affaires in China Comments [Pyongyang Radio 30 Jul]	9
Attitude of U.S. Toward Denuclearization Viewed [Pyongyang Radio 31 Jul]	9
Embassy in Moscow on Denuclearization Proposal [Pyongyang Radio 31 Jul]	10
Committee in Japan Views Nuclear-Free Proposal [KCNA 2 Aug]	11
U.S. Informed of Denuclearization Plan in China [KCNA 3 Aug]	11
USSR Supports Korean Denuclearization Proposal [KCNA 3 Aug]	12
Vietnam Supports Denuclearization Proposal [KCNA 3 Aug]	12
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Statement on START	12
Calls Treaty 'Significant Step' [Pyongyang Radio 4 Aug]	12
Hopes START Will Aid Korean NFZ [KCNA 5 Aug]	12
U.S. Middle East Arms Proposal Called 'Unjust' [KCNA 4 Aug]	13

SOUTH KOREA

Removal of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Debated	13
U.S. Concerns With Japan [Mun Chang-kuk, Pang In-chol; CHUNGANG ILBO 4 May]	13
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal Discussed [HANGUK ILBO 3 May]	15
Response to North's Proposal for Nuclear-Free Korea	16
Official Sees 'Nothing New' [YONHAP 30 Jul]	16
Presidential Statement at UN Considered [CHOSON ILBO 30 Jul]	17
Government Seeks 'Full-Scope' Inspections [YONHAP 1 Aug]	17
Rejects Linking Inspections, NFZ [THE KOREA TIMES 2 Aug]	18

Editorial Welcomes Discussion of Issue [CHOSON ILBO 3 Aug]	18
Seoul Considers Joint Declaration [YONHAP 4 Aug]	19
Editorial Views START's Military, Political Significance [THE KOREA HERALD 31 Jul]	19
EAST EUROPE	
ALBANIA	
Foreign Ministry Statement Hails START Treaty [ATA 1 Aug]	20
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	
EGYPT	
Government Submits Regional Disarmament Proposals to UN [MENA 5 Aug]	21
INDIA	
Parliament Welcomes Signing of START Treaty [Delhi Radio 2 Aug]	21
Prime Minister Calls START 'Historic Development' [Moscow TASS 5 Aug]	22
ISRAEL	
U.S. Concerns About Arrow Failure Answered [R. Pedatzur; HA'ARETZ 22 Jul]	22
SOVIET UNION	
GENERAL	
Bessmertnykh on Post-START Arms Control Plans [IAN]	23
START TALKS	
Revised U.S. Targets in USSR Change Little [V. Gan; PRAVDA 24 Jul]	23
Military Plants To Use Surplus Missiles for Space Launches [IZVESTIYA 25 Jul]	24
Observer on Bilateral Ties, START Significance [G. Vasilyev; PRAVDA 29 Jul]	24
Shevardnadze Meets Baker, Views START [INTERFAX 30 Jul]	25
START Will Normalize World Situation [B. Omelichev; TASS 29 Jul]	25
START Delegate General Lebedev Interviewed [IAN 30 Jul]	25
Ignatenko-Fitzwater Briefing at Moscow Summit Cited [TASS 30 Jul]	26
Physicians' Group Hails START, Calls for Further Action [TASS 30 Jul]	26
Academic Views START Provisions [V. Chernyshev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 31 Jul]	27
Gorbachev Address at START Signing [Moscow TV 31 Jul]	29
START Treaty Signing Ceremony Reported [L. Aleksandrova; TASS 31 Jul]	29
U.S., Soviet Geneva Delegates on Treaty Completion	30
Brooks, Nazarkin at Final Plenary Session [B. Shabayev; TASS 29 Jul]	30
Brooks Briefs Press [TASS 31 Jul]	30
Russian Republic Supports Signing of Treaty [TASS 31 Jul]	30
Criticism of START Treaty Foreseen [A. Golts; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 Jul]	31
Observer Comments on START [V. Levin; Moscow Radio 1 Aug]	31
Officials Cited on Prospects for Follow-On Talks [INTERFAX 1 Aug]	32
Assessments of START Treaty Reported	32
Yazov on Treaty Provisions [IZVESTIYA 2 Aug]	32
Lebedev Explains Provisions [TRUD 27 Jul]	34
Democratic Movement Welcomes Treaty [INTERFAX 1 Aug]	36
Military Analyst Views Treaty [V. Bogachev; TASS 1 Aug]	36
Likely Impact of START Treaty Viewed [M. Ponomarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Aug]	37
START Treaty Provisions Viewed [Ye. Shaskov; PRAVDA 2 Aug]	38
NATO Officials Said To Welcome START Treaty [V. Peresada; PRAVDA 2 Aug]	39
Observer Sums Up START Achievements [T. Kolesnichenko; PRAVDA 3 Aug]	40
START Negotiator Discusses Treaty [Yu. Nazarkin; Moscow Radio 4 Aug]	40
Moiseyev Comments on Strategic Arms Treaty [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Aug]	44
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
Defense Minister Yazov Rejects New U.S. Charges on SS-23's [Bratislava PRAVDA 26 Jul]	46
FRG Denies Soviet SS-23 Sales Violate INF Treaty [IZVESTIYA 27 Jul]	47
Yazov Confirms SS-23's Sold to East Europe [Moscow International 31 Jul]	47

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Polish Spokesman on Troop Pullout Problems [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Jul]	47
Need For More Compromise on Polish Pullout Seen [V. Kopteltsev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jul]	47
Preparations for CFE Implementation Under Way [A. Chernyshev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Jul]	48
CSBM Inspection of U.S. Forces in Baumholder, FRG [TASS 31 Jul]	49
WGF Aide on Pullout From FRG Laender Capitals [I. Podgorny; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Aug]	49

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Conference Discusses Cooperation in Space [TASS 5 Aug]	50
--	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Further on Controversy Over Semipalatinsk Operations	50
Residents Offered Compensation [Moscow Radio 4 Jul]	50
Republic Politburo Statement [Moscow Radio 6 Aug]	50
March Urges Closure of Test Site [INTERFAX 6 Aug]	51
Spokesman Hails Swedish Test Ban Proposal at CD [TASS 1 Aug]	51
Controversy Over Novaya Zemlya Operations Continues	51
Yeltsin Backs End to Testing [Radio Rossii 6 Aug]	51
Calls Issue 'Complicated' [INTERFAX 6 Aug]	51
Correspondent Denied Access [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 2 Aug]	51
Issue Raised at Conference in Japan [Miu Oikawa; Tokyo KYODO 2 Aug]	52

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

DPRK Statement on Korean NFZ Discussed [Moscow International 30 Jul]	52
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Expresses Support for Korean NFZ [TASS 1 Aug]	53

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Hades Pre-Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Formed [LE MONDE 26 Jul]	54
Former Chief of Staff on Nuclear Deterrence [Paris Radio 30 Jul]	54

GERMANY

SDP Aide Criticizes French Short-Range Nuclear Missiles [ADN 27 Jul]	54
Bundeswehr Practices for Soviet CSCE Inspections [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 30 Jul]	54
Signing of START Treaty Prompts Reactions	55
Kohl Praises Summit [DPA 31 Jul]	55
Genscher Hails Accords [DPA 1 Aug]	56
Other Politicians Comment [ADN 31 Jul]	56
Effects of Treaty Analyzed [L. Wieland; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 31 Jul]	56
Editorials View Summit Results [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, etc]	57
Progress in Disarmament Viewed [T. Sommer; DIE ZEIT 26 Jul]	58
USSR Asked To Resume 'Open Skies' Talks [ADN 2 Aug]	60
Soviet Army Vacating Meiningen, Other Sites [ADN 5 Aug]	60
Discussion of Bundeswehr Reductions, Reorganization	60
Defense Minister Submits Plan [DPA 6 Aug]	60
FDP Defense Expert Comments [W. Hoyer; BILD AM SONNTAG 4 Aug]	60

SPAIN

Government Welcomes U.S.-Soviet START Treaty [Madrid International 1 Aug]	61
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Reports, Commentaries on Moscow Summit, START

Treaty Limitations Stressed

HK0108085191 Beijing in Chinese
30 Jul 91 p 6

[Article by staff reporter Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500):
"Bush's Visit to Soviet Union—U.S.-USSR Moscow
Summit as Seen by U.S. Media"]

[Excerpt] Washington, 27 July (RENMIN RIBAO)—U.S. President George Bush goes to Moscow for a heads of government summit with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. This is Bush's third official meeting with the Soviet leader since assuming the presidency. Newspapers here maintain that the biggest difference between this Moscow summit and previous U.S.-USSR heads of government summits lies in the fact that for the first time, principal attention is not focused on the "hot issues" that have plagued them for 40 years, but on economic and political reform in the Soviet Union and on how the West can "help."

During this Moscow summit, the United States and the Soviet Union will sign a strategic arms reduction treaty, but this is merely a signing ceremony, and the question of arms control will not be the main topic of the summit. Not a few commentaries regarding this nuclear treaty have appeared in the U.S. media and the general views are as follows:

One, according to the treaty, both the United States and the Soviet Union agree for the first time to slash their respective strategic nuclear arsenals by roughly 30 percent, and not 50 percent as originally planned. The treaty provides that the two countries should cut the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles from 2,000 to 1,600, and that the number of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles should be reduced from more than 10,000 to 6,000 in name, but because several special stipulations have been made in the treaty, both the United States and the Soviet Union have some nuclear warheads which are not included in the 6,000 ceiling. In effect, the number of nuclear warheads they possess is 9,000 (United States) and 7,000 (Soviet Union). Two, while the treaty has offered detailed provisions on nuclear inspections, loopholes are inevitable given the highly technical nature of nuclear inspection and future disputes between the two are very likely to arise. Three, while the treaty has imposed certain restrictions on improvement of nuclear weapons, these will not affect efforts to improve nuclear weapons by the two sides. New generations of nuclear weapons will continue to emerge from both sides.

All this shows that the nuclear disarmament task of both the United States and the Soviet Union is far from over. Some people have maintained that even if the nuclear warheads were slashed by half, this would not affect their deterrence capability; meanwhile, some high-ranking officials are concerned that further reduction will undercut U.S. deterrence capability and have proposed an "intermission" in nuclear negotiations. [passage omitted]

Treaty Signing Reported

OW3107145591 Beijing XINHUA in English
1440 GMT 31 Jul 91

[Text] Moscow, July 31 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sealed off the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) at the Kremlin today, bringing the two-day U.S.-Soviet summit to a climax.

Under the 700-page treaty, which the two sides have negotiated for more than 9 years, the Soviet long range nuclear bombers will be cut by about 35 percent overall, while those of the United States by about 28 percent.

In terms of warheads, the Soviet Union now has about 10,800 and they will be cut back to about 8,000. The United States has about 12,000 and they will be reduced to about 10,400.

It will take seven years for the two countries to implement the treaty, if the U.S. Congress approves it by a two-thirds majority.

Speaking at the signing ceremony, Gorbachev described the treaty as a "beginning of voluntary reduction of the nuclear arsenals" of the two countries and "a process with unprecedented scope and objectives."

"The document before us marks a moral achievement and a major breakthrough in our countries' thinking and behavior," he said, adding that "our next goal is to make full use of this breakthrough to make disarmament and irreversible process."

Calling the treaty "the most complicated of contracts governing the most serious of concerns," Bush said that the treaty "stands as a monument to several generations of U.S. and Soviet negotiations."

"It represents a major step forward for our mutual security and the cause of world peace," Bush pointed out.

"Reductions alone are not enough, so START requires even deeper cuts of the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons," he said.

Bush said that neither side won unilateral advantage over the other in signing the treaty and both sides "committed themselves instead to achieving a strong effective treaty and securing the mutual stability that a good agreement would provide."

"By building trust, we pave the path to peace," Bush added.

UN Chief Cited on Significance

OW3107203491 Beijing XINHUA in English
1755 GMT 31 Jul 91

[Excerpt] United Nations, July 31 (XINHUA)—U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar said today that the signing of agreement on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) "constitutes a tangible contribution to a more secure and peaceful world."

The U.N. chief is particularly encouraged by the fact that the two sides have begun in earnest the actual elimination

of their strategic nuclear weapons arsenals. He very much hoped that this process "will continue with a view to achieving further reduction." [passage omitted]

'Roundup' on Summit

*OW0208091791 Beijing XINHUA in English
0410 GMT 2 Aug 91*

["Roundup: Bush's First Trip to Moscow (by Sheng Shiliang)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Excerpt] Moscow, August 1 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush visited for the first time the Soviet Union from July 29 to August 1, making the trip the most calm and fruitful among his six meetings with his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev.

The failure to bridge the differences concerning the Soviet-American treaty on reduction of offensive strategic weapons, nine years in the making, had repeatedly put off the Moscow summit scheduled in the end of last year. The signing of the treaty thus became the most noticeable event of the Moscow summit.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed in the Kremlin on July 31, mandates that the superpowers must reduce 30 percent of their strategic arsenals within the coming seven years to the level that each side owns less than 1,600 strategic vehicles and 6,000 warheads. It also bans any further improvement of the weapons.

The START will lower the level of the Soviet-American confrontation because Washington and Moscow will be required for the first time to slash, not merely cap, their stockpiles of deadly nuclear weapons.

The cut of delivery vehicles is four or five times more than the amount defined in the former abortive treaty on limiting strategic arms at stage 2. Nuclear warheads carried by ballistic missiles will be reduced by 48 percent on the Soviet side and by 39 percent for Americans.

Yet, the cut fails to reach the expected reduction by half and is not a balanced one.

For all the reductions, both sides will still retain more than enough nuclear weapons to wipe out each other—9,000 warheads on the U.S. side and about 7,000 for the Soviets. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara calculated that 400 warheads would be enough to eliminate either of the two countries. [passage omitted]

DPRK's Korean NFZ Proposal, Foreign Response Reported

Statement Cited

*OW3107222791 Beijing XINHUA in English
1707 GMT 31 Jul 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, July 31 (XINHUA)—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced new proposals Tuesday that call for a joint declaration by the two sides of Korea to establish a nuclear free zone [NFZ] in the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK official radio quoted the Foreign Ministry as saying that the new proposals include an appeal to South

Korea to negotiate on the joint declaration that should be approved by the end of 1992.

The joint declaration will prohibit tests, production and possession of nuclear weapons by the two sides, the Foreign Ministry's statement said.

It should also ban deployment and military manoeuvres involving nuclear arms, the Foreign Ministry said.

The United States should negotiate with nuclear states around the Korean peninsula such as the Soviet Union and China to guarantee the nuclear free status of the peninsula, the statement said.

It noted that the United States must withdraw its nuclear arms from the Korean peninsula to pave way for the establishment of the nuclear free zone.

The statement also called on non-nuclear states in Asia to voice their support for DPRK's requests and respect the nuclear free status of the Korean peninsula.

Seoul Rejects Proposal

*OW0108104691 Beijing XINHUA in English
0943 GMT 1 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 1 (XINHUA)—The South Korean Government has rejected the proposal for a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, which was put forward Tuesday by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

South Korean officials were quoted as saying that the proposal "has no new content," and that the North "should sign a nuclear safeguards agreement first."

The South Korean authorities discussed the proposal on Tuesday. The meeting decided that the proposal was "unrealistic," and that a nuclear-free Korean peninsula would be "meaningless" at a moment when the major countries around are armed with nuclear weapons and regional conflicts are continuing.

The DPRK's proposal calls for a joint declaration by the two sides of the peninsula being nuclear-free, and appeals to the United States, the Soviet Union and China to guarantee its nuclear-free status.

Soviet Spokesman Voices Support

*OW0108210591 Beijing XINHUA in English
1646 GMT 1 Aug 91*

[Text] Moscow, August 1 (XINHUA)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin said today that the Soviet Union supports DPRK's (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) initiative to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Speaking at a press conference, Churkin said if DPRK and South Korea "reach an agreement" on the proposal put forward on Tuesday, the Soviet Union, as a nuclear state, "is willing to give necessary guarantees, with other nuclear powers, for the zone's nuclear-free status."

The spokesman stressed that the Soviet Union pays much attention to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the setting-up of nuclear-free zones.

He noted that the issue of nuclear security is vital for the Korean peninsula which was overfilled with armed forces and armaments, saying that the political and military confrontation still exists.

The proposal to build the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone is conducive to clearing up suspicions between DPRK and South Korea and normalizing the situation on the peninsula.

Vietnamese Spokeswoman Backs Proposal

*OW0108212191 Beijing XINHUA in English
1513 GMT 1 Aug 91*

[Text] Hanoi, August 1 (XINHUA)—Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Ho Thi Lan said today that Vietnam supported the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) proposal to make the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone.

Speaking at a press conference, Ho Thi Lan said the proposal, which was announced by the Korean Foreign Ministry on Tuesday, would be conducive to the consolidation of stability and peace in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asian regions.

She said the Vietnamese had made active contributions to the establishment of a world without nuclear weapons.

Referring to the Bangkok meeting between Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai and United States Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, on Tuesday, the spokeswoman said the talk was "necessary and beneficial."

The meeting was helpful in understanding each's views on normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States, the Cambodian issue and problems of common concern.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Pacific Nations To Renew Criticism of French Nuclear Tests*BK2707125691 Hong Kong AFP in English 1022 GMT 27 Jul 91*

[Text] Palikir, July 27 (AFP)—South Pacific nations will launch a "strong objection" to French nuclear testing at the annual heads of government meeting here, New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger said Saturday.

Last year's forum statement did not specially mention testing, leading French diplomats to claim Pacific acceptance of nuclear tests in the region.

Mr. Bolger, whose country has spearheaded regional opposition to French testing, said the issue would be covered "firmly."

"Leaders again expressed their strong rejection of French arguments that they must continue to test in the Pacific."

He said he noted the concerns of the Pacific registered in the communique this year.

"I wouldn't say the (feeling on the issue) is strong but it is a continuing strength, given that France as yet has shown no inclination to stop.

"We don't want it, we don't need it."

Mr. Bolger was speaking after a day-long private and informal meeting of the 15 leaders.

All outstanding issues were basically resolved in the private meeting ahead of Monday and Tuesday's formal session, he said.

AUSTRALIA

Foreign Minister Lauds START, Urges Further Arms Cuts*BK0608102991 Hong Kong AFP in English 0954 GMT 6 Aug 91*

[Text] Canberra, August 6 (AFP)—In a statement to mark Hiroshima Day, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called Tuesday for renewed global efforts to eradicate weapons of mass destruction.

The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed in Moscow on July 31, was welcome because it "reduced rather than merely stabilised the number of nuclear weapons in existence," Evans said.

"Not since the cold war began 30 years ago has the strategic environment looked so bright and hopes for global peace and stability been so strong," he said.

But he added: "As the Gulf war so graphically illustrated to us all, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must be controlled."

Evans said the world has "come a long way" in the 46 years since the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, foretelling the end of World War II.

"Many nations realise that their security cannot be guaranteed by military capabilities alone..."

"Let us work to eradicate weapons of mass destruction from the face of the earth long before another half-century passes," he said.

JAPAN

Cautious Response to DPRK Denuclearization Plan*OW3007124891 Tokyo KYODO in English 1147 GMT 30 Jul 91*

[Text] Tokyo, July 30 (KYODO)—Japan responded cautiously Tuesday to North Korea's proposal earlier in the day for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe told Japanese reporters that while Pyongyang's latest proposal contains a few new elements, "the basic idea is in line with what North Korea has been saying to date."

Watanabe noted that one new element was Pyongyang's pragmatic recognition that the major nuclear powers are moving from confrontation to cooperation and reaching agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Officials explained that North Korea had traditionally scoffed at arms reductions agreements between the superpowers, asserting that U.S. actions are geared toward ultimately launching a nuclear war.

Watanabe said another new element in Pyongyang's proposal was the call on the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula in the future.

The spokesman noted finally that the proposal cited a target date, the end of 1992, for Pyongyang and Seoul to negotiate legal and practical matters related to turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and to adopt a joint declaration with legal effect.

Officials stressed that Japan's recognition of the three new elements in the North Korean proposal did not constitute a value judgement about them.

The officials said Japan is still studying the proposal while taking into consideration the reactions of South Korea, the United States, and other concerned countries.

Hiroshima, Nagasaki Host Antinuclear Conferences*OW0108051191 Tokyo KYODO in English 0231 GMT 1 Aug 91*

["Antinuke Confab Series To Open in Hiroshima (by Miu Oikawa)"]—KYODO headline]

[Text] Tokyo, August 1 (KYODO)—The annual series of antinuclear world peace conferences opens in Hiroshima on Friday, just after the United States and Soviet Union signed an historic arms reduction treaty in Moscow.

In the series involving antinuclear bodies and citizens groups, the Persian Gulf war will be a major subject of

discussion besides traditional themes of disarmament, nuclear power, and recollections of the sufferers of atomic bombs.

On the eve of the 46th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the shadow of the Gulf war is likely to linger at the annual world conferences and gatherings slated in the two atom-bombed cities August 2-9.

The crisis in the Gulf vexed Japan on how to contribute to the multinational coalition that fought Iraq without contradicting its pacifist constitution.

Ironically, three of the four Japanese minesweepers dispatched to the Gulf in April, two months after the war ended and Japan's only nonfinancial contribution, left from ports in Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures.

The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, or Gensuikyo, backed by the Japanese Communist Party, will talk on themes such as the proposed dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas during their three-day annual meetings opening Friday in Hiroshima.

Some 300 people, including 50 foreign participants, are scheduled to attend the meetings while the city's peace gathering on August 6, the day an atomic bomb was dropped in Hiroshima for the first time in history, is likely to draw about 5,000 people, organizers said.

The rival Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, or Gensuikin, supported by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), will also begin a three-day yearly convention from Sunday in Hiroshima.

On August 5, some 200 people will attend the conference, including numerous foreign guests, to discuss peace in the post-Gulf war era.

The group is also planning eight subcommittee meetings, with themes such as environmental and nuclear power.

Both Gensuikyo and Gensuikin will move to Nagasaki on August 7, holding a series of meetings through August 9, the anniversary of the city's bombing 46 years ago.

The nation's largest labor union organization, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), will also hold its first peace gatherings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, discussing similar themes as the antinuclear groups.

Officials Welcome U.S.-Soviet START Treaty

Prime Minister Kaifu Comments

OW0108032591 Tokyo KYODO in English 0310 GMT
1 Aug 91

[Text] Tokyo, August 1 (KYODO)—Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu on Thursday welcomed the signing of an historic U.S.-Soviet treaty on reducing strategic arms, calling it the "fruit" of nine years of negotiations between the two superpowers. Kaifu told reporters he hopes the U.S. and the Soviet Union will have further talks toward deeper cuts to their strategic arsenals.

U.S. President George Bush and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed Wednesday the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which will cut for the first time ever

the number of long-range nuclear weapons in each country's arsenal. The treaty will slash U.S. and Soviet arsenals of long-range missiles and bombers by about a third, and includes detailed verification and confidence-building measures that give unprecedented access to the other's military facilities.

Statement by Foreign Minister

OW3107131291 Tokyo KYODO in English 1306 GMT
31 Jul 91

[Text] Tokyo, July 31 (KYODO)—Japan on Wednesday welcomed the signing of a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union ending the nine-year negotiations known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, in a statement issued after the accord was signed in Moscow by U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, said Japan "heartily welcomes" the agreement.

"Japan...hopes that U.S.-USSR relations and East-West relations will be further stabilized through the signing of the treaty and that the security of many countries, including Japan, will be enhanced," Nakayama said.

The treaty reduces for the first time the strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles of the two superpowers, limiting each to 1,600 intercontinental bombers and missiles carrying 6,000 thermonuclear charges, or roughly a 30 percent reduction in the overall size of the arsenals.

It also provides for detailed verification measures.

Officials said Japan also welcomes a separate U.S.-Soviet political declaration whereby the number of Soviet medium-range Backfire bombers would be limited to 500.

They said the Soviet Union has now produced just over 360 Backfires, some 76 of which are deployed in the Soviet Far East.

With the rate of production at about 30 Backfires a year, the number deployed in the vicinity of Japan could have increased substantially in the future if the ceiling were not in place.

"So in the long term perspective it has a positive effect," said one official.

NORTH KOREA

Daily Urges Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

SK2707090291 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting
Network in Korean 0013 GMT 27 Jul 91

[NODONG SINMUN 27 July editorial: "U.S. Imperialists Must Immediately Withdraw Nuclear Weapons and Their Aggressor Forces From South Korea"]

[Text] Today is the 38th anniversary of the historic victory won by our people in the Fatherland Liberation War. The three-year-long war, which was enforced by the U.S. imperialists and their stooges, was a rigorous war for our people, deciding the life and death of the nation.

Under the outstanding and tested leadership of the respected leader Comrade Kim Il-song—the anti-Japanese legendary hero, ever-victorious iron-willed commander, and great military strategist—our people and officers and men of the People's Army, unanimously rising in the sacred struggle to defend the fatherland and revolutionary gains, fought heroically. As a result, we inflicted disgraceful defeat upon the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their stooges by overcoming difficult trials in the war and won the historic victory in the Fatherland Liberation War.

The victory won by our people in the Fatherland Liberation War was a brilliant victory of the great military ideas and outstanding military arts of the respected leader Comrade Kim Il-song and was a great demonstration of the indomitable might of our people and People's Army who are firmly rallied behind the party and the leader.

By attaining the great victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, our people and People's Army shattered the myth about the powerfulness of the U.S. imperialists for the first time in history and opened the beginning of the U.S. imperialists' decline.

From when the boom of guns stopped in Korea to the present, our party and the Government of our Republic have made every sincere effort to turn the armistice into a durable peace and achieve the reunification of the divided fatherland.

Even in recent years, we put forward the proposal for tripartite talks, the proposal for multinational disarmament talks, the proposal for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone, the comprehensive peace proposal, and many other peace proposals. In addition, we mobilized soldiers of the People's Army in peaceful construction and took the initiative in unilaterally cutting the armed forces.

Early this year, in particular, we put forward a new epochal negotiation proposal for holding a political consultative conference for national reunification, in which delegations of the authorities, political parties, and public organizations in the North and the South will participate to reach a pan-national agreement on the method of national reunification. We are making every possible effort to realize this proposal.

The struggle for peace and peaceful reunification of the country has been persistently waged among the South Korean people and overseas compatriots.

Today the movement for national reunification has become a torrential trend of the nation which no one can block and halt.

However, the desire of our people for durable peace and the peaceful reunification of the nation has not been realized up to now and peace on the Korean peninsula is threatened more gravely with each passing day.

This is attributed to the U.S. imperialists' occupation of South Korea, to the policy of aggression, and to the antipeace and antireunification maneuvers of the South Korean puppets.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: Because of new war provocation maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and South Korean military fascist elements, today our country's situation has been strained to an extreme point and our nation is in a dangerous situation in which a war may break out any moment.

With the ambition to invade the northern half of the Republic and the Asian continent by using South Korea as a steppingstone, the U.S. imperialists are reinforcing the aggressor forces in South Korea and more undisguisedly perpetrating new war provocation maneuvers.

Today South Korea has been reduced to the largest U.S. nuclear advance base in the Far East, which is filled with more than 1,000 nuclear weapons and their delivery means. The U.S. imperialists and the puppets have drawn up a northward nuclear war plan and are staging a large-scale military exercise each year to complete the preparations for nuclear war, thus instigating war frenzy in South Korea.

The 'Team Spirit' joint military exercise, which the U.S. imperialists and the puppets stage every year across South Korea in defiance of the strong protest and denunciation of the people at home and abroad, is a preliminary war and test nuclear war designed to launch a surprise attack on the northern half of our Republic.

In particular, even after the 'Team Spirit' war exercise this year, the U.S. imperialists dragged strategic bombers and fighter-bombers into South Korea from overseas bases of aggression and each day are playing with fire in their attempts to make a surprise attack on our frontline and rear areas. They are also repeatedly committing grave military provocations on the Military Demarcation Line [MDL].

Furthermore, the U.S. imperialists, who became more arrogant through the Persian Gulf war, are running amok with groundless smear propaganda against us to find an excuse for a new war on the Korean peninsula. They undisguisedly launch even the nuclear threat and menace.

As has been known, the U.S. imperialists raved that the area in which the danger of conflict is greatest in the world after the Persian Gulf area is the Korean peninsula. They have even drawn up a war scenario and are frantically running amok with anti-Republic maneuvers on the ridiculous pretext of someone else's nonexistent development of nuclear weapons.

The puppet military heads even made absurd remarks that they will make a surprise attack on nuclear facilities in the North. This clearly shows that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are attempting to continuously deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea using us as a pretext to further accelerate the preparations for nuclear war and provoke a new northward nuclear aggressive war under the signboards of peace by repeatedly staging smear and slanderous propaganda.

To carry out the criminal two Koreas policy and war policy, the U.S. imperialists are implementing the most vicious military fascist rule in South Korea.

Under the U.S. imperialists' instigation, the No Tae-u military fascist clique even refused to adopt a North-South nonaggression declaration and are pursuing confrontation with us. While implementing the fascist security-oriented rule, the No Tae-u group is brutally repressing and massacring the South Korean youths, students, and people who rose in the just struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification by labeling them as pro-leftist and pro-communist forces.

In particular, the South Korean puppets raved that they would not allow the '91 pannational rally and the great reunification festival of youths and students—which have been prepared amid the interest of the entire nation—and indiscriminately arrested and imprisoned figures of related organizations including the Pannational Alliance for National Reunification and National Council of University Student Representatives.

This shows that the remarks about the great reunification march and so forth, loudly talked about by the No Tae-u group, are another political drama designed to rupture the '91 pannational rally and great reunification festival of youths and students and that the No Tae-u group has only the ambition for reunification through victory over communists and through North-South confrontation and war.

As long as U.S. imperialist aggressor forces remain in South Korea and continue to stage war maneuvers and as long as the No Tae-u group's fascist murderous rule continues, durable peace on the Korean peninsula cannot be guaranteed, the national sovereignty of the South Korean people and democracy cannot be realized, and the nation's reunification cannot be achieved.

Today the dark clouds of nuclear war hang heavy over the Korean peninsula and a dangerous situation in which nuclear war may break out even by an accident has been created.

This situation evokes the great concern of all Korean people who desire national reunification and the world's people who aspire to peace.

It is an urgent demand, which should not be delayed any longer, to prevent the danger of war and guarantee peace. To ease tension on the Korean peninsula, to realize durable peace, and to provide a turn favorable to the peaceful reunification, a peace agreement should be concluded between us and the United States, who are the very parties directly related to the armistice agreement; a non-aggression declaration should be adopted between the North and the South; and the Korean peninsula should be turned into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

The U.S. imperialists should discard the anachronistic and adventurous nuclear war commotions and conclude a peace agreement with us. They should immediately withdraw aggressor forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea.

If the South Korean authorities truly want peace and reunification, they should give up antinational maneuvers to drive fellow countrymen into nuclear calamity and call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons. They should discard the policy of anticommunist and

anti-North confrontation and suspend repressing the patriotic reunification figures. They should step forth onto the road of cooperation so that the second pannational rally and the great reunification festival of the youth and students can be held successfully.

Those who should prevent nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and achieve the peaceful reunification are none other than our people ourselves. No one else can bring peace and reunification to our people. Peace and reunification should be achieved only through our people's united strength.

The South Korean youths, students, and people from all walks of life should not have any illusion about the U.S. imperialists and the No Tae-u group but should firmly unite. They should more persistently wage the struggle to force the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons to withdraw from South Korea, to end the fascist security-oriented rule, and to achieve peace and reunification of the nation.

The U.S. imperialists and their stooges will get weak-kneed [maek motchuda] in the presence of all the Korean people in the North, the South, and overseas if they rise in the struggle to check and frustrate the reckless nuclear war provocation maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and the No Tae-u group, to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone, and to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of the nation.

During the period of anti-U.S. joint struggle month this year, a broad range of the people of the world condemned and denounced the new war provocation maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and the puppets and extended active support and encouragement to our people's just struggle for peace and reunification of the nation.

With the support and encouragement from peaceloving people of the world, our people will, in the future too, more vigorously carry out the sacred struggle to ensure durable peace on the Korean peninsula and to defend peace in Asia and in the world.

It is the firm will of the Korean people to achieve the reunification of the divided country in the nineties without fail by preventing war and maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.

Let us all vigorously march and fight to expedite the national reunification in firm unity with the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il by removing the danger of war casting a shadow over the Korean peninsula and by ensuring peace.

Foreign Ministry on Nuclear-Free Zone Proposal

Text of Statement

SK3007004991 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 2200 GMT 29 Jul 91

[Statement by the DPRK Foreign Affairs Ministry in regard to the DPRK Government's new proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula]

[Text] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK:

Mankind's attention at the present time has been focused on reducing nuclear weapons, removing their danger, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the earth. Because of the enormous nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and their dangerous nature, the Korean peninsula has become a global focus.

The international reaction to the joint statement issued recently by political parties and public organizations of the DPRK vividly shows the concerns of the peace-loving people of the world about the growing nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula and their aspirations for denuclearization in this region.

Changes have taken place in the situation in many regions of the world today. However, only on the Korean peninsula has the situation been further aggravated, instead of being alleviated. This is totally because of the U.S. policy of nuclear threat against us and the existence of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea not only have become a grave threat to the survival of our people, but also greatly endanger peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

Proceeding from the sacred desire to remove the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and to contribute to maintaining a durable peace in our country, Asia, and the rest of the world, the DPRK Government has already put forward peace proposals, including a proposal for establishing a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula, and it has made all possible sincere efforts for their realization.

Today's rapidly changing situation has defined the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as a mature [songsuk daen] requirement that should no longer be delayed. Today's reality, where major nuclear-weapon-possessing countries—that thus far have made the Korean peninsula the operational area for their nuclear confrontation—are shifting from confrontation to cooperation by reaching an agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons, has created a new objective possibility that can make the Korean peninsula a zone devoid of nuclear weapons.

The United States recently has clarified its stand that it will not oppose, in principle, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone as far as the countries concerned agree. It has also expressed support for the proposals for establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

We believe that if the United States and the South Korean authorities unselfishly respond to our peace proposals and join our sincere efforts and the trend of the times to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula can be completely removed.

With such expectation and firm conviction the DPRK Government puts forward the following new proposals for the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula:

1. The North and the South of Korea should agree to establish and jointly declare a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

The North and the South should negotiate all legal and practical issues in connection with turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. Thus, we claim that, no later than the end of 1992, the North and the South should adopt a joint declaration which has a legal validity.

We stress that included in the joint statement should be a ban on the North and the South experimenting, producing, and possessing nuclear weapons; a ban on the North and the South deploying or introducing nuclear weapons within the nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula; a ban on the North and the South conducting military exercise in the zone; and verification of the nuclear-free situation through inspection of nuclear weapons in the North and the South.

2. The United States, and the Soviet Union and China, which are nuclear weapon possession states in the neighborhood of the Korean peninsula, should legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and a declaration adopted.

Above all, those countries, which possess nuclear weapons, should not prevent the Korean peninsula from being turned into a nuclear-free zone and should express their readiness to guarantee the status of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. By so doing, they should accelerate the process of establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, those countries, which possess nuclear weapons, within a year after the North and the South of Korea jointly declare the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, should guarantee the removal of all factors contravening the status of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. In addition, they should promise not to use nuclear weapons according to the demand of international law and not threaten the Korean peninsula with nuclear weapons.

In particular, the United States, as the party responsible for deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea, should take a measure to withdraw its nuclear weapons in accordance with the demand of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

3. Those Asian countries, which do not possess nuclear weapons, should support the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and should respect its status.

The DPRK Government, to negotiate establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, is ready to hold bilateral or multilateral negotiations at any time.

This proposal has important meaning in removing a nuclear threat against us and in strengthening a nuclear

nonproliferation system on the Korean peninsula. In addition, this proposal will practically make a contribution to consolidating peace and security in Asia and the world.

If a nuclear-free zone is established on the Korean peninsula, a phase favorable for establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Northeast Asian district will be created, thus a base capable of expanding a nuclear-free zone to Northeast Asia will be laid.

The DPRK Government solemnly declares at home and abroad that, proceeding from its antinuclear and peace-loving policy, the DPRK is entirely ready to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

30 July, 1991 Pyongyang

Charge d'Affaires in China Comments

SK3007150091 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1300 GMT 30 Jul 91*

[Text] Concerning the publication of the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement which contained a new proposal for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, our country's embassy in China held a news conference today.

Attending the news conference were Chinese reporters from newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting stations, as well as foreign correspondents based in Beijing.

Pae Yong-chae, charge d'affaires of the DPRK Embassy in China, spoke at the news conference.

Stating that attention is focused on reducing nuclear weapons on earth, on removing their danger, and on preventing their proliferation, he said: Because of about 1,700 units of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and their danger, the Korean peninsula is the focus of global attention.

Although changes have occurred in the situation in many places throughout the world, the situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming more strained instead of becoming stable. This is entirely thanks to the U.S. policy of threatening us with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea are a serious threat to our people's survival and, at the same time, pose a great danger to peace and stability in Asia and the whole world.

The DPRK Government has long proposed a host of peace proposals, including one for creating a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula, out of a noble desire to remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula and contribute to durable peace and stability in our country, Asia, and the world. It has been making every sincere effort possible to realize this.

Today's changing situation makes the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula a pressing demand which cannot be postponed any longer.

We think that if the United States and the South Korean authorities accept our peace proposal impartially and join in our serious effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a

nuclear-free zone, and if they join the current trends, we will be able to rid the Korean peninsula of the source of the danger of a nuclear war.

After introducing the contents of the new proposal put forward by the DPRK in the Foreign Ministry statement for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, he stressed: Our new proposal is a just proposal, proceeding as it does from a desire to completely remove from the Korean peninsula the elements of nuclear threat that are related to the survival of our people according to the aspirations of human beings whose attention is riveted on the international trends toward arms reduction and the creation of nuclear-free zones.

At the same time, this proposal is significant in removing the nuclear threat to us and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system on the Korean peninsula. Going one step further, it will contribute practically to consolidating peace and stability in Asia and the whole world.

If and when the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula is realized, it will lead to a phase favorable to creating a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia, and a base capable of expanding a nuclear-free zone into the Northeast Asia will be laid.

He then stated that the DPRK Government, proceeding from its own antinuclear peace policy, is ready to take every step necessary to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

After that, he answered reporters' questions.

Attitude of U.S. Toward Denuclearization Viewed

SK3107034291 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0022 GMT 31 Jul 91*

[NODONG SINMUN 31 July commentary: "Realistic Proposal for Denuclearization"]

[Text] Proceeding from its sincere desire to remove the daily-increasing danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, the DPRK Government on 30 July put forward in the form of a Foreign Ministry statement a new proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Our new proposal includes most reasonable and realistic measures for basically removing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula can be realized only through the joint efforts of the North and the South. This cannot be consolidated without legal guarantee by the United States and the nuclear weapons states neighboring the Korean peninsula.

Thus, the new proposal put forward by the Government of the Republic includes the North and the South of Korea agreeing on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and making a joint declaration thereof; the United States, and the Soviet Union and China, the nuclear weapons states neighboring the Korean peninsula, legally guaranteeing the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and a declaration adopted to this effect; and the nonnuclear weapons states

in Asia supporting the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and respecting its nuclear-free status.

The Government of our Republic has declared that it is ready to hold bilateral and multilateral negotiations at any time to discuss establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

Our current proposal reflects the antinuclear, peace-loving position of the Government of our Republic and our people to permanently remove the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula by realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula at an early date and to rescue mankind from the nuclear threat.

Today, the Korean peninsula is seen by the world as presenting the greatest danger of a nuclear war throughout the world. The colossal numbers of nuclear weapons deployed by the United States on the soil of South Korea are ready to vomit fire against our Republic and other Asian nations.

If a nuclear war breaks out in Korea, it will inflict grave disaster not only on our people, but the Asian people. Guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula by removing the danger of a nuclear war is not only a vital question related to our people's destiny, but a most urgent demand for guaranteeing peace and security in Asia.

Proceeding from its noble desire to contribute to the cause of peace on the Korean peninsula and in Asia, the Government of our Republic has already put forward a series of peace proposals including the proposal for establishing a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula, and made every sincere effort toward achievement.

This notwithstanding, the United States and the South Korean authorities have ignored all our peace proposals, increased nuclear arms in South Korea, and strengthened their nuclear-threat policy against us.

Despite changes in the situation in different parts of the world, the situation continues to be aggravated—far from being alleviated—on the Korean peninsula and the danger of a nuclear war constantly is increasing.

Thus, the Government of our Republic again put forward a new realistic proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The proposal of our Republic is of great significance in removing the nuclear threat against us and in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation system on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, this proposal will substantively contribute to guaranteeing durable peace and security in Asia and the world.

Our new proposal is a fair and just proposal which can be accepted by all of the concerned parties who are responsible for realizing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

If the South Korean authorities truly want to strive for the nation's security and peace, they should immediately respond to our proposal. The United States has recently

taken the position basically not to oppose the establishment of a nuclear-free zone with the condition that the relevant parties reach agreement and has expressed its support for the proposal to establish nuclear-free zones in a series of areas.

Under these circumstances, the United States has no reason and excuse not to respond to our new proposal. The question depends on the attitude of the United States and the South Korean authorities.

The United States and the South Korean authorities should respond to our new proposal for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and should take steps for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea. We will in the future, too, exert all effort for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and will closely watch the attitude of the United States and the South Korean authorities.

Embassy in Moscow on Denuclearization Proposal

SK0108045191 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1300 GMT 31 Jul 91

[Text] A news conference was held at our embassy in the Soviet Union on 30 July in connection with the statement of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs pertaining to a new proposal for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Respectfully placed on the forefront of the news conference site was a portrait of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song.

The news conference was attended by Soviet reporters and pertinent functionaries from the Soviet Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

Yi Tu-yol, charge d'affaires ad interim of our country to the Soviet Union, spoke.

In referring to the motive of the Foreign Ministry's statement pertaining to the DPRK Government's new proposal for denuclearization that was released on 30 July in Pyongyang he said: The trend of detente has appeared in many regions of the world today. However, only on the Korean peninsula has it not appeared. Today's situation on the Korean peninsula has been further aggravated, instead of being alleviated. This is totally because of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and the U.S. nuclear threat against our country. The international reaction to the joint statement issued recently by DPRK political parties and public organizations vividly shows the concerns of the peace-loving people of the world about the growing nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula and their aspirations for denuclearization in this region.

In saying that today's changing international situation has defined the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as a requirement which should not be delayed, he continued:

That major nuclear-weapon-possessing countries—which have made the Korean peninsula the operational area for their nuclear confrontation—are advancing, shifting from confrontation to cooperation, has created a new objective possibility for the Korean peninsula to be made into a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union and the United

States, which are major nuclear powers of the world, have already abolished short-range and shorter-range missiles, and, according to a report, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will be signed in the Soviet-U.S. summit talks which are now being held in Moscow. This fact shows that there is no ground whatsoever for them to oppose the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula. In a statement, the Soviet Union has already declared that it will become a country which guarantees denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The United States has recently assumed the position of not opposing the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula on condition that the countries concerned reach an agreement. The United States has also expressed support for the proposals on establishing nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

The demands of all of the Korean people in the North and the South for denuclearization are surging unprecedentedly, and the South Korean authorities, as well, have expressed interest in the matter of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula to some extent [onuchongdo]. Such being the situation, we believe that if the United States and the South Korean authorities unselfishly accept our peace proposals and join our sincere efforts and the trend of the times to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, it will be possible to eliminate the source of the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

In saying that the DPRK Government has offered a new proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with this precise expectation and firm conviction, he introduced the content of the proposal.

In conclusion, he expressed the expectation that the Soviet publication and press circles will actively introduce the DPRK Government's new proposal for denuclearization and express support for it.

A question and answer session followed the news conference.

Committee in Japan Views Nuclear-Free Proposal

*SK0208053491 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0446 GMT 2 Aug 91*

[Text] Tokyo, August 1 (KNS-KCNA)—The Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon) issued a statement on July 31 concerning the new proposal of the DPRK Government to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

The statement says the situation on the Korean peninsula has not been eased and the danger of nuclear war is increasing now entirely because the United States is persisting in its policy of nuclear threat against the Korean people and refusing to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

It goes on:

We strongly demand that the United States and the South Korean authorities adopt a disinterested attitude toward

the new proposal of the DPRK Government and take steps for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula without delay.

The South Korean authorities should approach with sincerity the proposal that the North and the South agree to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and adopt and publish a joint declaration.

We also consider that the United States, and the Soviet Union and China, the nuclear weapon states neighbouring on the Korean peninsula, should legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and a declaration is adopted to this effect and thus stimulate the process of establishing a nuclear-free zone.

Especially, the United States, the party which has deployed its nuclear weapons in South Korea, must take measures to withdraw these weapons in conformity with the requirement of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

It is self-evident that as long as there exists the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula, the Asian people including the Japanese cannot be safe and a nuclear holocaust on the Korean peninsula will sweep the Asian region.

We believe that the peaceloving people in Asia and the rest of the world including the Japanese people will lift up loud voices of solidarity for an early denuclearization of the Korean peninsula out of the common desire for denuclearization and peace.

U.S. Informed of Denuclearization Plan in China

*SK0308045691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0442 GMT 3 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 3 (KCNA)—Recalling that a statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry envisages that the United States and the nuclear weapons states neighboring on the Korean peninsula shall legally guarantee the nuclear-free status as soon as the North and the South of Korea declare the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone through agreement, a KCNA [Korean Central News Agency] reporter asked an official concerned of the DPRK Foreign Ministry on August 2 about the channel through which this proposal was made to the United States.

The official answered:

The DPRK Embassy in Beijing on July 30 had a contact with the United States at councillor-level and transferred to the U.S. side the statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry containing the new proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

At the contact our side outlined the main content of the statement and expressed the willingness of the DPRK Government to negotiate this matter with the U.S. Government, hoping that the U.S. Government would pay a serious attention to our new proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

USSR Supports Korean Denuclearization Proposal*SK0308044591 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0426 GMT 3 Aug 91*

[Text] Moscow, August 1 (KCNA)—Vitaliy Churkin, a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, speaking before newsmen here on August 1, manifested support of the Soviet Union to the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, according to a TASS report.

He said the Soviet Union supports the initiative taken by the DPRK Government on July 30 and considers that this can be an object of debate between the parties concerned.

The Soviet Union, a nuclear weapon state, is ready to join other nuclear states in guaranteeing the status of nuclear-free zone once an agreement on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is reached and declared, he stated.

Noting that nuclear safety on the Korean peninsula is a very urgent question because the military and political confrontation has not yet been removed and the obvious saturation of armed forces and weapons is observed there, he said to turn the Korean peninsula into a zone without mass destruction weapons will be helpful to removing mutual distrust between the two sides of Korea, making the situation in Korea healthy as a whole and strengthening the international order concerning nuclear weapons.

Vietnam Supports Denuclearization Proposal*SK0308044291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0422 GMT 3 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 3 (KCNA)—Vietnam supports the proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula clarified in the July 30 statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said Ho The Lan, spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam at a press conference on August 1.

It will be beneficial to strengthening peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia as a whole, she stressed.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Statement on START**Calls Treaty 'Significant Step'***SK0408145191 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting
Network in Korean 1300 GMT 4 Aug 91*

[Statement issued by DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the USSR on 4 Aug—read by announcer]

[Text] According to a report, it has been said that the leaders of the USSR and the United States signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] on 31 July at the Kremlin in Moscow. As the first treaty for a reduction in strategic arms, it is a significant step in the course of overall nuclear disarmament.

Through the course of nine years of talks between the USSR and United States, it was a goal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent. However, it was agreed to reduce strategic arms by 30 percent ultimately. Thus, the world pays attention to this.

The government of our Republic hopes that this treaty, which will play a role in reducing strategic and offensive weapons, will, without fail, be linked to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, which are increasingly dangerous and destructive for the future.

The USSR and the United States signed the START treaty this time. This is a treaty creating an objective possibility [kaegkwanjok kanungsong] for the realization of the expectations and aspirations of the world's peace-loving people who want to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

The United States has deployed more than 1,000 nuclear weapons in South Korea. This is a direct product of the period of nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Therefore, it is a more mature demand to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone today at a time when the USSR and the United States have signed a nuclear disarmament treaty and when the nuclear confrontation has been eased.

Recently, the government of our Republic, proceeding from its policy against nuclear weapons and for peace, announced at home and abroad that it was ready to take all necessary steps for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

The government of our Republic thinks that the conclusion of the START treaty between the USSR and the United States this time will be a positive opportunity for preparing the bilateral or multilateral talks for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

4 Aug 1991, Pyongyang

Hopes START Will Aid Korean NFZ*SK0508045491 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0400 GMT 5 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 4 (KCNA)—The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] signed by the heads of state of the Soviet Union and the United States is a significant measure in the process of overall nuclear disarmament as the START treaty on reduction of strategic weapons.

A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said this in a statement issued to the press on August today. [sentence as received]

The world pays attention to the fact that the target of strategic arms reduction by 50 percent set at the beginning of the negotiations which both the Soviet Union and the United States have held more than nine years was reduced to 30 percent at the final phase, the statement pointed out, and went on:

The government of our Republic hopes that the treaty on reduction of strategic offensive weapons will surely lead to the complete dismantlement of most dangerous and destructive nuclear weapons.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States creates one more objective possibility to realise the expectation and desire of the world peaceloving people for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

As the deployment of 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in South Korea by the United States is a direct product in the period of nuclear showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula has become a more matured demand today when the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed and nuclear showdown is being relaxed.

The government of our Republic solemnly declared to the world recently that proceeding from its antinuke peace-loving policy, it is ready to take all necessary measures to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

The government of our Republic considers that the signing of the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms reduction treaty will mark a positive occasion in arranging bilateral or multilateral negotiations for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

U.S. Middle East Arms Proposal Called 'Unjust'

*SK0408090791 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0826 GMT 4 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 4 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today carries a commentary laying bare the unjustness of the U.S. "Mideast arms control overture".

The keynote of the "overture" is that the development, production and introduction of mass destruction weapons in the Mideast countries should be halted at once and the sales of conventional weapons to this region be restricted gradually.

The news analyst says:

If things go as proposed by the United States, Israel will not be affected at all by this as she has the biggest arsenal of mass destruction weapons in the Middle East and these weapons will remain a source of permanent threat to other countries in the Middle East.

This will naturally lead the region to an arms race to possess more conventional weapons.

We are supporting disarmament in the Mideast region, that is, the solution favored by all the Mideast countries and not a unilateral and self-righteous proposal for disarmament, the commentary observes.

Recalling that the United States recently claimed it does not oppose in principle the proposal for establishing nuclear-free zones in South Asia and Africa and brought forward the "Mideast arms control overture" and is trying to carry it into effect, the commentary queries why the United States ignores the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

The reason is that the United States is afraid of lining the question of denuclearising the Korean peninsula with more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. If the United States wants to convince the

world people of the truth of the "Mideast arms control overture", it should take a practical step for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

SOUTH KOREA

Removal of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Debated

U.S. Concerns With Japan

*912C0228A Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
4 May 91 p 5*

[Article by Mun Chang-kuk and Pang In-chol: "Extraordinary U.S., Japanese Concerns Over the Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] Editor's note: Controversies over the nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula have markedly intensified lately as arguments about the North Korean nuclear weapons development program have expanded to involve the nuclear weapons of the U.S. Forces in Korea [USFK], making it an issue. While the U.S. Government and public are showing extraordinary concern about this issue, Japanese and French newspapers reported that U.S. and Soviet authorities are conducting secret negotiations on removing the U.S. nuclear arms from Korea to get North Korea to halt its own nuclear weapons development. The following are reports on Washington's position and Tokyo's view on the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. [end editor's note]

A media debate is under way on withdrawing the USFK tactical nuclear weapons as a means of preventing North Korea from developing its own nuclear weapons. The debate is drawing public attention.

After the Japanese newspaper NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN reported that the United States and the Soviet Union have been conducting secret negotiations on the withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons since last year, the French paper LE MONDE reported that the United States is considering removing its nuclear arms from Korea on the condition of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Concerning the North Korean nuclear weapons development program, Washington has so far been leading an international effort to put pressure on North Korea under the policy of resolving the issue diplomatically.

However, in the wake of the Gulf war, while the diplomatic effort failed to produce results, the Korean peninsula was highlighted as a region with the greatest danger of conflict and, as a result, the North Korean nuclear weapons program began drawing more and more international attention.

Analyses available indicate that the lesson of the Gulf War made North Korea skeptical about the effectiveness of its military forces armed with Soviet weapons, and that as a result, North Korea now clings to its nuclear weapons development program even more persistently. Some insist that the North Korean nuclear weapons program not only poses a direct threat to the ROK but also is likely to neutralize the effect of the USFK tactical nuclear weapons as a war deterrent.

They are concerned that this will increase the possibility of Japan and the ROK—currently under the U.S. nuclear umbrella—beginning their own nuclear weapons programs in haste, compelling Washington to fundamentally alter its whole concept about Northeast Asian security.

Furthermore, as ROK National Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku said, it could also create a situation in which a surprise attack on the North Korean nuclear facilities by the ROK military forces cannot be ruled out. If things should develop that way, the Korean peninsula could be drawn into the vortex of war.

After all, the best thing is to get North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons program. It refuses to cooperate, however, and therein lies the problem for the countries concerned.

The United States is trying to talk North Korea into cooperation, on the condition of improvement in the U.S. and Japanese relations with it. Even the Soviet Union came to its assistance but the U.S. effort has so far produced no specific results.

Therefore, U.S. academics and government institutes came forward with suggestions that accepting the North Korean demand and withdrawing the USFK tactical nuclear weapons from Korea could be a way to break the deadlock.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, in a 16 April editorial dealing with nuclear weapons on and in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula, wrote that a partial withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons could be a way to allay the North Korean misgivings. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL also carried an article suggesting removal of the U.S. ground forces' nuclear weapons from Korea.

Also, U.S. political leaders including Rep. Solarz, chairman of the House East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, have long been suggesting denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Administration has not officially responded to this debate as yet.

Based on its policy of "neither confirming nor denying" as far as the presence of nuclear weapons is concerned, the United States keeps mum on whether or not the USFK have nuclear weapons.

It was confirmed indirectly, however, that Washington does not see the idea of denuclearization as convincing.

Also, some insist that when the Soviet Union and China adjacent to the Korean peninsula are armed with their nuclear weapons, it is meaningless to make the Korean peninsula alone nuclear-free.

Their position is that if a perfect denuclearization is to be attained on the Korean peninsula, the United States is required to withdraw all its nuclear arms from Northeast Asia. In that case, they emphasize, there will be no way to protect Japan against the Chinese and Soviet nuclear threat.

In fact, Japan itself adheres to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles of "not making, not possessing and not using nuclear weapons."

However, the United States, which defends Japan with its strategic nuclear weapons operated by the naval and air forces, finds it inevitable for that nuclear weapons strategy in the region to suffer a setback should the Korean peninsula be denuclearized.

Therefore, Washington holds on to the policy viewing the Korean peninsula denuclearization plan pushed by the Soviet Union and North Korea as unacceptable.

According to a different assessment, the United States cannot afford to completely rule out the possibility of considering a more limited question, namely, removal of the USFK tactical nuclear weapons, to get North Korea to halt its own nuclear weapons development program.

This assessment, discussed mostly in the United States, is based on a judgment that it could be possible to apply to the Korean peninsula the same nuclear weapons strategy relying on the naval and air forces that is currently applied to Japan, and that if so, the nuclear weapons currently assigned to the ground forces could possibly be removed.

However, in this case, too, there is a difficulty—that is, since the U.S. policy is not to acknowledge the existence of nuclear weapons, Washington cannot officially announce that it is removing the ground forces' nuclear arms; consequently, it is in no position to negotiate with North Korea on it.

In addition, there is no guarantee that North Korea will halt its nuclear weapons program.

Therefore, it is feared that the ROK and Japan will feel compelled to begin their own nuclear weapons programs, making nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia inevitable.

In the absence of a reliable guarantee that North Korea will not develop its nuclear weapons, the United States finds it not an easy thing to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula.

Washington will likely continue to apply diplomatic pressure on North Korea for the time being under the policy of viewing the question of North Korea joining the international nuclear safety pact and the question of the USFK nuclear weapons as problems of entirely different dimensions and allowing no linkage between them.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Government and public are even more concerned about the North Korean nuclear weapons program than the ROK. While showing their profound apprehension, they are endeavoring to bring the North Korean program to a halt.

During his talks with President Gorbachev, who visited Japan last month, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, explaining developments on the Korean peninsula, made references to the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Also, reflecting his positive stance on the issue, a Japan-USSR joint communique stated that the two countries

"wish that North Korea would sign the international nuclear safety pact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)."

Furthermore, Jushiro Komiyama, Lower House member who is currently visiting North Korea as the leader of the Japanese delegation to the IPU (Interparliamentary Union) session, met with Kim Il-song in the capacity of a senior delegate. At this meeting, Komiyama twice asked Kim "Don't you think North Korea should accept the IAEA nuclear inspection?" to embarrass the North Korean side.

Japan is extremely nervous about the suspicion that North Korea is developing its nuclear weapons. The reasons are: 1) It is the only country in the world that has experienced an atomic bombing; 2) if North Korea should develop its nuclear weapons, Japan would come within their range; 3) if there is any radioactive fallout from a North Korean nuclear accident, it could cause direct damage to Japan.

It is said that in fact, Japanese authorities have been aware since the mid-1980's of the possibility of North Korea having nuclear bombs by 1994-95.

However, it is known that Washington sent several defense intelligence and nuclear experts to Japan in the late October-early November period last year with more than 10 photographs from a U.S. military reconnaissance satellite proving that "the North Korean nuclear weapons development program has entered its final phase," and that Japanese Foreign Ministry and other officials have since been perceiving it as a "burning issue."

Japanese intelligence sources are also paying attention to the fact that North Koreans frequently make remarks admitting their nuclear weapons development program as a fact.

On 3 September last year, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam stated in a memorandum made public after his talks with former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: "If the Soviet Union establishes diplomatic relations with South Korea, we will take measures to make on our own some of the weapons for which we have been depending on the alliance." Subsequently, a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent in a dispatch from Pyongyang—carried in the Soviet newspaper dated 29 November—reported that Kim Yong-nam had admitted that the "weapons to be made on our own" meant nuclear weapons.

Thus, as the possibility of North Korea having nuclear weapons emerged as a "real threat," the Japanese Defense Agency, the Public Security Investigation Agency [PSIA] and other government organizations grew extremely sensitive to the ROK's response as well as the North Korean move.

The PSIA in its 1991 "Report on the Domestic and International Situations" observed that North Korea will not easily agree to an IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities because it intends to use the issue as "a trump card for negotiations with the United States." A PSIA source noted that "the North Korean nuclear weapons

development program is pushing the ROK into undertaking its nuclear weapons program." He appeared to be more concerned about the possibility that the ROK, which prevails over North Korea in economic strength, can develop its nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so.

Japan is apprehensive that if this situation should result in a domino phenomenon and nuclear weapons development spreads throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the tension in the region will increase rapidly and, possibly turn it into a "post-Gulf War powder keg."

In this connection, Japan pins its hopes on the "U.S.-USSR secret negotiations on removing the USFK nuclear weapons" as reported by NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN on 2 May, as a way to head off such a nuclear domino phenomenon.

However, the Soviet ability to persuade North Korea has a limitation because North Korea has been saying at every opportunity that "the nuclear inspection issue is a U.S.-North Korean issue"; in addition, North Korea has been using the "nuclear trump card" for negotiations on disarmament including withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean peninsula. Under these circumstances, some experts express skepticism over the effectiveness of the reported secret negotiations, noting that this is no time for the United States to be the first to propose the withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons.

Inasmuch as the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union all share the same concerns about the highly possible North Korean development of its nuclear weapons, seeing it as a threatening time bomb, there is every indication that Japan as a potential victim will grow increasingly more sensitive than us as time goes by. Consequently, the North Korean nuclear weapons program will very likely become a stumbling block with a potentially serious impact on Japan's normalization talks with North Korea.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal Discussed

912C0228B Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
3 May 91 p 5

[Article by Pae Chong-kun: "Great Impact Upon the Peripheral Countries of the Korean Peninsula Possible"]

[Text] If it is true that the United States and the Soviet Union entered secret negotiations on the removal of the USFK [U.S. Forces Korea] nuclear weapons from Korea as reported by NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN on 2 May, it is clearly an "important development" with an immense impact on the overall situation surrounding the Korean peninsula.

The reason is that if the withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons should become a reality, it would inevitably have direct consequences to the North Korea-Japan normalization and North Korea-U.S. rapprochement moves as well as North-South Korea relations.

The U.S.-USSR discussion of the USFK nuclear weapons, as reported by the Japanese media, can be viewed as a

strategic move responding to, and seeking to bring to a halt, the North Korean nuclear weapons development program.

The United States and its Western allies—which used halting Iraq's nuclear weapons development as a major justification of the Gulf War—pointed their finger at North Korea as a potentially nuclear-capable country after the Gulf War and began putting diplomatic pressure on it to accept the IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Based on the common understanding that they do not want to see a new military conflict occur on the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union and China, too, are against North Korea's nuclear weapons development. The NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN report pointed out that behind the U.S.-USSR secret negotiations is the judgment that a nuclear-armed North Korea would make the Soviet Union and China lose their military influence on the Kim Il-song government, prompt the ROK to develop its nuclear weapons, and create a crisis situation on the Korean peninsula when Kim Il-song dies.

In this connection, China and the Soviet Union have been insisting that in order to prevent North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons, the USFK nuclear weapons must be removed simultaneously. Based on that argument, the Soviet Union proposed denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

These proposals have found a favorable response in the United States. In February, the ROK-U.S. Relations Committee, comprising prominent scholars in the two countries (ROK cochairman: former ambassador to Washington Kim Kyong-won) made an unprecedented open proposal for removing the USFK nuclear weapons from Korea. THE NEW YORK TIMES also carried a substantively similar editorial.

Their position is that the ROK now has the defense capability to deter North Korean provocations even without the help of the nuclear umbrella, and that for preventing an isolated North Korea from creating increased tension on the Korean peninsula, too, the withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons is called for.

It is a fact that the USFK nuclear weapons are for a more symbolic than tactical purpose. It can be expected that their removal will first of all contribute positively to the domestic situation and North-South relations. The fact that the nuclear weapons that can bring a catastrophe to the Korean peninsula are being managed by the U.S. military has been a factor of the rising anti-U.S. sentiment in the ROK. North Korea has also been demanding the withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons as a major precondition for better North-South relations.

Therefore, if the United States removes the USFK nuclear weapons, it will in effect relieve the ROK Government of a heavy burden, namely, the obstacle impeding its free pursuit of policy in various fields.

Internationally, it will very likely create a new turning point for U.S.-North Korea relations. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN foresees the possibility of the United States and North Korea entering direct negotiations by the good

offices of the Soviet Union should the negotiations on the USFK nuclear weapons produce results.

North Korea has long held a strong desire for better relations with the United States. It has been in unofficial contact with U.S. officials in Beijing since last year. In these contacts, it strongly demanded that the U.S. side upgrade the contacts from the working level to an ambassadorial level.

Washington recently suspended these contacts, ostensibly for reasons relating to the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Therefore, it appears that North Korea will positively respond to proposals for bilateral talks on nuclear weapons and withdrawal of the USFK.

Furthermore, the withdrawal of the USFK nuclear weapons will probably work as a catalyst to powerfully accelerate the North Korea-Japan normalization talks which currently are facing hard sailing.

Japan has been procrastinating on the normalization talks as a result of the U.S. and ROK pressure for it to withhold normalization until North Korea accepts obligation under the nuclear safety agreement.

In the final analysis, the possibility is great of all these developments leading up to a cross recognition of North and South Korea by the four big powers with interests on the Korean peninsula.

However, this possibility is only conceivable under the premise that the United States removes the USFK nuclear weapons and, at the same time, North Korea accepts obligation under the nuclear safety pact. The reason is that considering the current cooperative mood between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is doubtful whether Washington will get to deciding to withdraw all the USFK nuclear weapons, and that it is difficult to predict how North Korea—demanding not only the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons but assurances of nonuse on nuclear weapons as well—will respond.

Response to North's Proposal for Nuclear-Free Korea

Official Sees 'Nothing New'

SK3007124991 Seoul YONHAP in English 1211 GMT 30 Jul 91

[Text] Seoul, July 30 (YONHAP)—A South Korean Government official said Tuesday that North Korea's latest proposal for the declaration of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula guaranteed by neighboring big powers had nothing new in its basic context despite its unusual concreteness.

He pointed out that North Korea again dwelled on their conventional call for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear arms from South Korea. His comment came a few hours after the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced the proposal through Pyongyang's media.

The official hinted at possible refusal by Seoul of the denuclearization proposal by saying, "North Korea should

sign the nuclear safeguards agreement and accept outside inspection of its nuclear installations before coming out with such a proposal."

He said, "There is no change in the basic position of the South Korean Government that proposals for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula would be meaningless under the present situation in which neighboring big powers are armed with nuclear weapons."

Meanwhile, representatives of related government agencies, including the Presidential Office, Board of National Unification, Foreign and Defense Ministries, and Agency for National Security Planning, met later Tuesday and reviewed the new North Korean proposal.

Presidential Statement at UN Considered

*SK3007014091 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
30 Jul 91 p 1*

[Text] It has been learned that the government is studying whether President No Tae-u should make an important declaration in his keynote speech at the UN General Assembly [UNGA] on 24 September in connection with the handling of the "nuclear [issue] on the Korean peninsula."

It was noted that this declaration would be similar to a northward proposal for substantive settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula and eventually be linked to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

It was also learned that, for this, the government is planning to hold talks between high-ranking ROK-U.S. diplomatic authorities in the United States in August to discuss and adjust the concrete direction of impending important questions including the issue of handling the "nuclear [issue] on the Korean peninsula."

On 29 July, a government source said that "the keynote speech by President No Tae-u in the UNGA in September will be the first speech of the head of our state after the entry of the North and the South into the United Nations. Thus, his speech has a historic mission of elucidating the firm will and policy of our government to pursue the peaceful solution of the situation on the Korean peninsula."

This official pointed out: "However, North Korea's abandonment of its line for communizing South and of its will to develop nuclear weapons must be a precedent condition for consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula."

He added: "Therefore, the important declaration which President No Tae-u is studying would inevitably include the measures that North Korea must take, including abandoning development of nuclear weapons, as well as the future of the nuclear issue in regard to the U.S. forces in South Korea."

He disclosed that he understands "an agreement was already reached on the principled direction of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula between President No Tae-u and U.S. President Bush during summit talks in White House on 2 July."

This official explained that "the declaration which President No is mapping out will be based on the results of these summit talks."

It has been learned that during the 2 July summit in the White House, the ROK and the United States agreed that any change in connection with nuclear weapons of the U.S. forces in South Korea will be handled under the initiative of the ROK side and that accordingly, the two sides will cope with the issue of nuclear withdrawal of the U.S. forces in South Korea, which North Korea put forward, under the initiative of the ROK.

To visualize as a concrete policy, the principle agreed upon between the summits of two countries, the governments of the ROK and the United States agreed to hold a meeting between high-ranking diplomatic authorities in the United States in August at the proposal of the U.S. side.

Government Seeks 'Full-Scope' Inspections

*SK0108110991 Seoul YONHAP in English 1051 GMT
1 Aug 91*

[Text] Seoul, August 1 (YONHAP)—South Korea, responding Thursday to a North Korean proposal for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, counterproposed that the two sides discuss nuclear non-proliferation, first suggestion that the nuclear issue can be discussed at bilateral talks.

"The Korean Government takes note that North Korea's proposal concerning the establishment of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry statement on July 30, 1991, contains some new details compared with its previous proposals," said an official statement released by the South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman.

It must be made clear, the statement said, that North Korea must accept full-scope inspection of all its nuclear-related materials and installations, including nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities.

"The fulfillment of this obligation cannot be linked with any other issue," it said, referring to Pyongyang's policy of linking the issues of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea to its signing of the nuclear safeguards accord.

"After having made this clear, the Korean Government considers that, for the purpose of reducing tension and building confidence on the Korean peninsula, military and other methods including nuclear non-proliferation can be discussed between the South-North authorities in the future," it said.

This is the first indication by the Seoul government that the nuclear issue can be discussed between the two sides.

Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chong-ha on Thursday told a morning cabinet meeting that North Korea made a similar proposal in 1989 which suggested a tripartite declaration of denuclearization be signed by South and North Korea and the United States.

Tuesday's statement, however, suggested limiting the concerned parties to South and North Korea, Yu told the cabinet.

A ministry official said, however, that the inter-Korean discussion will not spread to the problem of U.S. nuclear weaponry in South Korea.

The two sides, he said, would be able to talk about nuclear non-proliferation between South and North Korea.

North Korea last Tuesday made a three-point proposal for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. It said that Seoul and Pyongyang should jointly declare to make the peninsula nuclear free and that nuclear weapon states, including the United States, China and the Soviet Union, shall guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula.

Rejects Linking Inspections, NFZ

*SK0208035691 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
2 Aug 91 p 1*

[Text] The South Korean government announced yesterday that the North Korean proposal for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is debatable only after Pyongyang accepts a full-scale inspection of its nuclear facilities, thus to clear up any international suspicions of the North going nuclear.

The Korean government "Notes" that the North Korean proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula contains "some new details" compared to its previous proposals, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Ministry spokesman Chong Ui-yong said, "Military and other matters including nuclear non-proliferation can be discussed between South and North Korean authorities for the purpose of reducing the tensions and to build confidence," after North Korea signs the nuclear safeguards accord with International Atomic Energy Agency and opens all of its nuclear facilities, including reprocessing facilities, to a full-scale inspection.

However, the Foreign Ministry spokesman made it clear that North Korea's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord, an obligation of a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), should not be linked to any other issues.

The South Korean government's response came two days after North Korea renewed its proposal for the establishment of a non-nuclear zone on the Korean peninsula through a statement on Tuesday.

The issue is expected to be on top of the agenda for the inter-Korean prime ministers' meeting late this month in Pyongyang, though South Korea wishes to take on the agenda of promoting the inter-Korean exchanges.

Pyongyang suggested that South and North Korea adopt a joint declaration on a non-nuclear Korean peninsula by the end of next year to be guaranteed by surrounding nuclear powers, the United States, China and the Soviet Union.

A Foreign Ministry official say, "At a glance, the North Korean proposal contains some reasonable points in that it recognizes South Korea as a partner to deal with on nuclear issues."

So far, North Korea has attempted to deal with nuclear issues with the United States, putting aside South Korea.

"Nevertheless, it is meaningless to denuclearize the Korean peninsula as long as surrounding powers, including the Soviet Union and China, maintain a nuclear presence on soil adjacent to the peninsula," said the official in charge of security affairs.

On the other hand, Seoul government officials say that it is more urgent for both Koreas to build mutual confidence by resolving "practical" issues, rather than talking about a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Government officials still regard the North Korean proposal of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a peace overture to upgrade its image ahead of entry into the United Nations along with the South.

Editorial Welcomes Discussion of Issue

*SK0308135291 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
3 Aug 91 p 3*

[Editorial: "Discussion of How To Curb Nuclear Proliferation Is Welcome"]

[Text] On 1 August the government made its stand and policy on the nuclear issue public for the first time. Over the past few years, international attention has been focused on whether North Korea was engaged in nuclear development, while North Korea has tried to keep it a secret by linking it to nuclear weapons under control of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

By nature the nuclear weapons possessed by U.S. forces stationed in Korea cannot be linked to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, because the treaty is meant to distinguish the duty of the nuclear powers—such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and France—from that of other non-nuclear countries. Fortunately, North Korea, probably aware of this, proposed in a Foreign Ministry statement released on 30 July that the South and North agree on and declare the creation of a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] on the Korean peninsula before the end of 1992, without linking it to the nuclear weapons under the control of U.S. troops. The Foreign Ministry statement on 1 August that "the nuclear non-proliferation can possibly be discussed" between the South and North authorities can be regarded as an affirmative response to the North Korean side's proposal.

Of course, our government has made it clear that it will discuss the nuclear issue with the North only when the latter fully opens its nuclear facilities to an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Nevertheless, the problem does not seem as simple as that because everything will not go as smoothly as expected if North Korea puts facilities and materials for producing nuclear weapons off limits to inspectors or keeps them away from the list of items to be inspected. The IAEA can inspect only the facilities that have been reported by the host country after getting consent from the host country and has no authority to impose forced inspection on the host country.

North Korea has given the outside world enough evidence for it to be suspicious about its intent. Cases in point are the fact that North Korea has postponed signing the IAEA

safeguards even after signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, something it was supposed to do shortly after the signing. It has not ruled out the possibility that it possesses nuclear weapons in response to the nuclear weapons owned by U.S. troops. It remains to be seen if North Korea will try to use the nuclear issue as a trump card. This notwithstanding, the government's decision to discuss the nuclear issue with North Korea is welcome: First, it can circumvent North Korea's nuclear development; second, it can frustrate North Korea's attempt to use the nuclear issue as a trump card in initiating negotiations with the United States.

Frankly speaking, the government has refrained from making any positive remarks about the nuclear issue—known as “no-confirmation-no-denial” [NCND] policy—because of its respect for U.S. policy. At any rate, the military and political effectiveness of the nuclear weapons allegedly deployed in South Korea by U.S. troops, even if they do exist, has begun to fade, as noted in our editorials and as discussed by nuclear experts in and out of the U.S. Government.

Moreover, the United States is flexible in applying the so-called NCND policy to Europe, whereas Japan, which has adhered to its three-no nuclear policy, while being under U.S. nuclear umbrella, made it a rule that deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory should be discussed in advance. We can hardly wipe out the image that only we have been blindly obedient to the NCND policy.

If the South and North can genuinely declare a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and if the international community can verify it, U.S. nuclear weapons in the South will be no problem. What is the use for the deterrence when there is no threat? By the same token, U.S. troops stationed in Korea will leave if North Korea abandons its line of communizing the South through revolution and makes the Korean People's Army give up the so-called revolutionary ideology.

Seoul Considers Joint Declaration

SK0408061591 Seoul YONHAP in English 0558 GMT
4 Aug 91

[Text] Seoul, August 4 (YONHAP)—South Korea is reportedly considering offering a joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to North Korea, on condition that Pyongyang prove it will not develop nuclear capability, an informed government source said Sunday.

The Seoul government may propose simultaneous inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or on-site inspection of each other between South and North Korea, the official said.

The agreement between Seoul and Washington that South Korea will now initiate the negotiation on nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula signifies that eventually, South and North Korea can make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone through bilateral agreement, the official said.

South Korea may convey its intention to North Korea that it will not own nuclear arms and propose adopting a joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula between the two sides.

The offer, however, is based on the expectation that North Korea will completely scrap its idea to develop nuclear capability and open its nuclear-related materials and installations, including nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, to the IAEA inspection, the official said.

Editorial Views START's Military, Political Significance

SK3107012591 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
31 Jul 91 p 8

[Editorial: “Moscow START Summit”]

[Excerpts] In spite of the meetings with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev since he was elected in 1988, U.S. President George Bush wished to dub this week's summit in Moscow the first post-Cold War summit, with good reason.

The two-day summit meeting that opened yesterday is aimed not so much at defusing a crisis as at evolving new relations of both nations after they have officially agreed to slash their long-range nuclear arsenals to fit into a new world order.

The long-delayed summit has been set up as a symbolic occasion to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START], which took nearly a decade of negotiations. [passage omitted].

The conclusion of START is military significant. Politically, it would serve to weaken the voice of conservatives in and out of the Soviet military. Bush's visit is supposed to bolster the reformists there. The strategic balance of the Korean peninsula under the dominant influence of the United States and the Soviet Union should be so steeled as to induce stability and reconciliation in Korea and in the Northeast Asian region.

ALBANIA**Foreign Ministry Statement Hails START Treaty**

*AU0108195691 Tirana ATA in English 1729 GMT
1 Aug 91*

[Excerpt] Tirana, August 1 (ATA)—Regarding the agreement on reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals (START) between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania made on August 1, 1991 the following statement:

“Our country hails the signing of the treaty for the reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals (START) between the

American President George Bush and the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, sure that this will serve the long expected process of disarmament and peace .

Marking another step towards the elimination of the [word indistinct] of cold war and confrontation, the treaty will strengthen the current positive tendency in the international relations for the reduction of the armaments race and understanding among the peoples and states. The positive changes occurring on the international arena, the democratization of these relations and the achievement of a stable security for all require the undertaking and continuation of such steps.” [passage omitted]

EGYPT

Government Submits Regional Disarmament Proposals to UN

NC0508182491 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1733 GMT
5 Aug 91

[Text] New York, 5 August (MENA)—Egypt has submitted specific proposals to the United Nations on armament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa has sent a message to this effect to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, in which he conveyed Egypt's proposals in light of President Husni Mubarak's initiative on this subject.

In his message, the foreign minister said that the Egyptian proposals on eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East are based on the following points:

A. Egypt calls on the main arms-exporting countries, particularly the Security Council's five permanent members, as well as Israel, Iran, and the Arab countries, to submit declarations to the Security Council reflecting clear-cut and unconditional support for declaring the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. These states should declare that they will not take any steps or measures bound to impede the realization of this objective.

B. Egypt calls on the arms-exporting countries that are parties to the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] to intensify their efforts to ensure that the Middle East countries that have not yet joined the NPT do so now, because this is an extremely important and urgent step.

C. Egypt calls upon the Middle East countries which have not yet done so to declare their commitment:

1. not to use any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons;
2. not to produce or obtain any nuclear weapons;
3. not to produce or obtain any nuclear material suitable for military use and to dispose of their stocks of this material; and
4. to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's international inspection system to examine all their nuclear facilities.

D. Egypt calls on those countries of the region which have not yet done so to announce their commitment to join the NPT and the 1972 treaty banning biological weapons at a date no later than the conclusion of the negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons at the disarmament conference in Geneva.

E. Egypt calls on all Middle Eastern countries to announce their commitment to deal effectively and honestly with matters involving the delivery systems of various weapons of mass destruction.

F. Egypt calls on the countries in the region to announce their agreement to a mechanism by which the United Nations or some other international organization would

play a role, to be specified later, concerning the verification of these countries' commitment to the agreements which they will reach to ban and limit arms.

In his letter to the UN secretary general, Musa noted that President Husni Mubarak had sent messages to the heads of state and government of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as of major industrial countries. Mubarak explained Egypt's views on disarmament and the recent proposals on this issue.

'Amr Musa said that Mubarak's messages also expressed Egypt's eagerness to play a constructive role in the discussions on arms limitation and the ban on weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

'Amr Musa said Egypt intends to communicate directly with the major parties concerned with these issues on both international and regional levels.

'Amr Musa concluded his letter by saying that Egypt "views positively" all disarmament proposals that meet the following objectives:

A. To increase the security of the countries in our region at a lower level of weapons stockpiling, because security cannot be achieved except through peace arrangements and dialogue and without policies involving the use of force.

B. To establish a quantitative and qualitative balance of the military capabilities of all countries in the region, because the continuation of the current imbalance is unacceptable in a region which seeks a just and comprehensive peace.

C. To reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament that will be applied to all countries in the region and will be reinforced by effective monitoring procedures. Such agreements should guarantee equal rights and responsibilities to all countries in the region. Regional as well as international parties should cooperate to determine the procedures for limiting arms and for disarmament, to ensure a comprehensive treatment of the problem, and to provide a realistic answer to the security needs of the region's countries.

D. To give top priority to the objective of ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical, and biological ones. The limitation of conventional weapons also should be considered when political realities permit such an effort, that is, when peace is achieved in the region or at least when the peace process has made considerable progress toward its goals.

INDIA

Parliament Welcomes Signing of START Treaty

BK0208091091 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0830 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Text] The Lok Sabha has unanimously welcomed the signing of the historic Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, by the United States and the Soviet Union. Describing it as the first-ever attempt at reducing the strategic arsenal, the house in a resolution expressed the

hope that the treaty will be followed by more far-reaching measures through multilateral negotiations and will finally culminate in the elimination of all nuclear and destructive weapons.

The resolution, moved by the speaker, Mr. Shivraj Patil, also endorsed the policies of the government of India in this direction. It called upon the government to take the initiative to usher in a nuclear-free world.

Prime Minister Calls START 'Historic Development'

*LD0508104991 Moscow TASS in English 1014 GMT
5 Aug 91*

[By diplomatic correspondent Konstantin Voytsekhovich]

[Text] Moscow, August 5 (TASS)—Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao described the conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty of strategic arms reduction, signed on 31 July 1991, as a historic development. He has sent a message to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on the occasion of the signing of the treaty. The text of the message has just been circulated in Moscow by the Indian Embassy in the USSR.

Narasimha Rao stressed in the message, that "START will make an invaluable contribution in promoting trust and confidence and in consolidating the climate of peace. It demonstrates that even the most complex issues can be resolved, given the necessary political will". The Indian prime minister noted, that START has underscored that it is possible to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and achieve a nuclear disarmament in reality.

The prime minister expressed hope that the treaty will be followed by even more far-reaching measures for nuclear arms reduction, not only between the United States and the Soviet Union but also among other nuclear weapon states.

ISRAEL

U.S. Concerns About Arrow Failure Answered

*TA2207135391 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
22 Jul 91 p A3*

[By Re'uven Pedatzur]

[Excerpts] An extraordinarily sharp letter was sent to the defense establishment by the U.S. "Star Wars" project command in reaction to an Israeli report on the results of

the second experimental launching of the Arrow missile on 25 March. In the letter, the Americans hint they believe an attempt was made to conceal information from them on what really took place during the experiment, which was marked by a failure after 26 seconds.

The letter, signed by General Hammond of the SDI Command, conveys the writer's doubts about the reliability of the Israeli report on the experiment. He writes that after he talked with all Israeli elements involved in the experimental launch, he found that their versions did not match, which raises questions about the official Israeli report. [passage omitted]

In reaction, Israeli sources who are well informed about the Arrow project said that the problem involved in the reports to the Americans lies in "Jewish disputes." "Air Force people do not speak with experts of the Israeli Aircraft Industries [IAI], Defense Ministry personnel are not on good terms with Air Force people, and each party is trying to place the blame for the failure of the experiment on the other." The result is that after the report was sent to the United States, the Americans, who held talks with all Israeli elements concerned, found different and contradictory versions.

An examination of the failure during the second experiment indicated it was caused by an interruption in the work of the central computer. [passage omitted]

The next Arrow experiment will take place toward the end of summer. The initial plan was to conduct the third experiment sooner, but for reasons independent of the project itself the launching date had to be postponed. Plans are for an Arrow missile to intercept another Arrow, for the first time, in the course of the third experiment.

An IAI management source who confirmed the receipt of the strongly worded U.S. letter clarified that the reason for the partial report given the Americans immediately after the launch was a lack of full information on the nature of the fault. When that report was given, all data collected during the launch had not been fully analyzed. There was surely no intention to conceal information from the Americans.

According to the source, the Americans have received all IAI explanations, and at the last meeting, held at the beginning of the month, the U.S. representatives even expressed satisfaction with the level of information given them by the IAI and by the action taken to correct the fault.

GENERAL

Bessmertnykh on Post-START Arms Control Plans

PM0508133391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English (Undated)

[IAN interview with A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR foreign minister, 29 July in Moscow; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Ministers Conduct Dialogue During Summit. Aleksandr Bessmertnykh Talks to Vladimir Markov of NOVOSTI"]

[Excerpt] The Soviet-US summit had in fact begun even before President George Bush arrived in Moscow. Seven hours before his arrival, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh met his US counterpart James Baker for a two-hour talk here. After his talks with Baker wound up, Bessmertnykh gave an interview to Novosti Information Agency.

QUESTION: What did your talks, which have sort of opened the summit, begin with?

ANSWER: Indeed, our present-day talks are being conducted within the summit's framework. We have discussed the contents of joint statements and agreements to be adopted during the summit. We have also made a detailed discussion of the entire range of arms-reduction issues. Having finalized the START Treaty, which is going to be signed in the Kremlin on July 31, we have in fact launched a new round of talks pertaining to future agreements as regards strategic arms.

QUESTION: What can you say about the two sides' approach to arms-control issues?

ANSWER: To begin with, we realize the necessity for holding consultations as regards future talks on ensuring strategic stability, their content, goals and stages, etc. without delay. Both the secretary of state and I have agreed that such consultations should not be postponed and should be held in the near future. We have reached mutual understanding in this respect. However, owing to the fact that these are going to be extremely important and large-scale talks, both sides are naturally thinking about their structure. This question, as well as some others, will be the subject of the forthcoming consultations.

We have discussed other arms-limitation spheres where we should reach additional accords. We have also examined the possibility of transforming the talks' structure and to set up additional working groups, which would act in an entirely different way—that is they would resolve the problems at hand by 'brain-storming'.

The reduction of conventional arms in Europe, the 'Open-Skies' proposal, the limitation of nuclear tests, the non-proliferation of missiles and related technologies and some other issues were discussed. On the whole, both the Soviet Union and the United States are capable of ensuring uninterrupted arms-limitation process. [passage omitted]

START TALKS

Revised U.S. Targets in USSR Change Little

91SV0019A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jul 91
Second Edition p 4

[By V. Gan: "In the Nuclear Sights"]

[Text] Washington—At a news conference in London following the meeting of the 'seven', U.S. President G. Bush was asked how he would characterize relations with the USSR. The President intimated that our relations are very good, although they are not the relations of allies. Allies, he observed, do not have missiles targeted on one another.

Bush, of course, was right. Even now, on the eve of signing the treaty on strategic offensive arms during the upcoming Moscow meeting at the end of July, approximately 7,000 "points" in the Soviet Union remain in the nuclear sights of the United States. As THE WASHINGTON POST reports, citing competent sources, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney has just approved a list of targets which would be subject to an American nuclear attack in the event of Armageddon. Compared with past years, the list has in principle been revised—East Europe has been removed entirely and the number of targets has altogether been cut by 3,000. But all the same the total annihilation of Russia is envisaged.

As a result of the comprehensive revision of targets begun by the administration in 1989 the U.S. President acquires greater flexibility—he can decide not to wipe out the Soviet political leaders who are capable of terminating a nuclear conflict, or, equally, spare the leaders of separatist republics of the Union. Only a month ago President Bush was at a White House ceremony singing the praises of Boris Yeltsin for his "devotion to democratic values and the principles of the free market." But in fact, if anything were to happen, this would not save Russia. First, because Moscow is both the Union and the republic capital. Second, Russia accounts for the bulk of the country's territory, and, consequently, the military and political decision-making centers and the deployment of the bulk of strategic nuclear weapons and the armed forces are all concentrated there. As THE WASHINGTON POST reports, given the version of the "most massive attack," 5,000 nuclear warheads, each far more powerful than the bombs which leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain down on Russia. The Pentagon believes that such an attack would turn Moscow and the territory of the republic as a whole into a smoldering radioactive ruin.

The "cold war" has solemnly been proclaimed the property of the past. However, this has not in the least influenced the plans for nuclear attack. Evolution is evolution, but, as an administration spokesman said, "these are not automobiles with a new model coming out every year; there is much inertia in our system."

More than enough inertia, truly. As before, the target remains constant—the destruction of many thousand Soviet military bases, storehouses, command centers and industrial facilities, which could be used to support our offensive against West Europe (which is, naturally, now

deemed to be extremely unlikely). A large part of the American nuclear missiles is targeted on our missile launch silos, submarine anchorages, strategic bomber airfields and command centers in the hope that damage from a Soviet strike could be limited by a swift and massive retaliatory attack of "retribution" against facilities where Soviet arms are stored or controlled.

At the very outset of the nuclear age military plans provided simply for a concentrated attack. But since 1960 the United States has been devising plans for a limited nuclear response to a Soviet "first strike." The list of targets is periodically updated, but since the Reagan presidency the persons responsible for it have adhered to the guidelines of the three-page NSDD 13 memorandum. Neither Bush nor Cheney have gotten around to revising Reagan's directive, according to which America's nuclear forces are to prevent a Soviet attack by the threat of the rapid and assured destruction of the principal components of the USSR's military and civilian potential.

The anachronism and needlessness of all that on which the American taxpayers' money is spent are recognized there, of course. L. Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, was right, I believe, when he said: "It is hard to imagine what further damage we could do to the Soviet economy with our nuclear weapons over and above that which it has inflicted on itself."

But the plans exist, for all that. The doctrine of mutual deterrence remains in force on both sides. That is, the more terrifying we are to one another, the more secure we are. An absurdity for our times? It does not even require an answer.

Military Plants To Use Surplus Missiles for Space Launches

*PM2907091191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2*

[POSTFAKTUM report: "Military-Industrial Complex Representatives Set Up Joint-Stock Company"]

[Text] A constituent conference of the "Ural-Kosmos" closed joint-stock company [aktsionernoye obshchestvo zakrytogo tipa] has opened in Miass (Chelyabinsk Oblast). Most of the company's founders are representatives of the military-industrial complex. They intend to set up a company, and one of its main tasks will be to utilize for commercial purposes missiles which are coming to the end of their military life or are due to be destroyed under arms cuts. Their warheads will be replaced by communications satellites. The founders of the "Ural-Kosmos" company note that rockets will be launched both from land-based pads and from military submarines.

Observer on Bilateral Ties, START Significance

*PM2907110591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 7*

[Article by political observer Gennadiy Vasilyev: "Meeting in Moscow. Thoughts Ahead of the Summit"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] I saw this telephone behind glass in a U.S. museum. An ordinary telephone of the kind used in the sixties. But why did visitors stop in front of what appeared at first glance to be an unremarkable exhibit and gaze at it attentively? It turned out that we were looking at the first Washington-Moscow "hot line" telephone, installed in the White House under President Kennedy.

It appeared in the U.S. presidential office a year after the Caribbean missile crisis when the world, as historians on both sides now admit, found itself on the brink of nuclear war. [Passage omitted].

I remembered the old Washington-Moscow "hot line" telephone when glancing over articles devoted to the incipient Soviet-U.S. summit. How thin and flimsy the line of communication connecting the leaders of our two great powers was! It was designed to help avoid a fatal error and allow them to urgently question one another in the event of alarm bells ringing. But personal contacts between the leaders themselves, rare and episodic at that—we remember Khrushchev's meeting in Vienna with Kennedy in 1961—often developed into a clash of political ambition and characters. [passage omitted]

It is only the current period of Soviet-U.S. relations, opening with the Vienna summit in 1985 and marked by an intellectual breakthrough in Reykjavik (1986) and the signing of the first agreement to really cut back the arsenals of mass-destruction weapons—the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (Washington 1987)—that began the process of pulling mankind back from the edge of the nuclear abyss. This only became possible due to a change in the philosophical-conceptual basis of Soviet-U.S. relations and foreign policy as a whole: the deideologization of interstate relations, the priority of pan-human values, peoples' right to choose their own destiny, and the predominance of law over force. These principles of the new political thinking have an elevated, ephemeral ring. But they have become the firm foundation of the new world system that is taking shape before our eyes.

So, a strategic offensive arms treaty will be signed in Moscow the day after tomorrow. What kind of agreement is it? What are its parameters? Whereas the treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles only "cut" USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals by 4 and 2 percent respectively in terms of the number of carriers and warheads, the new wide-ranging agreement makes provision for cuts of 30 percent on average. Moreover, cuts in the most formidable, strategic offensive arms. I am referring to intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched and air-launched nuclear missiles, and bombers. It will take seven years to put the agreement into effect. Its term of operation is 15 years, with provision for it to be extended.

This represents a mighty cut in the potential of mass destruction. It as it were rolls back the nuclear threat and creates confidence that our countries can cope with subsequent steps toward a safe, nonviolent world.

These are not only our thoughts. This is what the U.S. LOS ANGELES TIMES writes about it: "We won't stint in assessing the significance of the strategic offensive arms treaty. It constitutes another important step toward further improving Soviet-U.S. relations and strengthening the elusive but vitally important foundation of trust that makes it possible to increase mutual understanding and secure new agreements. We are bound to give credit to the efforts made and determination shown by the two countries' specialists—70 on the U.S. side and 50 or 55 on the Soviet side—who have worked so long in Geneva on formulating this incredibly complex treaty. But ultimately it is not the technical decisions but the political will that saw the completion of this work."

As for the telephone, the new replacement rings often. Presidents Gorbachev and Bush talk regularly. They discuss urgent problems pertaining to bilateral relations and pressing international matters. This is what is interesting. No one calls the line between the Kremlin and the White House a "hot line" any longer. Because the word "hot" contains a hint of alarm and reflects the nature of our relations when they kept blowing hot and cold. Today the Moscow-Washington temperature is normal.

Shevardnadze Meets Baker, Views START

OW3107010691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1200 GMT 30 Jul 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Monday Eduard Shevardnadze received in his home the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Their informal conversation went on for about 4 hours. During it the two men exchanged views on problems they had worked on together previously.

"Relations between the USSR and the U.S. changed fundamentally, having turned into partnership", Eduard Shevardnadze told IF's [INTERFAX's] diplomatic correspondent Petr Vasiliev.

"We spoke about bilateral relations", he went on to say. "We focused on our domestic problems, since they worry the entire world now".

Concerning the START treaty which will be signed on the Moscow summit E. Shevardnadze said that "the main—the most difficult problems within the framework of that treaty were solved in the course of our negotiations with the State-Secretary and in the summits. The difficulties which are turned out later are artificial". According to Shevardnadze they arose because of "caprice of some of our comrades".

The former minister gave an affirmative answer on the question whether [as received] the military men should be accused of: "Not all of them are guilty, but in principle—yes. "Now they are convinced of our rightness," stressed Shevardnadze. [quotation marks as received]

"The following visits to Washington were of no results," he went on. "They achieved nothing and moreover they agreed and signed the less beneficial minutes for the Soviet Union".

START Will Normalize World Situation

LD2907173291 Moscow TASS in English
1654 GMT 29 Jul 91

[By Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, July 29 (TASS)— "A treaty on strategic offensive weapons (START), which is expected to be signed by Soviet and U.S. Presidents in Moscow on July 31, will considerably lower the level of nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States and promote strategic stability, while reducing a possibility of a nuclear conflict," Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, told TASS today.

He said the signing of the treaty will normalise the military and political situation in Europe and the world.

Omelichev recalled that negotiations on strategic offensive weapons have been held since March 12, 1985 within the framework of the talks on nuclear and space armaments. "A summit meeting in Geneva between November 19-21, 1985 helped reach an agreement on radical reductions of strategic offensive weapons," Omelichev said.

He said a draft treaty envisages reductions and limitations of intercontinental ballistic missiles and their launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their launchers, as well as heavy bombers and their nuclear armaments.

These weapons should be reduced in three phases within seven years after the treaty comes into force.

By the end of the seven-year period and after it, each side should have not more than 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their launchers, as well as deployed heavy bombers and 6,000 military loads for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

The treaty also envisages a number of qualitative limitations of strategic offensive weapons, including specific bans on certain categories of strategic offensive weapons, types of deployment and activity.

"The signing of the treaty will provide a good basis for further efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States and other nuclear states to reduce nuclear confrontation," Omelichev said.

START Delegate General Lebedev Interviewed

PM0508110391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English 30 Jul 91

[Interview with General Yuriy Lebedev by IAN'S Vladimir Nazarenko; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "General Lebedev on the START Treaty"]

[Text] General Yuriy Lebedev, a member of the Soviet delegation in Geneva is interviewed here by Vladimir Nazarenko of NOVOSTI:

[Nazarenko] The painstaking nine-year-long work on the START treaty is over. For the first time in the history of Soviet-U.S. nuclear confrontation they have come to an agreement on reducing their strategic arsenals. How much will this affect the strategic trends of the world's most powerful nuclear states?

[Lebedev] Each side will reduce the aggregate number of delivery vehicles (deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) to 11,600, and the number of warheads to 6,000, including ICBM and SLBM warheads to 4,900, heavy ICBM warheads to 1,540, and mobile ICBM warheads to 1,100.

This means that the warheads on strategic delivery vehicles will be reduced by roughly a half, while the number of delivery vehicles will be reduced by less than 40 percent for the Soviet Union and about 30 percent for the USA.

[Nazarenko] What additional limitations does the Treaty envisage?

[Lebedev] The aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of either side shall not exceed the level which amounts to about 50 percent of the existing aggregate weight of the deployed Soviet missiles.

Heavy ICBM's (which only the Soviet Union has) will be halved to 154. Under the politically binding joint statement, long-range SLCM's (over 600 km) that are not covered by the Treaty shall have a ceiling of 880 items.

The USA shall have no more than 150 heavy bombers (within the limit of 1,600 established for delivery vehicles), and the Soviet Union shall have no more than 180. The Treaty also provides for other limitations.

[Nazarenko] What about the verification regime?

[Lebedev] A verification regime that I consider unprecedented has been elaborated for the entire duration of the Treaty (which is 15 years, with possible prolongation for five-year periods). It includes the use of national technical means of control, all kinds of on-site inspections, exchange of data and a system of notifications, as well as binding on-site inspections. In short, there are practically no loopholes in the Treaty.

[Nazarenko] You know all the intricate links between the START Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty, on which the Soviet Union and the US could not agree. How was the problem settled?

[Lebedev] Seeking to get out of the deadlock, the Soviet Union agreed to sign the START treaty even if the sides did not come to an agreement on the ABM problem. Simultaneously, the sides agreed that if the ABM Treaty were violated, this would free the Soviet Union of its commitments under the START treaty.

[Nazarenko] Back in the 1970s the Soviet Union and the USA established a rough parity in their strategic forces. Will it not be disrupted as a result of the realisation of the START treaty?

[Lebedev] We have done everything in our power to preserve the balance of the sides' strategic nuclear forces and parity, and thus to serve national interests in full

measure. More than that, we have laid a firm basis for continued movement towards deeper reductions of the sides' nuclear arsenals.

Ignatenko-Fitzwater Briefing at Moscow Summit Cited

LD3007185791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 30 Jul 91

[Excerpt] Moscow, July 30 (TASS)—In reply to a question put by a TASS correspondent about the directions in which the arms control talks between the USSR and the United States will further develop and about the priorities of the USSR and the United States in this respect, the press secretary of the U.S. President said:

"We believe that the treaty to be signed tomorrow is truly a document of historic proportions. We have already mentioned that the current summit meeting symbolizes changes at the basis of the USSR-U.S. relations. When we signed the treaty on shorter and medium-range missiles in Washington in 1987, there was discussion on the nature of our relations, which were then only beginning to change. Then there was talk about the old rivals—not the old friends.

"I think that the present meeting has demonstrated with all clarity a sharp change in this respect. Now we talk about constructive friendship. We are nevertheless interested in keeping discussion of arms control on the agenda. Both presidents will probably discuss these problems tomorrow. But now we are extremely pleased that we have attained such a substantial breakthrough in the sphere of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons."

"I absolutely agree with this evaluation", added Vitaliy Ignatenko. "Today we believe that a fundamentally new mutual security model based on openness, trust and predictability must be at the center of the concept for the second stage of disarmament. This will be disarmament at a qualitatively new and higher level. It will go beyond the bounds of deterrence. This will be full partnership within a model based on the principles of what is reasonable and of strict self-defense. Specifically, for instance, under discussion could be problems of space weapons, tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Navy, and chemical weapons."

Marlin Fitzwater also said that in the coming autumn the sides intend to consider specific arms control problems on which it would be possible to hold talks with a view to carving out a new path in this sphere. "But at this stage," he noted, "in our view, it would be premature to try and predict with precision where exactly that path would lead." [passage omitted]

Physicians' Group Hails START, Calls for Further Action

LD3007195991 Moscow TASS in English 1201 GMT 30 Jul 91

[Text] Moscow, July 30 (TASS)—On the eve of the Moscow summit, co-presidents of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), American Professor Bernard Lown and Soviet corresponding

member of the Academy of Medical Sciences Sergey Kolesnikov sent a message to Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush. The letter reflects the organisation's point of view on problems and prospects of nuclear disarmament in connection with the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

"On behalf of the more than two hundred thousand physicians in seventy-six countries that comprise IPPNW, we applaud the important step forward you are taking with start and urge you to take the additional steps necessary to ensure that START is truly the beginning of a process of nuclear disarmament," the message says.

"The START treaty you will sign in Moscow this week is a milestone in Soviet-American relations, and we congratulate you on its successful completion," the co-presidents write in the letter. "We must also recognise that START reductions will leave awesome arsenals capable of destroying the planet."

"Accordingly, we urge you to use the Moscow summit to begin immediately new efforts to ban nuclear tests and to reduce further the size of your nuclear arsenals."

"Ultimately, the nuclear proliferation problem, acutely evident in Iraq, cannot be solved by military force." The message says, "a stronger nuclear non-proliferation regime, with increased controls on the spread of nuclear technology, is needed. You can do much to strengthen the NPT [nonproliferation treaty] by signing a test ban treaty."

Academic Views START Provisions

PM0508100191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 31 Jul 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Chernyshev, deputy general director of the Russian-U.S. University's Center for International and Military-Political Studies: "A Victory for Reason. New Step Taken Toward the Elimination of Nuclear Missile Weapons"]

[Text] In order to assess the scale of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction [START] Treaty being signed in Moscow today, let us examine its main provisions, agreed upon after long and tense discussions during which compromise steps were taken by both sides. According to the treaty, reductions in strategic offensive weapons will be implemented in three stages over a seven-year period, in other words by the end of this century. After the reductions, the USSR and the United States will have 1,600 nuclear weapons delivery systems in the following categories: land-based ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers. The total quantity of weapons will be reduced to 6,000 units, including up to 4,800 units on deployed ICBM's and SLBM's, up to 1,540 weapons on heavy ICBM's, and up to 1,100 weapons on mobile ICBM's.

However, in actual fact the "threshold" figure of 6,000 weapons remains, I would say, only a "base" figure; the total number of weapons on both sides will in practice exceed it. This is due to the compromise solution of two problems: The elaboration of rules for counting heavy

bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's), and the methodology for limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's).

Let us take, for example, the rule for counting heavy bombers. These airplanes, which are fitted for nuclear weapons, will be counted as single delivery systems within the ceiling of 1,600 units. Provided such an airplane does not carry cruise missiles with ranges of 600 km or more, it is counted as a single nuclear weapon within the ceiling of 6,000 units. But, for example, the United States has bombers of this type which can carry 20 or more nuclear bombs and "air-to-surface" missiles with ranges of up to 600 km. That means that in reality the number of nuclear weapons per bomber will be not one single unit, but 20 or more units. This is one source for exceeding the ceiling of 6,000 weapons. According to estimates by U.S. experts, up to 3,000 U.S. and up to 1,000 USSR gravity bombs and "air-to-surface" missiles with nuclear "fillings" could be left out of the reckoning.

A similar situation—adding up "with an element of under-estimation"—arises also in the case of heavy bombers fitted with long-range ALCM's. Different types of airplanes, and different airplanes of the same type, could carry different numbers of such missiles. But after all, it is impossible to subject each and every airplane to constant monitoring. Thus a compromise solution had to be found—to work out "average" parameters for counting nuclear weapons. Ten weapons will be counted per U.S. bomber (in reality there may be 20), and eight weapons per Soviet bomber (in reality there are six on the Tu-95 and 12 on the Tu-160). In accordance with this counting rule, the United States has a possibility of deploying approximately 800-900 more units of long-range ALCM's than the figure that is counted. In order to compensate for the ensuing imbalance, the treaty allows the Soviet Union to deploy 40 percent more heavy bombers with ALCM's than the United States (210 and 150 units respectively).

Finally, about long-range SLCM's: They will not be covered by the START treaty itself. Limitations on these missiles will be implemented on the basis of a separate document taking the form of unilateral statements of a politically binding nature. Thus there is yet another source for the initially agreed levels to be exceeded.

Where do the accords described above lead? In the opinion of U.S. specialists, the United States will reduce its nuclear strategic arsenal from 12,000 weapons to approximately 8,800 units, and the USSR will reduce its arsenal from 11,000 to 7,000 units. This means that the intended 50 percent reduction has not been fully realized. In fact more modest results have been achieved—an approximate 30 percent reduction in weapons for both sides.

The treaty also envisages lowering the total throw-weight (in other words, in effect, the total capacity of the weapons) which can be carried by each side's deployed ICBM's and SLBM's. After reductions this weight will not exceed a level constituting roughly 50 percent of that which exists at the present time in the Soviet Union.

One further detail should be noted: The number of deployed heavy ICBM's held by the Soviet Union alone

(SS-18's) will be reduced by one-half, to 154 units. The modernization of heavy ICBM's limited in this way will be possible only within agreed criteria. New types of heavy missiles are banned.

Soviet critics of the treaty note that, in its elaboration, it proved impossible to remove disparities in such an indicator of the two sides' combat potential as the total number of weapons on delivery systems, and the ratio of forces under this indicator remains in favor of the United States. They also point to the fact that the substantial reduction of the total throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's gives advantages to the United States, whose missiles possess greater accuracy, and therefore do not require high weapons capacity. They list the 50 percent reduction in Soviet heavy ICBM's among the treaty's shortcomings. And the permission granted to the Soviet Union in the treaty to exceed the United States' quota of heavy bombers by 40 percent is interpreted not as an achievement but as a "concession" by Washington which is at best useless to our country.

Can these critical attacks on the treaty be considered fair? Let us try to examine them.

Yes, in practice the number of weapons held by the United States will remain somewhat higher and the accuracy of their missiles evidently greater. And the USSR's opportunity to increase its fleet of heavy bombers is by no means a "gift," it will only lay an additional burden on our ailing economy.

But are quantitative and qualitative differences in nuclear arsenals so important, and is there a need to "opt for" our quota of bombers in its entirety? The answer to this question, I think, lies in the following: Authoritative research carried out by U.S. and Soviet Academies of Science testify to the fact that stable nuclear equilibrium can be maintained with 6,000 weapons, or, with a modest restructuring of forces, even with 3,000 weapons. The "distortions" in the treaty are neutralized by an extremely important circumstance: The opportunity available to the USSR to retain 7,000 nuclear weapons for purposes of defense and deterring any party from risky actions offers the potential—and then some, as the saying goes—of inflicting so-called "unacceptable damage" on an attacking side. The remaining nuclear weapon reserves can continue playing the role of a deterrence factor against the mutual launch of war.

As for the 50 percent reduction in heavy SS-18 missiles—indeed the Soviet arsenal's most powerful strategic weapons with the greatest accuracy of delivery to the target—arguments on this point are conducted not only in our country but also in the United States. This provision in the treaty is being interpreted by the U.S. Administration as a major "coup."

At the same time we should not lose sight of another point: Conservative critics of the treaty in the United States are expressing doubt over this "achievement" by the administration, claiming that, by agreeing to permit the modernization of SS-18 missiles, the United States is cancelling out the effectiveness of the reductions in these "first-strike

weapons." The CIA recently tried to "confirm" these arguments by the treaty's opponents. In its report, as reported by THE WASHINGTON TIMES, this department claims that, following the 50 percent reduction in SS-18's, Moscow will nevertheless possess the potential necessary to destroy all the U.S. missile forces sited in silos. The Soviet Union, in the CIA's opinion, agreed to the U.S. proposal to reduce the number of SS-18's by one-half "only after it had made sure that this potential could be preserved."

But let us leave these claims by the U.S. department to its conscience and return to the treaty. The Soviet side, although it made big concessions at the talks, managed to uphold a number of provisions that are to its own advantage, making the Americans make compromises in their turn. An extremely substantial element in the Soviet Union's favor, in my view, is the U.S. side's agreement to the deployment of land-based mobile missiles, which possess an extremely high degree of survivability in the event of a nuclear strike. We have such missiles, while at the present time the United States does not. By virtue of their high degree of invulnerability, mainly due to the difficulty in determining their location, they would "survive" a first strike and could be used to inflict a retaliatory blow. Such weapons are a serious means of deterrence.

The following should also be chalked up as a "gain" for the Soviet side: In spite of Washington's initial position, there was ultimate success in imposing quantitative restrictions on ALCM's and SLCM's, in which the Americans are "strong." The treaty also enshrines the USSR-proposed flight range for "air-to-surface" class missiles—600 km and over. The United States was initially insisting on a limit of 1,500 km, then 800, and then conceded, agreeing with the USSR. Consequently, a large range of U.S. "air-to-surface" class weapons comes within the limitations imposed by the treaty.

Compromise has been achieved also on the question of the so-called "off-loading" of missiles. The elimination of missiles will require large financial resources. According to a statement by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, the treaty obliges us to destroy approximately 800 missile delivery systems, which will require about 5 billion rubles. So as to avoid eliminating a larger number of delivery systems, it was proposed to achieve the ceiling of 6,000 weapons simply by removing some of the warheads from some missiles, preserving the missiles themselves. Initially the USSR proposed removing 1,650 warheads altogether, but the United States agreed only to 1,250 units. Then they "came together" on the figure of 1,250.

All the same, readers should not get the idea that the treaty is ideal. Of course, it has serious shortcomings. It will not resolve all the pressing strategic problems, it will not allow nuclear weapons to be reduced even to the levels envisaged by currently existing military doctrines, and it will not halt the modernization of offensive weapons. The treaty puts a bar on the quantitative growth of strategic offensive weapons, but the reduction in the numbers of delivery systems and nuclear weapons can be compensated to a

significant degree by qualitative improvement of remaining arsenals. And in this sphere, it should be admitted, the advantages are on the side of the United States.

The treaty did not solve another fundamental problem: It does not properly reflect the interconnection between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weapons. The Soviet side went ahead with the signing of the START treaty without guarantees from the U.S. side that the Americans will not demolish the ABM Treaty, which is the cornerstone in the maintenance of strategic stability. But meanwhile the U.S. administration is pursuing its line of supporting the SDI program, which envisages, in breach of the ABM Treaty, the deployment of antimissile defense systems involving the use of space—a program which, according to THE WASHINGTON POST, is “the most glorious stupidity of all Ronald Reagan’s defense follies.” If Washington continues to pursue this course, in time the United States will annul everything that was enshrined with such great labor in the START treaty. Such an outcome would be pernicious both for Soviet-U.S. relations, and for stability in the world.

The START talks were an important element in relations between the USSR and the United States, and the fact that they were still incomplete after the “cold war” had ended acted as a sort of hindrance to stepping up efforts in other spheres. Now, when economic, political, and regional problems are coming to the fore, both sides have acquired greater freedom to solve them, insofar as this important chapter in the disarmament sphere has finally been closed. At the same time it can be hoped that the START treaty will become the basis for achieving other accords on reducing, and subsequently eliminating nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev Address at START Signing

*LD3107135691 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1241 GMT 31 Jul 91*

[Address by President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the START Treaty signing ceremony in St. Vladimir’s Hall in the Kremlin, Moscow—live]

[Text] Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, comrades, in several minutes I and the President of the United States are to append our signatures to the treaty on reducing strategic offensive arms. It is a result, a result of many years of efforts which, apart from enormous work and patience, required that statesmen, diplomats, and servicemen have the will and boldness; that they break with the deeply rooted images of each other, and that they have trust. It is also the beginning of a voluntary reduction of nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, unprecedented as far as its scale and goals are concerned. It is an event of worldwide importance, because we are giving such momentum to the dismantling of the infrastructure of fear that used to hold sway over the world that it will be difficult to put a halt to it.

A far from simple process of ratification of the new treaty is ahead for both countries. There will be criticism, too. There will be talk of unilateral concessions here in

Moscow, while in Washington there will be talk of concessions made to the Soviet Union. Others will say that the new treaty fails to justify all hopes for a peace dividend, since not inconsiderable resources will be required to have the missiles destroyed. And if the missiles are not destroyed, critics will say that they have become obsolete, and that they must be replaced with new ones and this will cost even more. One can also expect vigorous criticism from those who would like faster and further-reaching steps toward being rid completely of nuclear weapons. In a word, the treaty will have to be defended.

I am convinced that what we have done at present is the optimum possible, and what is necessary for further progress. Colossal work has been done, and unique experience of cooperation in a most complex sphere has been amassed.

It is important that there is a growing understanding of the absurdity of arming oneself beyond all measures at a time when the world has moved toward an era of economic interdependence, and the information revolution is making the integrity of the world ever more apparent.

Politicians are forced to take into account, however, that on the way to this era great efforts will be needed for removing the dangers, which have been inherited from the past and those appearing anew, and for overcoming obstacles of a material, intellectual and psychological order.

Normal human thinking must take the place of militarized political thinking, which is deeply rooted in the public conscience. This will take time. A new conceptual basis for security is to help the matter. Doctrines for waging wars must give way to a concept of the forestalling and prevention of wars. Plans for the utter defeat of a notional enemy must be replaced by joint projects for strategic stability and defense sufficiency. The document before us is a moral achievement and marks a major breakthrough in the thinking and behavior of our countries. The future goal is to use this breakthrough fully and to establish the irreversibility of the disarmament process.

Let us do justice to what has been achieved and express gratitude to those who made the mental and nervous effort and who invested a lot of skills working on the treaty. Let us embark on tackling new tasks for the sake of our and worldwide security.

Mr. President, we can congratulate each other, and we can congratulate the Soviet and American people and the entire world community on the conclusion of such an agreement. Thank you. [applause]

START Treaty Signing Ceremony Reported

*LD3107131491 Moscow TASS in English 1246 GMT
31 Jul 91*

[By diplomatic correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, July 31 (TASS)—St. Vladimir’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace today witnessed another historic event—the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments (START).

The treaty was signed by U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in a ceremony attended by about one hundred representatives from both sides.

Observers point out that the START Treaty marks an important stage in lowering the risk of nuclear war. Its implementation would break for the first time in history the persistent trend towards a strategic arms buildup and considerably reduce the level of military confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers.

Under the strategic arms reduction treaty, the USSR and the United States will cut their inter-continental land-based ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), heavy bombers and corresponding nuclear warheads during the period of seven years after it goes into effect.

By the end of the seven-year period, each side will have not more than 1,600 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers combined and 6,000 warheads. The treaty envisages numerous bans restricting the perfection of strategic offensive armaments.

The treaty will remain in force for 15 years and can be extended for subsequent five-year periods unless it is replaced with a new agreement.

In the opinion of Col.-Gen. Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the implementation of the treaty "will help strengthen strategic stability and thus diminish the risk of nuclear conflict."

U.S., Soviet Geneva Delegates on Treaty Completion

Brooks, Nazarkin at Final Plenary Session

*LD2907122391 Moscow TASS in English 1205 GMT
29 Jul 91*

[By correspondent Boris Shabayev]

[Text] Text] Geneva, July 29 (TASS)—The initialling of the Soviet-American treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons here today crowned the ten-year marathon of drafting [words indistinct] historic document.

Addressing the final plenary meeting of the Geneva talks, chief Soviet and American negotiators, Yuriy Nazarkin and Linton Brooks, were unanimous in their assessment of the treaty.

It is important, they said, because the two [words indistinct] powers not merely limit, but substantially cut their most dangerous armaments for the first time in history.

Both officials are convinced that the treaty will reinforce principles of Soviet-American relations and expand and consolidate positive trends in international relations towards cooperation and trust, and away from confrontation.

The Russian and English copies of the document will be brought to Moscow on Tuesday. President Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bush will sign the treaty during the Moscow summit.

Brooks Briefs Press

*LD3107194691 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT
31 Jul 91*

[By correspondents Aleksey Agureyev and Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, July 31 (TASS)—A briefing, held at the summit press centre today by Ambassador Linton Brooks, U.S. chief negotiator at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space arms and, recently, U.S. chief delegate at the strategic arms reduction (START) talks, began in a businesslike manner, without long introductory speeches.

More than nine-years-long negotiations resulted in the START treaty signed today by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush.

Journalists asked Brooks questions concerning the future of Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks.

That was a long and difficult process. We should now stop and see where we are. We are resolved to carry on negotiations in the spirit of our joint statement adopted at last year's summit, he said in response to a question from a U.S. reporter.

Perhaps, we should wait, rather, until the Senate ratifies this treaty before going further in new negotiations, Brooks added.

Asked by a TASS correspondent about possible criticism of the START treaty both in the United States and the Soviet Union, he said that the START treaty is full of compromises. Critics of the treaty will most likely focus on those aspects where the other side has traditional advantage.

Critics in the USSR will argue that the treaty insufficiently limits bombers while critics in the U.S. will say that the treaty insufficiently limits heavy intercontinental ballistic and mobile missiles, Brooks said.

At the same time Ambassador Brooks voiced hope that critics, provided they evaluate the START treaty impartially, would realise that this is a balanced document.

Russian Republic Supports Signing of Treaty

*LD3107170191 Moscow TASS in English 1625 GMT
31 Jul 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, July 31 (TASS)—Russian authorities fully support the signing of the historic START treaty which has "immense significance" and "turns a new page in Soviet-U.S. relations," Russian Federation Prime Minister Ivan Silayev told TASS. "It will be undoubtedly received positively, with enthusiasm and hope across the world and in our country," Silayev said.

The prime minister represented leadership of the largest Union republic at the signing ceremony in the Grand Kremlin Palace today. At the ceremony U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the strategic arms reduction treaty.

Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin failed to attend the ceremony.

Present among the Soviet side were prominent politicians, statesmen, military leaders, and diplomats. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev was the only leader of a Union republic present. Journalists who attended the ceremony drew attention to the absence of the Russian president.

On Tuesday Yeltsin did not take part in the Soviet-U.S. talks either, although the official program [words indistinct] participation.

As Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko assured a briefing on Tuesday, the absence of the Russian Federation president was agreed upon on Monday between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Criticism of START Treaty Foreseen

PM3107150891 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Golts under the "Topical" rubric: "Abandoning the Old 'Legacy'"]

[Text] On 31 July the Soviet and U.S. presidents will sign the text of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The crux of this truly historic agreement is that over a seven-year period the strategic arms of the USSR and the United States will be reduced to a level of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 nuclear munitions on each side.

Future historians will be struck by an apparent paradox. It is many years since Moscow and Washington recognized that so many weapons have been stockpiled that even parity achieved on top of a mountain of 25,000 nuclear warheads does not guarantee security. In these conditions, any incident could lead to a universal catastrophe. But it took all of 10 years to draw up an agreement that does not limit the growth of nuclear potential, as before, but actually reduces that potential.

The fact is that the task in hand proved too difficult. The so-called "strategic triads" (including ground-launched intercontinental missiles, sea-launched missiles, and nuclear weapons on strategic bombers) of the two countries are far from identical. The Soviet Union has always given preference to ground-launched missiles, and the Americans to sea-launched missiles and strategic aviation. Added to this is the fact that the ballistic missiles are equipped with different numbers of individually targeted warheads, and the strategic bombers with different numbers of nuclear munitions. As a result, finding a common denominator for equal reductions proved difficult in the extreme. Highly complex counting rules had to be formulated.

There were many misunderstandings. Remember the Reykjavik drama, the threat of disruption of the ABM Treaty as a result of work on SDI, the crisis over American violations of the SALT agreement. But all the same, realpolitik always prevailed over politicking. Both in Moscow and in Washington, there was the will to seek and find the necessary solutions.

But I have no doubt that this life-saving treaty will be subjected to cruel attacks in both the USSR and the United States. Some critics will say that nuclear arsenals are actually going to be reduced by only 30 percent, instead of the promised 50 percent.

Those who take this view are keen to mistake wishes for reality. I am not denying that Soviet-U.S. relations are experiencing an upsurge. But nuclear arsenals, the terrible "legacy" left to us by the era of confrontation, must be eliminated the same way you disarm a mine—without making any sudden movements. Because any instability, even a hint of instability, in this process means an additional risk. It follows from this that the present treaty should be developed. I therefore hope that after signing the START Treaty the presidents will proceed to instruct the military and the diplomats to prepare stage two of the process.

There will, of course, be other critics too. They will accuse both Bush and Gorbachev of making "unjustified concessions." Our conservatives will certainly point out that on the strength of sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles the United States could obtain a superiority of approximately 1,000 nuclear warheads. And their U.S. "colleagues" will emphasize that the Soviet Union retains the right to modernize its heavy missiles...

Thus those who highlight only the concessions to the "potential enemy" are unwilling to see that the document basically constitutes a highly complex equation of reciprocal compromises.

I do not mean that the START Treaty poses no problems. But it seems to me that they do not lie in the treaty itself. One way or another, its signing exhausts, for a certain period, one of the priority avenues of our foreign policy—disarmament. So it is time to advance new priorities. The integration of our country into the world economy, for instance. Are we ready for this? I don't know. But I am sure of one thing, this task, like others, can only be resolved in the conditions of strategic stability.

Observer Comments on START

LD0108083591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 0530 GMT 1 Aug 91

[Studio interview with "observer" Viktor Levin by unidentified announcer on 1 August—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] With us in the studio is our observer Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, and we decided to talk with him about the summit. Viktor Nikolayevich, the question that interests me first of all is this: For a number of years we have been saying, while strategic arms negotiations have been in progress, that nuclear arms must be reduced by 50 percent. Now the figure 30 percent has appeared. Why the discrepancy?

[Levin] Yes, that's right. The treaty signed yesterday by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush provides for a 30 percent reduction of strategic offensive arms, and not 50 percent as was being said earlier. But I think this is a technical matter, there are no political

factors lurking behind it. We have succeeded in overcoming the political—above all psychological—impediments, and a very important step has been taken on the path that leads to reduction—and let us hope, ultimately, abolition—of nuclear arsenals, and moreover of those which are most dangerous and destabilizing: the strategic nuclear arsenals. As far as I am aware—I have also been asking myself this question and seeking an answer to it—the view that has been expressed is that the important thing is not that this is not a 50 percent but a 30 percent reduction, the important thing is that this very crucial and very difficult first step has been taken.

[Announcer] And as a result each side will have 6,000 warheads, yes?

[Levin] Each side will have 6,000 nuclear warheads, and the specific number of carriers is stipulated, there is a precise stipulation of the number of the most terrible carriers, intercontinental ballistic missiles. So everything is very precisely tied up, and control measures are very strictly established.

[Announcer] Yes, that is just what I wanted to touch on. We know that in human and international relations and in politics a very important question is that of trust. You will remember that President Reagan used to say trust, but verify [doveray, no proveryay]—a Russian proverb, incidentally. How can we ensure the maximum of trust and observance of agreements? All this is stipulated in the agreement that has been signed by the Presidents. And there is a figure there, an exact date, I took note of it—on the situation that existed on 1 September 1990—that is the reference point from which all accords begin and all measures of control are associated with, as I see it. This treaty has now been signed, and a very important step has been taken. These words are now becoming banal in the disarmament process. What do you think, Viktor Nikolayevich, will there be a pause in this area, in the area of strategic arms reduction, or will the talks continue?

[Levin] The disarmament talks will certainly continue. As far as strategic arms are concerned, here I think some pause is possible, and this would be natural and logical. The treaty provides for reduction over a period of seven years, in stages, three years and two stages of two years, with appropriate levels of what must be done in that period. And we will probably have to wait for the beginning of the process of actually putting the treaty into practice. But if that pause were to be excessively long, it would probably be bad. Now, of course, a certain inertia and movement has developed, there is a quantity of experience amassed as a result of previous work [narabotanny opyt], as it is now very fashionable to say, and it would be a pity not to use that experience without delay. Though of course there has to be some pause for reflection, pause for developing conceptual approaches to the next agreement. But I repeat, I have, for example, the hope that it won't be too long.

[Announcer] And this treaty will be followed by new ones and...

[Levin, interrupting] Certainly.

[Announcer] Let us hope they will be no less successful.

[Levin] You know, this question was touched on yesterday at the news conference of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush. It is very important now, and perhaps very exceedingly important, to take measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think we really are confronted by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States are taking—it is a banal definition but absolutely true—an important step in that direction, the reduction of nuclear arms. In the first place, the other nuclear powers have not yet joined it. And besides that, there are not a few paranuclear [okoloyadernny] powers, they are called paranuclear though many of them are known for sure to possess nuclear weapons—so the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and control of the nuclear weapons existing in the world in general now takes on, in the light of the Soviet-American treaty, especial importance.

Officials Cited on Prospects for Follow-On Talks

OW0208085091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1430 GMT 1 Aug 91

[From "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR and the U.S. might start consultations on cuts in nuclear and space weapons subject to strategic stability in the near future. According to officials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Department on Arms Control and Disarmament, this is envisaged in the statement coordinated by the Soviet and American Presidents back on June 1, 1990, during M. Gorbachev's first visit to Washington in the course of the G. Bush presidency. The two presidents agreed then that as soon as the START treaty is signed discussions will begin on further cuts in their nuclear arsenals. M. Gorbachev and G. Bush were mindful of their previous agreement when planning their further steps in the area of disarmament.

Consultations will involve a tangle of issues connected with concrete outlines of the future treaty and with all that belongs to the notion of strategic stability. The agreement to launch consultations without delay doesn't mean that they'll begin tomorrow. Nevertheless, as a Soviet Foreign Ministry expert said, there is no intention to delay this affair till the START treaty signed in Moscow recently is ratified by the U.S. Congress and by the Supreme Soviet. Consultations on the Geneva-2 talks might begin much earlier.

Assessments of START Treaty Reported

Yazov on Treaty Provisions

PM0108180591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov by correspondent V. Litovkin; place and date not given; first part is IZVESTIYA INTRODUCTION: "Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov: It is a Balanced Treaty"]

[Text] On 31 July the USSR and U.S. Presidents signed a Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Our military correspondent V. Litovkin talked with USSR Defense Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov.

[Litovkin] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, the signed treaty contains more than 800 pages of closely written text. Analyzing it is difficult. The political significance of the document is well known. What about its purely military aspect?

[Yazov] It is difficult to separate the treaty's military aspect from its political significance. It makes it possible to lower the level of nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States, strengthen strategic stability, and thereby reduce the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. Moreover, the treaty affects all components of strategic offensive arms: land-based ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's] and strategic aviation ballistic missiles including air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's], and other nuclear arms. It is a treaty that for the first time ever not only limits, but reduces strategic nuclear arms.

I will give some specific figures. The total number of deployed land-based ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers is to be reduced to the level of 1,600 units and the number of weapons to 6,000. According to the official data we exchanged, the USSR currently has 2,500 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and 10,271 weapons for them. The United States has 2,222 vehicles and 10,371 weapons respectively.

We are reducing the total number of vehicles by 900 units, which is 36 percent, including 154 heavy ICBM's—only we have them—which is 50 percent. The United States will reduce the number of vehicles by 622 units, or 28 percent. The total number of weapons on both sides, according to the agreed counting rules, will be reduced by 4,271 (USSR) and 4,371 (United States) weapons respectively, by 42 percent in all.

The actual number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to be cut and taken out of service will depend on the structure and composition of the strategic nuclear forces the sides consider they will need by the end of the reductions within the framework of the agreed levels. The Soviet Union's preliminary intention is to reduce in the context of its strategic nuclear forces the number of ICBM's by approximately 400 missiles (30 percent) and the number of SLBM's by approximately 500 missiles (50 percent). There will be practically no reduction of heavy bombers in the Soviet Union.

I will provide the following table as a demonstration for your readers.

USSR	Initial Figures	Approximate Number of Strategic Offensive Weapons Being Reduced to Levels of 1,600 Delivery Vehicles and 6,000 Weapons
ICBM's	1,398	approximately 400 (30 percent)
SLBM's	940	approximately 500 (50 percent)
Heavy Bombers	162	—
Total	2,500	900 (36 percent)
Weapons	10,271	4,271 (approx. 42 percent)
United States		
ICBM's	1,000	approximately 250 (25 percent)
SLBM's	648	approximately 200 (30 percent)
Heavy Bombers	574	approximately 200 (35 percent)
Total	2,222	622 (28 percent)
Weapons	10,371	4,371 (42 percent)

The total throw-weight of the ICBM's and SLBM's deployed by both sides as a result of the reduction will not exceed the level of approximately 50 percent of the existing level of the total throw-weight of the Soviet Union's deployed ICBM's and SLBM's.

Existing types of heavy ICBM's which are being quantitatively limited can be modernized within agreed criteria. But the creation [sozdaniye], production, and deployment of new types of heavy missiles is prohibited.

Heavy bombers equipped with nuclear arms will count as one vehicle toward the maximum level of 1,600 units. Those that are equipped with nuclear bombs and air-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 600 km will count as one weapon, which will be included in the maximum of 6,000. U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range (over 600 km) ALCM's will count as 10 weapons. The similar USSR bombers will count as eight.

Sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's] will not be limited by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. They are limited by the sides' politically binding statements relating to deployed long-range nuclear SLCM's. The number of these deployed SLCM's on each side should not exceed 880 for the duration of the treaty.

The reduction of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers and their armaments will be carried out over a period of seven years in three stages (lasting three, two, and two years). We will reach this goal by reequipping or eliminating strategic offensive armaments in accordance with agreed procedures. ICBM's and SLBM's will be able to be used to launch objects into the upper layers of the atmosphere or into outer space.

The treaty will remain in force for 15 years and can be extended for further five-year periods unless it is replaced by a subsequent agreement before its term is up.

[Litovkin] What have we and the Americans gained from this treaty?

[Yazov] I would single out a few fundamental points. Our partners agreed with our demand for the 1972 ABM Treaty to be observed because a profound reduction of strategic offensive arms is impossible without a ban on the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of wide-ranging ABM defense.

Secondly, we secured a restriction on the flight range of ALCM's. This has been fixed at 600 km. Why 600? There are many reasons for this: The main reason being our antiaircraft defense capabilities. A longer range would enable the United States, for instance, to equip its tactical aviation strike aircraft with these missiles, allowing them to carry out attacks without coming within range of our antiaircraft defenses.

The restrictions on SLCM's are very important (they have a range of up to 2,600 km and fly at an altitude of 50 meters). Combating these missiles is a difficult task. They pose a serious threat. And the United States has a great advantage as regards these missiles.

We agreed that we would settle the question of SLCM's outside the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty. The number of these missiles has been reduced to 880 units. Their range has also been fixed at 600 km.

Needless to say, it was difficult to reach agreement on this. The sides had to make certain compromises. Thus, the U.S. side pressed for a total ban on the production, all launches, and modernization of our heavy ICBM's. But then we would be left with no chance of counteraction in the event of the United States' deploying wide-ranging ABM defense.

We agreed to cut our heavy ICBM's, as you already know, by 50 percent. We will not create [ne budem sozdavat], test, or deploy new types of these missiles, but we are entitled to modernize them.

We are keeping our mobile ICBM's. At the same time we agreed to cut back roughly 50 percent of the total throw-weight of our ICBM's and SLBM's and agreed to count each heavy bomber with low-yield nuclear armaments and nuclear bombs as one carrier and one weapon.

There are other conditions too. I want to stress the main point. The Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty is an adequately well-balanced, well-considered document ensuring the sides' equality and identical security.

[Litovkin] Why did the sides only agree to a 40 percent cut in their strategic offensive arms—a 50 percent cut was planned, after all?

[Yazov] The point is that the preliminary accord in 1987 concerned the number of remaining nuclear munitions and carriers. It was thought that the number of carriers in 1991 would be greater than it is. But life and the real situation have made changes. There is nothing surprising in that. I

think that a 40 percent reduction in nuclear weapons represents a tremendous success for both sides.

[Litovkin] What guarantees are there that the treaty will be carried out?

[Yazov] The guarantees are our experience of implementing the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and strict verification, including use of national equipment and facilities, on-site inspections, data exchange, and a system of notification, along with an end to the restrictions on access to telemetric information transmitted by ICBM's and SLBM's when launched.

Verification makes provision for permanent stays [postoyanno prebyvaniye] by inspection groups at mobile missile production sites, trips to deployment areas, and a number of other conditions that will enable us to keep trusting one another.

[Litovkin] So, the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty has been signed. What next?

[Yazov] I think that the next stage in ensuring international security could be to reach a qualitatively new level of cooperation between the USSR, the United States, and other states. First, political structures must do their work. I would single out two main areas here: the European-U.S., and the global areas. The state of affairs as regards the former is the most productive. It could be possible to outline the aim of moving on from separate major agreements to setting up an effective system of mutual security or permanent European security structures.

There could specifically be talk of setting up a permanent organ (a kind of European Security Council) vested with extensive powers—possibly based on the Conflict Prevention Center—"coalescing" existing military structures. In the course of this process there could be further strategic offensive arms cuts, restrictions on nuclear tests, and an agreement on further cuts in conventional armed forces (Vienna-2) and reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. Naval forces must also be included in the disarmament process.

The second area involves resolving major global questions, above all through relations with developing countries. It could consist of maintaining stability there, averting and settling regional conflicts, preventing the proliferation of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons, along with missiles and missile technology, and reducing the trade in combat hardware and arms.

There are many prospects. But first it is important to carry out precisely and thoroughly the pledges that have been made. Peoples' hopes of a secure world must not be disappointed.

Lebedev Explains Provisions

91WC1040B Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with Major General Yuriy Lebedev, Soviet military expert, by E. Alekseyev and Yu. Dmitriyev; place and date not given: "A Terrible Weapon Loses Weight: What the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Provides For"]

[Text] It is the general opinion that the culmination of the present meeting between the presidents of the USSR and the United States will be the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START]. This ceremonial act will draw the line under the nine-year marathon of discussions, doubts, heated arguments, and difficult compromise. It has taken nine long years to reach agreement on the initial stage of a reduction in the level of the strategic nuclear missile confrontation between our two countries. But how, and by how much? This is the subject of an interview with Soviet military expert Major General Yuriy Lebedev.

[TRUD] Let us begin with what is, in our opinion, the main thing, namely, under the treaty, how realistically will the most terrible and powerful of weapons—the strategic offensive arms—be reduced?

[Lebedev] First of all it is necessary to emphasize that the treaty covers all the main components of strategic offensive arms, namely, ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles [GLBM's], submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's], and heavy bombers. This will be the largest treaty ever drawn up in history. What is important about it is that it not only limits strategic arms but also really reduces them.

And now, what are called the basic parameters of the treaty. Here we must quote many figures, but they are the essence of the treaty.

Thus, under the terms of the treaty, each of the sides will reduce the total number of GLBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber delivery systems deployed to a level of 1,600. Within the limits of this number of weapons, the number of heavy GLBM's deployed, which only the USSR has, will be reduced to 154.

With respect to weapons [boyezaryady] deployed on GLBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, each side will reduce these to 6,000. No more than 4,900 should be deployed on GLBM's and SLBM's, no more than 1,540 on heavy bombers, and no more than 1,100 weapons on mobile GLBM's.

[TRUD] You have cited the maximum number of weapons reduced under the treaty. But how do they correspond to the numbers of weapons [zaryady] in existence?

[Lebedev] It will not be a mistake to assert that during the course of the implementation of the treaty the weapons on strategic delivery systems will be approximately halved. But for the delivery systems the reductions will be less than 40 percent for the USSR and about 30 percent for the United States.

The treaty also provides for reductions in the total throw-weight carried by the GLBM's and SLBM's deployed by the sides. After these reductions the throw-weight will not exceed a level that is approximately 50 percent of that existing in the Soviet Union.

And yet one more detail should be noted, namely, that heavy GLBM's of the existing types subject to limitations

with respect to numbers can be modernized within the framework of agreed criteria. However, new types of heavy GLBM's are banned.

Heavy bombers that can be armed with nuclear weapons will count as one delivery system within the 1,600 level. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear bombs and air-to-ground missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometers will count as one weapon. They, too, will be counted as part of the 6,000 level. Heavy U.S. bombers equipped for nuclear air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's] with a range of more than 600 kilometers will count as 10 weapons. Similar USSR heavy bombers will count as eight. Within the limit of 1,600 delivery systems the United States may have no more than 150 heavy bombers armed with nuclear ALCM's, which are counted as 10 weapons, while the USSR may have no more than 180 of these bombers.

It is planned to implement the quantitative limitations set by the treaty by re-equipping or eliminating strategic offensive arms in three stages in accordance with agreed procedures over seven years.

[TRUD] Has the question of sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's] been resolved or set aside?

[Lebedev] Long-range SLCM's, that is, those with a range of more than 600 kilometers, are not directly covered by the START treaty. However, with respect to these missiles the sides are issuing a politically binding statement. The number of such SLCM's deployed will not exceed 880 for each of the sides while the treaty is in force.

[TRUD] How will treaty compliance be monitored?

[Lebedev] For the entire period that the START treaty is in force there will be what I would say is an unprecedented regime of monitoring of compliance. It will include the use of national technical means, various categories of on-site inspections, the exchange of data and a system of mutual notification, and a ban on hampering access to telemetry information transmitted from aboard ballistic missiles during launches. So it is a broad and reliable system.

[TRUD] It is pleasing to be able to state that every detail of the treaty has been worked out and agreed upon. But surely everything was not quite so simple, was it? On what in particular did the two sides "stumble"?

[Lebedev] The process of the negotiations for the START treaty was complex in nature and demanded certain compromises from both sides, particularly on the most difficult questions. And there were many such questions.

I believe it is worthwhile to single out the problem of the interconnection between the new treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty. On this issue the USSR and the United States had taken diametrically opposed positions. The Soviet side proceeded from the premise of the need to preserve the ABM Treaty as a defining condition for the stability of the strategic situation. The United States brought things to an undermining position of that treaty by retaining for itself the possibility of deploying an "effective strategic defense" within the framework of SDI.

In order to extricate ourselves from this impasse the Soviet side said that it would be possible to sign a START treaty

even in the event that no agreement would have been reached on the ABM problem by the time it was to be signed. At the same time provision was made for our statement that if the ABM Treaty were violated, that would free us from our obligations under START.

Another complicated problem has been that of limiting heavy bombers, and also certain issues concerning monitoring. But thanks to the mutual efforts of the sides and their desire to achieve positive results, agreement was reached on those issues.

[TRUD] In conclusion, what is your assessment of the importance of the treaty for the security of our country?

[Lebedev] If we proceed from the premise that approximate balance was established during the 1970's between the USSR and the United States in terms of strategic forces, then arms reductions in line with the START treaty, which reduces the level of nuclear confrontation, will not upset that balance.

The START treaty will undoubtedly bring much that is positive in both the military and political aspects.

It is a first step providing for a significant reduction in the most powerful and dangerous weapons. Consequently, the level of nuclear confrontation will be lowered, and that means that the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war is reduced.

The treaty significantly augments the changes in sociopolitical thinking that have taken place in recent times and been reflected in the steady trend toward expanding cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

It is also important that the new treaty will be a good basis for further advance along the road of eliminating nuclear weapons. Factors such as the adjusted balance of military forces, the strengthening of mutual trust, and a more stable strategic situation will promote this.

Democratic Movement Welcomes Treaty

OW0208051191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1100 GMT 1 Aug 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Movement for Democratic Reforms welcomes the signing of the strategic arms reduction treaty (START) by the Soviet and American Presidents, the movement announced in its statement. The act of signing these documents is of enormous importance not only for the USSR and the U.S., but also for the world as a whole, the statement points out.

According to the statement, this poses a very serious step in the particularly complicated and sensitive area of nuclear disarmament. As a result a considerable part of the two countries strategic arsenals will be liquidated. Besides, the treaty establishes tough enough restrictions and ceilings for many categories of strategic arms as well as provides for strict control over compliance with commitments under the treaty, including long-site inspections. The treaty will undoubtedly strengthen the regime of

non-proliferation of nuclear arms and the maintenance of another treaty on limiting anti-missile defence systems.

Nevertheless the Movement for Democratic Reforms points out in its statement that the treaty could have been signed earlier if at the various stages of negotiations certain circles, including Soviet, which should be mentioned unequivocally, had not put up resistance to its signing. However attempts to upset the treaty failed.

But these attempts were not altogether futile, the statement goes on to say. Much will have to be done to strengthen mutual trust and prove that both sides are reliable partners at disarmament talks. Nonetheless the signing of the strategic arms reduction treaty (START) has restored the necessary dynamics in the Soviet-American relationship and opened new prospects in different directions.

According to the authors of the statement, the Moscow meeting between the Soviet and American Presidents "objectively served the interests of stabilizing the situation in this country and promoting democratisation processes in the USSR. To cut strategic arms and defence spending is a kind of direct investment in the Soviet economy. Moreover, it's a big contribution to the efforts to strengthen peace and international security".

Military Analyst Views Treaty

LD0108171691 Moscow TASS in English 1534 GMT
1 Aug 91

[by TASS military analyst Valdimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, August 1 (TASS)—The signing in Moscow of the Soviet-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) has produced nothing like the euphoria the world experienced when the two countries signed the intermediary nuclear force treaty in 1986 to scrap their medium and shorter range missiles.

Even before this new treaty was signed the world public was already inured to the thought that the threat of a catastrophic nuclear war had already been radically reduced. It is known that the Soviet-U.S. Moscow summit focused not around military but economic and political problems. The whirlpool of recent developments has obfuscated the fact that arms to be restricted under the START treaty include B-52 bombers and non-nuclear cruise missiles which were used in the Gulf war a short time ago and caused thousands upon thousands of deaths.

However, the significance of the new treaty is by far not symbolic. It envisages the most significant reduction of armaments in mankind's history.

The SALT-2 treaty, that was never ratified and implemented, provided for the scrapping of about 300 Soviet and U.S. missiles or bombers. The START treaty provides for the scrapping within seven years of five to six times more strategic arms delivery vehicles.

The historic INF treaty reduced the total nuclear weapon nuclear tonnage by three-to-four percent. Under the treaty signed in Moscow this past Wednesday, nearly 48 percent of all Soviet and about 39 percent of all U.S. ballistic missile warheads will be eliminated.

Earlier specialists noted that the reduction of weapons as a result of negotiations lagged behind the actual arms growth during the period of conducting these negotiations. Now, as a result of the fulfillment of the START treaty, both sides will reach a strategic arms level which existed when the negotiations first began nine years ago. However, the treaty sets up no insurmountable barriers to the qualitative improvement of weapons which can reduce quantitative cuts to nil.

The Geneva negotiations were characterized by a patient search for mutually acceptable solutions. Compromise was at times reached in a most bizarre form. For instance, as the United States insisted, up to 20 nuclear bombs carried by a strategic bomber will be regarded as equal to one ballistic missile warhead. These bizarre rules for counting weapons resulted in cutting about one third of strategic weapons by each side instead of fifty percent as planned earlier. The USSR cuts somewhat more of its strategic weapons than the United States. In its time the United States demanded that the Soviet powerful SS-18 missiles be fully scrapped. But then a compromise solution was found—the Soviet Union will cut only half of its delivery vehicles of this kind.

The Soviet side eventually agreed to overlook naval cruise missiles in the present treaty. They are considered in a special protocol to the treaty. On the other hand, Washington made concessions to the Soviet side and agreed to legalise mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with which only the Soviet Union is armed.

The START treaty has not solved all problems of ensuring peace on earth. Each side retains enough nuclear weapons to enable it to destroy life on earth many times over. Both sides need to ensure a continuous process of negotiations on the reduction of mass destruction weapons, including strategic. It is important to submit the START treaty for ratification by Soviet and U.S. legislators in time in order to avoid the fate that befell the 1979 SALT-2 treaty, the treaty that was signed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter but was later formally rejected by his successor Ronald Reagan.

Likely Impact of START Treaty Viewed

*PM0208130291 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Aug 91 First Edition p 3*

[By Manki Ponomarev: "We Need It, and So Does the Whole World"]

[Text] By the time this issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reaches the readers, the two-day meeting in Moscow between the Soviet and U.S. presidents will be over. But as I write these lines it is still going on. And therefore I cannot, of course, claim to make a comprehensive analysis of its outcome. As the poet said, shapes are more clearly visible from a distance: A face seen close up is blurred. And this meeting was an event on such a large scale that a certain distance in time is necessary in order to assess it fully.

All of this is true. Nonetheless I will venture to express an opinion on some of the major problems raised during the many hours of talks in Moscow and Novo-Ogarevo. Because what was discussed is something that not only we, the Soviet Union, and not only the United States, need; the whole world needs it.

In this context it appears necessary to return in our thoughts to M.S. Gorbachev's Nobel lecture. Speaking in Oslo, he said that peace now presupposes an ascent from mere coexistence to cooperation and joint creativity by countries and peoples, and predicted that in the late 20th century force and weapons will have to be substantially suppressed as the main lever of world politics.

It is less than two months since these words were spoken. But they have already been confirmed convincingly in the course of the Moscow summit meeting.

Indeed, the whole course of the summit showed that both the USSR and the United States have advanced purposefully toward a new era, toward new milestones in bilateral relations, which in a number of instances can be characterized as partnership. This applies to their joint actions in the international arena—on regional problems, for instance. It applies to the problems of ensuring security in the most direct sense of the word—the military sense, to problems of alleviating the burden of superarming.

The ceremonial signing in the Kremlin of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms is clear evidence of this. This is indeed a major step toward strengthening strategic stability, toward disarmament in the most dangerous and certainly the most complex sphere.

The treaty's text has yet to be published, and it is hardly likely to be published in the newspapers—the document is too long, running to hundreds of pages. But the public already knows about some of its main provisions, and these enable us to assess its full significance.

For the first time in history it is a question of not only limiting, but reducing strategic nuclear arms. The reductions are considerable—by approximately one-third of the number actually deployed today. Upper limits have been set on what the parties to the agreement can have, along with very strict measures of monitoring observance of the accords. In short, the signing of the START treaty has shown that given good will, the biggest tasks are within the powers of the Soviet Union and the United States.

It must be mentioned that the newly concluded treaty is meeting with not only approval and support, but also criticism, some of it very sharp, among a section of the foreign public, and our own too. People point out, for instance, that according to the letter of the treaty, the United States, instead of reducing the number of its nuclear weapons to 6,000, could increase them to 11,000. Other criticisms are also made.

Well, there may be criticisms of some of the treaty's provisions, but it must be remembered that they were formulated under the conditions of a sharply deteriorating "cold war," whose consequences have not yet been fully overcome to this day, and they were formulated in relation to those conditions. More than nine years of hard work

produced the maximum that could be achieved. Take the possibility of the United States increasing the number of its nuclear weapons to 11,000. The possibility exists, but the intention to do so does not. We have every reason to believe that, precisely because of the treaty, they will not do it.

Of course, we must not get complacent. Reports come in from time to time from across the ocean that cause us to doubt the true desire of certain circles to strengthen stability in the military sphere, but that is on the side. In the main the treaty is wholly in accordance with the interests of the parties that signed it.

Here I think it is apposite to cite an assessment of the treaty by Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. He believes that the treaty will ensure the security of our national interests to the fullest extent.

It is also necessary to take sober account of the realities that will determine the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty. Thus it does not prohibit us from testing nuclear warheads, or the United States from modernizing theirs. But as Academician Ye. Velikhov said the other day, neither the USSR nor the United States is in a position to do this in practice: Thanks to the demands of the public, the production of fissile materials has stopped in both countries.

Thus the conclusion of the START treaty, whose implementation is to take place over seven years, confirms the view that weapons will have to be suppressed by the end of the 20th century. In this connection the question arises: What next? Does this treaty mark the end of the disarmament problem, or is it only a stage on the road to a world where weapons will cease to play a top, decisive role? It seems that there are no grounds for regarding it as an end. The time has come to move on to the next stages—to begin serious talks on tactical nuclear weapons, space arms, naval forces, chemical weapons, and not only between the USSR and the United States. It is time to bring other countries belonging to the "nuclear club" into these talks. The main thing is that a new conceptual basis of security must be formulated, based on joint schemes for strategic stability and defense sufficiency.

Only time will tell what will happen in practice. But the question arises: If force and weapons are ceasing (they have not yet ceased, of course—remember the Gulf war) or will in the foreseeable future cease to be the main lever of world politics, what will take their place? I think the Moscow meeting answered this question. Economic problems, and also regional problems, are increasingly coming to the fore.

That is why the question of ways of stabilizing the situation in the Soviet Union occupied such a major place at the talks. President Bush quite naturally wanted to know what and whom he has to deal with in the USSR. And President Gorbachev, answering in broad terms the questions of his partner in the talks, not only emphasized our determination to continue and develop political and economic reforms, but also noted that improving relations with the

United States is a final choice that is in the profound long-term interests of our country.

Welcoming the readiness expressed by the U.S. leadership to develop trade relations with the USSR and grant it most-favored-nation status, the Soviet side called for the speediest eradication of the "cold war" legacy in this sphere. One of its relics, seriously hampering both bilateral economic relations and the USSR's incorporation into the world economic system, is the Cocom lists of restrictions. These are obsolete, and only hamper the launching of large-scale projects for what is ultimately mutually beneficial cooperation.

Other questions were also examined at the two presidents' meeting, and of these I would like to highlight regional questions, especially that of the Near East. A joint statement was adopted expressing the desire to hold a peace conference and achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in the region. A joint statement was also adopted on the situation in Yugoslavia. A common language was also found on a number of other regional problems.

It would, of course, be wrong to claim that there were no difficulties during the talks, that the atmosphere in which they were held remained invariably cloudless. At times pressure could be sensed from those forces across the ocean that would not mind warming their hands at the difficulties the Soviet Union is experiencing and pushing it toward disintegration.

The American side placed what I regard as excessive emphasis, for instance, on the Soviet Union's relations with Cuba. And in a number of other cases the U.S. President's tone was importunately lecturing, especially when it came to a number of internal aspects of Soviet policy, particularly in relation to the Baltics, or relations with other countries, first and foremost Japan, where Bush expressed solidarity solely with the Japanese view on the so-called "northern territories." But there is nothing surprising about that. The United States has every right to its own view of problems, and the differences that exist, far from overshadowing the generally optimistic character of the Moscow meeting, only serve to highlight it.

Both for us and the whole world, the Moscow meeting showed that a further improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and the scaling of new heights in cooperation between our great countries is in the interests of everyone and detrimental to no one. I think the near future will confirm this conclusion.

START Treaty Provisions Viewed

*PM0208122591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Aug 91 Second Edition p 4*

[By Yevgeniy Shashkov: "START Made"]

[Text] So another Soviet-U.S. summit meeting is behind us. Although disarmament problems were not the main or only point on the agenda the signing by the USSR and U.S. presidents of the treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms was undoubtedly its culmination.

We shall not try to pretend: Had this agreement not been ready for signing, the very summit meeting would have been in doubt.

The 700-page document backed by the signatures of the heads of the two superpowers is the outcome of many years of efforts by politicians, diplomats, and military men. (Almost 10 years ago they began with a 59-page draft of the treaty). It is the result of the enormous labor of a whole generation of Soviet and U.S. participants in the talks, the fruit of their will and patience, boldness and trust, and the breaking of stereotypes. But it is at the same time the beginning, a kind of "START" (incidentally, that is the English acronym for the agreement on strategic offensive arms) to an unprecedentedly large voluntary reduction of the strategic nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States. Both M. Gorbachev and G. Bush assessed this document very highly and noted its historic importance not only for our two countries but also for the whole world.

What is the thrust of this document, what are its main provisions? I do not lay claim to a thorough account of the treaty, which is virtually impossible in a newspaper column. I shall merely highlight its main provisions, basing myself on how Soviet and U.S. specialists interpret it. And so the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons will continue for seven years. The arsenal of Soviet ground-launched ICBM's must be reduced by 30 percent and of U.S. ground-launched ICBM's by 25 percent while submarine-launched ballistic missiles must be reduced by 50 and 30 percent respectively. Soviet heavy bombers will not be reduced at all while for the Americans their number will decrease by 35 percent. As a whole the arsenal of delivery vehicles coming under the treaty will be reduced by 36 percent by the USSR and 28 percent by the United States. As for the number of warheads [boyezaryady], it will be reduced by approximately 42 percent for both the USSR and the United States.

The term of the treaty is 15 years unless it is replaced with a new agreement before then. It can be extended for another five years with both sides' agreement. The provision on the Soviet Union's unilateral statement that one of the "exceptional circumstances" which could serve as grounds for suspending the treaty's operation could be the withdrawal of one side from the ABM Treaty or its substantial violation is of extraordinary importance.

I intentionally cited a long list of figures since it seems to me that it is to the figures that those initially critical of the disarmament processes within the START framework will turn. And the fact that there will be criticism was stated by the Soviet president when the treaty was signed: "There will be talk here in Moscow of one-sided concessions while in Washington there will be talk of concessions to the Soviet Union."

Indeed, the agreement is characterized by a spirit of mutual concessions and compromises. I shall cite just one example of these concessions. The United States has agreed that our TU-22M ("Backfire"), which the Western press has been using in recent years to intimidate its ordinary readers, should not be regarded as a heavy bomber since the Soviet side has undertaken not to give it

an intercontinental range, including through the use of midair refueling. On the other hand the Americans have agreed to count their MX "Peacekeeper" missile as a mobile missile although only in principle could it be converted in this way. Foreseeing possible criticism leveled at him on his return home, when he signed the treaty G. Bush stated frankly: "Neither side has acquired unilateral advantages over the other."

Of course, it is sad that the absurd logic of overarmament has become so deeply rooted in the consciousness of many people in both the USSR and the United States that even the two countries' presidents, on signing very important documents like the START treaty are obliged to be evasive with regard to those who do not want nuclear disarmament. As, incidentally, they have to do with regard to those who, conversely, demand even more rapid nuclear disarmament steps. The logic of the latter's appeals is akin to the naive dreams of some of our figures who think that "we can scrap all the missiles and immediately start living like real people."

Time will be needed for the militarized and primitivized political thinking rooted in public awareness to be replaced by normal, human thinking. Only then will the doctrines of warfare give way to the concepts for forestalling and preventing them and only then will plans for the "crushing defeat" of an imagined enemy be replaced by joint plans for strategic stability and defense sufficiency. The START treaty is only a kind of start, a first but very important and necessary step in that direction. One wants to believe that the time will come when all members of the "nuclear club" will realize that a concept of security based on nuclear overarmament is not strategy but pathology.

NATO Officials Said To Welcome START Treaty

PM0208131591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Aug 91 Second Edition p 4

[By V. Peresada: "Rivalry? No, Partnership!"]

[Text] Brussels, 1 August—In the North Atlantic alliance, where they kept a close watch on the course of the Moscow meeting, the reaction to its results came from the highest level. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has issued an official statement on the signing of the START treaty.

The statement warmly welcomes the Soviet-U.S. treaty. Its signing, the NATO leader believes, is one more step toward a world in which security will be guaranteed by a minimum quantity of arms which, Woerner said, is also the aim of the North Atlantic alliance. In proposing a substantial reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR, the treaty at the same time will substantially strengthen the sides' mutual trust in this sphere and lay the foundation to strategic stability in the 21st century, the NATO secretary general stressed.

And here is what the leadership of the North Atlantic Assembly, which unites the parliamentarians of the NATO countries, thinks of the results of the Moscow summit. My interlocutor is John Boravski [surname as transliterated], director of the assembly's political committee.

"In my view the political importance of this meeting is that it displayed with unprecedented clarity the desire of the United States and the USSR not for rivalry but for partnership. That is borne out primarily by the spirit of mutual understanding embodied in specific joint decisions. As a representative of the North Atlantic Assembly, to which security problems are particularly close, I would like to single out among these decisions the treaty on strategic nuclear forces. It will undoubtedly go down in history because until now we have succeeded in reaching agreements only on not building up these forces. But now for the first time there will be reductions."

"Whatever skeptics may say, in particular by stressing the fact that only one third of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR will be reduced and that the remaining potential could destroy all mankind within an hour," my interlocutor continued, "it is clear to realistically minded people that a great deed has been done. A path has been opened, not verbally but in essence, toward the practical easing of confrontation at the level of the most powerful and dangerous modern weapons systems, and that is of colossal importance not only for the USSR and the United States themselves but also for the world as a whole. This is true primarily for Europe, where the confrontation between West and East has always been particularly tangible. Although the Soviet-U.S. treaty is bilateral and does not affect the strategic situation in Europe directly, it cannot fail to affect the movement of the 'European train' of disarmament and confidence-building. After all, it has been concluded not simply by the nuclear powers but also by the most influential participants of the CSCE process. I am convinced that the constructive approaches they have displayed in the sphere of strategic nuclear forces will encourage a similar trend at talks on other problems connected with the consolidation of international security, including within the framework of the all-European process."

It is no accident that the sociopolitical circles of the NATO countries, including the North Atlantic Assembly, see in this treaty, as in the Moscow meeting of the USSR and U.S. presidents in general, a breakthrough toward new order in the world of which very recently we could only dream.

Observer Sums Up START Achievements

PM0408150191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Aug 91 Second Edition p 6

[Political observer Tomas Kolesnichenko "View from Moscow": "Even the Impossible Is Possible"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms [START] was the culmination of the Moscow meeting. And it was this that got the main compliments. At the same time you do not have to be a military specialist to see that this treaty is by no means ideal and is vulnerable to criticism. But it enshrines the chief point, which has enabled all of us who live on the earth to breathe a sigh of relief. I mean the reversal of the arms race. The count is now going back down to "zero."

Nonetheless this treaty has to be defended, as the White House has done by disseminating an official statement. It points out that considerable reductions in the strategic nuclear forces deployed by both sides are envisaged for the first time in the history of arms control. Still more importantly, the START Treaty will strengthen strategic stability in the three main aspects:

- First, it will concentrate the reductions on the most threatening and destabilizing systems. These reductions will be equivalent to a reduction by 40-50 percent in the total number of warheads of strategic missiles deployed today.
- Second, the treaty will prompt both sides to change the structure of their strategic forces so as to make them less threatening. In accordance with this treaty a ban will be imposed on new types of heavy ICBM's [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile], and it will encourage a reorientation on a wider scale to heavy bombers, SLBM's [Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile], and ICBM's with fewer warheads on each one.
- Third, the treaty provides for numerous, diverse, unprecedented, and strict measures of verification, which are to help ensure compliance with this treaty. These measures will also help to strengthen mutual trust and to reduce uncertainty. They include a ban on encoding the data transmitted during ballistic missile flight tests, the intensive exchange of information on the size and composition of the strategic forces of each of the sides, 13 different types of on-site checks, and special verification of the production of mobile ICBM's.

All this really is a tremendous achievement. It is pointless to deny this. But it is clear even to an ordinary, untrained eye, as it is to that of a military specialist, that the emphasis here has been placed on ground missiles. Incidentally, we have more of them. Moreover, the treaty permits the modernization of strategic weapons. I will point out that this is not to reproach the treaty but to emphasize that there is still "untapped potential." A particularly large proportion of it will be revealed in the United States when the question of naval missiles and new technology arises. And I would very much like the Moscow meeting to make a start on a new START, as the abbreviation for strategic offensive arms sounds in English. [passage omitted]

START Negotiator Discusses Treaty

LD0408184591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program
Radio-1 Network in Russian 1230 GMT 4 Aug 91

["International Review: The World This Week" program presented by Viktor Levin, with Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, 'roving' ambassador and head of the Soviet delegation on nuclear and space weapons]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. summit has ended. The time has come to review the first results, to make sense of what happened, and to analyze it to some extent. Naturally, attention is drawn first and foremost to the START treaty, which was signed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush. I am deeply grateful to roving ambassador

Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, the head of the Soviet delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, for agreeing to take part in our program, even though it is difficult for him, since the visit has only just ended and he has a great deal of work to do.

Yuriy Konstantinovich, first and foremost, one would like to hear your general evaluation of the treaty, since you have had to carry out some very thorough and painstaking work on it. What would you like to stress first and foremost?

[Nazarkin] For the first time in the history of the two countries possessing the world's biggest stocks of strategic offensive armaments, the process of the reduction of these weapons will begin, thereby commencing the movement toward reducing the level of military confrontation in the sphere of armaments that pose the greatest threat to the whole of mankind. In brief, I think the treaty is significant in the following ways: It is important, I think, to draw attention to one aspect of this—if I may go into detail on this significance—connected with the economy, namely, conversion. Our country is now implementing conversion. The treaty should stimulate this process. At the same time, it will create conditions that ensure that this conversion will not cause any harm to our security. I think that this is very important under the circumstances in which we now find ourselves.

We should not forget, of course, that this treaty will be an extremely important step in the further strengthening of confidence and improvement of relations with the United States. The point is that the START treaty contains a system of verification that is unprecedented in its scope and detail. The sides have already exchanged a great volume of information connected with strategic offensive armaments on both sides, and will continue to do so. This information, this data, will be verified by means of those measures on which we have agreed and which are included in the verification system.

[Levin] In other words, the principle of trust, based on verification, has been embodied in a specific accord.

[Nazarkin] Yes, that is quite right. That is also a very important circumstance, in my view. I would put it this way. As far as the bilateral aspect of our relations with the United States is concerned, the conclusion of the treaty will be an extremely large contribution to bringing Soviet-U.S. military relations into line with the growing level and quality of improving Soviet-U.S. relations in general. Ultimately, as a result of all this, the treaty will expand and strengthen the positive turn that international relations have taken in the world over the last few years thanks to the policy of new thinking making steady headway in the international arena.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, you mentioned what is probably the most important thing, the thing that interests all of us: the problem of national security. Please would you tell us how this problem is being resolved. Why is it that we can say, with every justification, that national security will not suffer as a result of the signing of the treaty or, to be more precise, the fulfillment of this treaty?

The signing is a very important fact, of course, but the treaty has to be honored by both sides. How will national security benefit from the fulfillment of this treaty?

[Nazarkin] The START treaty, as we call it for short, is intended to halt the momentum behind the race in strategic offensive arms. As I have already said, the level of these armaments will be reduced on both sides. Unquestionably, this process of reduction will go further. As I see it, this process will not stop with the conclusion of the START treaty. In other words, it will acquire momentum, but in the opposite direction, in the direction of reducing strategic offensive armaments. The fewer weapons in the world, the more security there will be, not just for the two states making these reductions, but for all others.

[Levin] There are individual comrades in our country—there are not many of them, but such a view is being expressed—who claim that the reduction of strategic armaments will make us more vulnerable. As I understand it, both the Americans and ourselves will have an identical number of strategic armaments as a result of the reductions. Therefore, it seems to me that this view has no foundation. But since such views are being expressed, what would you say to these people?

[Nazarkin] There is no doubt that the treaty is a result of mutual concessions. On some things we conceded, on other things the United States conceded. By the way, there is criticism of the treaty in the United States as well. Moreover, the main aim of the criticism there is that the administration is reproached and accused of damaging U.S. security, as a result of the treaty's conclusion.

[Levin] The terminology is identical.

[Nazarkin] Yes, on the whole, there is a certain mirror reflection. But in order to genuinely, objectively evaluate the treaty, you must not take any of its individual aspects. Let's say on some types of strategic offensive weapons we conceded to the Americans.

[Levin] In particular you have in mind intercontinental ballistic missiles.

[Nazarkin] Yes. In particular it is possible to talk about them, although I would not maintain that we gave way completely on ICBMs. We have two types of these missiles that the United States does not have. I have in mind heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs. The United States does not have heavy ones at all, and they have not yet developed mobile ones. They are carrying out work, and maybe they will develop them, but at the moment they do not have them. For this reason the measures stipulated in the treaty on these missiles, at the present time, refer to us. But if the United States develops these types, then they will refer to the United States to the same degree.

But this is not the only matter. There is criticism of the United States administration due to the United States making concessions to us on heavy bombers. If we are to balance this treaty on a political scale, then we must balance all these aspects. In other words, the treaty was achieved as the result of mutual concessions, a painstakingly checked balance of interests, and it is precisely thanks

to this that it must become a reliable instrument that will strengthen security for both sides.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, in this regard I would like to ask you what role military specialists played in the development of the treaty.

[Nazarkin] The conclusion of the treaty would have been unthinkable without their participation.

[Levin] That is understandable, but....

[Nazarkin, interrupting] I must say that they put much effort into this treaty being concluded. Relations of very close cooperation and, I would say, creative coordination were established inside the delegation and out. Of course, all the decisions that were made in connection with the treaty were made with their direct participation. It could not be otherwise, since the treaty touches on very sensitive spheres of our military mechanism. It would be simply unthinkable for them not to have participated in this.

[Levin] Tell me, please, a few years ago when Ronald Reagan came out with the so-called SDI, the Star Wars program as it was called at that time, we expressed the opinion that the implementation of this program might rule out a possible treaty on strategic offensive weapons since a completely different situation might be created. How has this issue been decided?

[Nazarkin] The link between offensive and defensive weapons in the strategic sphere exists. It is impossible to examine in isolation offensive weapons or defensive weapons. I think that this link had its effect despite work on creating these so-called Star Wars weapons in the United States. Nevertheless, nothing has been undertaken there that would violate the treaty on antimissile defense which was concluded in 1972. I think that the very fact of talks being held is of no small merit. In other words, the U.S. Congress took into account, and now even more will take into consideration, the coming reductions in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons. I think that the signing of the treaty will have the most positive effect on the sphere of defensive weapons as well. That is what I think.

[Levin] I take your reference to a positive effect to mean reduction in appropriations, perhaps eliminating them altogether. After all, these are quite astronomical amounts of money. American congressmen, who must be given credit for being able to value the taxpayers' money, are scarcely going to start spending or giving their blessing to spending on something that, to a considerable measure, is losing all practical sense.

[Nazarkin] That is precisely what I wanted to say. That is quite true.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, I know that at the final stage of the talks there was a very intensive discussion about three particular problems: telemetry, determining new missiles, and counting the number of warheads. What is more, decisions were made at the very last moment. Could you tell us how these problems were resolved, in what way solutions were found, and whether there were elements of haste in the tackling of these issues, that

is, whether there was a slight desire to neglect the substance of the matter given that the summit was looming on the horizon and there was a desire to hold it as soon as possible? In other words, wasn't it that terrible disease—and I have observed for myself that it is not just our characteristic—of fulfilling enhanced pledges by a certain date?

[Nazarkin] You are quite right. Those three matters were indeed dealt with at the closing stage of the talks. But that does not mean that these three issues emerged at that stage of the negotiations. They appeared a very long time ago. As far as telemetry is concerned—to call it that for the sake of brevity—this was a problem that arose back when the SALT-II treaty was being ratified in the United States. By the way, this was one of the accusations levelled against the SALT-II treaty in the United States, that the treaty did not provide for telemetry as a channel for monitoring compliance. Let me explain what it was all about. At the time of launch, each side receives telemetric data, information, for itself from a ballistic missile. This data is then processed and updated. Naturally, in the secretive atmosphere of the cold war this telemetric information was encoded to prevent the other side from gaining access to it and discovering any secrets. We have now agreed in the treaty that neither side will encode the information, thus enabling the other side to check on data, the monitoring of which is provided for in the treaty. Why couldn't we resolve this problem for such a long time? It was mainly because it is very complicated from the technical point of view. In other words, the political decision, the political accord, which I referred to just now, existed before, but each of the sides has its own method of transmitting this information and encoding it. A lot of effort was needed to formulate provisions making it possible for each side to have access to this information in equal measure. Yes, from the technical point of view it was difficult, but when an accord was reached on the need for signing the treaty, a strong political spur was provided—that's how I would describe it—and the technical experts on both sides doubled and tripled their efforts. The problem was finally resolved like that.

[Levin] But they did not surrender their principles?

[Nazarkin] No, of course not. Everything was sorted out very reliably, in equal measure for each side, I believe.

[Levin] What about the other two problems?

[Nazarkin] The other two were also problems that did not just appear at the last moment. Moreover, a decision on them, an agreement on them, was effectively found last year. I have in mind the Houston meeting of the foreign ministers last autumn. But unfortunately the U.S. side then backed away from the accord. Certain details came to the surface that needed further work. That is the reason the three issues that you mentioned were tackled during the final stage.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, I wish to return to the issue of telemetry. I know that the treaty prohibits encoding. That is clear. It also prohibits jamming, and that is also clear. But it also prohibits the use of capsules to deliver such information when ballistic missiles are launched. For the benefit of technically ignorant people like myself, please could you explain what these capsules do?

[Nazarkin] The use of capsules is one way of transmitting telemetric information to Earth. In other words, this information is not transmitted through the air but is recorded on special devices called capsules. When the missile falls to Earth, the capsule is picked up and the data is retrieved. Capsules are also used when the missile passes through what is known as the plasma formation stage. In other words, when a missile enters the dense layers of the atmosphere, it creates a dense layer around itself. This makes it difficult to transmit telemetric information over the air. Therefore, the period when the missile passes through the plasma formation stage is also encapsulated—by us at any rate. I believe that the Americans do not do so. This is another point of difference that caused difficulty when resolving questions related to telemetric information.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, I wish to return to the foundations of this treaty and to ask you a question which, to be honest, I have already heard mentioned several times. Originally, when these talks first began, a 50 percent reduction was mentioned. The figure now arrived at is 30 percent. I understand perfectly well that the important thing was to get the process under way. All the same, why 30 percent and not 50?

[Nazarkin] Well, even at the start it was not envisaged that 50 percent would apply to all parameters. Indeed, a 30 percent reduction is now being discussed. This is also not quite accurate, because, for some parameters, we have in fact agreed on a 50 percent reduction. In other words, in both cases there were elements of simplification. When 50 percent was mentioned, there was a bit of exaggeration. Now that we are talking about 30 percent, we are slightly underestimating. That is how I would put it. But when 50 percent was discussed at the very beginning, it referred to a 50 percent reduction of throw-weight, and that is what we agreed on. Ultimately that is what has been achieved, roughly 50 percent. We have exactly halved heavy ICBMs, the aim of the negotiations from the very beginning. For other parameters, the reduction will in fact be slightly less. As I have already said, one-third is also not quite accurate.

[Levin] That is clear. The reductions are supposed to be achieved within seven years of the treaty's coming into force, in three stages—the first stage consists of three years, stage two, the next two years and stage three, the last two years. This means a precise number of armaments to be scrapped has been spelled out for each stage. Once the first stage has been completed, the second stage will follow. Is that right?

[Nazarkin] Yes. It has been done this way to ensure uniformity in the scrapping process, to ensure that one side does not find itself at an advantage during any one of the stages. For example, we might start reducing quickly while the United States might hold onto its armaments for a bit; or the other way around. I am speaking hypothetically.

[Levin] Yes, I understand.

[Nazarkin] In order to prevent such an imbalance occurring in the process, these intermediate landmarks, as it were, have been established. By the end of the first stage,

the sides must achieve certain intermediate figures. Likewise by the end of the second stage. Subsequently, they will arrive at the finish, so to speak, with 6,000 warheads and 1,600 carriers. The first figure includes 4,900 warheads for ICBMs. For these parameters we have established intermediate levels to ensure uniformity.

[Levin] In other words, this is—I would say—an additional guarantee for national security.

[Nazarkin] Yes, of course.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, how do you see the further development of events? I realize that some sort of pause will probably now ensue because things need to be analyzed. Implementation of this treaty has to start. At the moment it has not even been ratified. We know that this may also take a certain amount of time. But the question of other nuclear powers will no doubt arise, and the idea that they should also join this process in some way. I am not saying at the next stage, but surely they should join in. Then there is a question which cannot fail to worry us. This is the question of how rigorously the requirements of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty are being carried out. After all, we could agree with the Americans—let's speak theoretically, as I do not see any immediate prospect for this at the moment—but we and the Americans could agree that we will not keep nuclear weapons any longer on either side. Britain, France and China will not have them either. Then suddenly it turns out that somebody else has them. That could be extremely dangerous.

[Nazarkin] It is only possible, of course, to talk about no one having nuclear weapons. The conception of a nuclear-free world envisages precisely this—the complete absence of nuclear weapons in all states. You are right to link the problem of reducing nuclear weapons with the problem of their non-proliferation. Of course, the non-proliferation treaty must be observed and it is being observed. In the final count, these flows, so to speak, these processes of non-proliferation, of ensuring non-proliferation, and the reductions of nuclear weapons must, of course, merge.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, I would like to clear up this question: Reductions must take place over seven years. At the same time the treaty is valid for 15 years. According to the agreement between the sides, after this time is up, the treaty will be prolonged for five years, if during this time there is no new agreement. How is this to be understood?

[Nazarkin] The reduction in weapons is only part of the implementation of the treaty. The second part, which will be observed after the first seven years, is observation of the levels to which the sides will come after seven years. In order to be sure that these levels are not exceeded, there exists a monitoring system. In the period after the seven years, this monitoring system will come into action immediately after the treaty comes into force. It is even intended to implement certain measures before this, before it comes into force, the period between its signing and its coming into force. But after seven years reductions will not take place since the sides will come to the level which we

agreed, but the necessity of monitoring these levels will remain. And this will be continued.

[Levin] Yuriy Konstantinovich, in both the American press and our own I have seen various initial figures from which the Americans and ourselves will go towards implementing the provisions of this treaty. The variants are fairly noticeable, yet everyone refers to authoritative sources. I noticed, if I have understood correctly, that we are proceeding from the date of 1 September 1990. The Americans are proceeding from this date as well. Right?

[Nazarkin] Yes, that is absolutely correct. We exchanged data from precisely this date. These data will be updated according to the position on the day the treaty comes into force.

[Levin] That is, the point of calculation will be the day that the treaty comes into force. It is important, if I understand it correctly, not how much there are just now—say the Americans have 11,000 and we have more or less—it is important that we come to the same parameters. Right?

[Nazarkin] Yes, absolutely correct.

[Levin] But it is not important how many nuclear weapons one or other side has today.

[Nazarkin] Of course this is important. But I think that you put the question correctly. The United States has more nuclear weapons, about 13,000. We have about 10,000. We have more carriers. We have about 2,500 carriers, while the Americans have 2,200. Therefore, we are beginning to move with various indices from these basic parameters. But at the end of the seven year, period we must come to the same indices—6,000 weapons and 1,100 carriers.

[Levin] Thank you very much, Yuriy Konstantinovich, for this conversation. I think that we can congratulate everyone, the whole of mankind, on the conclusion of this treaty, particularly those who directly participated in its development.

[Nazarkin] Thank you very much.

Moiseyev Comments on Strategic Arms Treaty

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[Interview with Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by observer M. Ponomarev; date, place not given: "Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty and USSR Security"]

[Text] [Ponomarev] The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow a few days ago, has elicited a multitude of comments both in our country and abroad. The majority of them concur that the realization of the treaty will result in the strengthening of strategic stability, lower the level of military confrontation, and reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Is it possible, Mikhail Alekseyevich, to agree with such an assessment?

[Moiseyev] Putting it in a nutshell, I could say: "Undoubtedly." But, obviously, such a laconic reply would not be

enough. In order to explain why I think this, I would single out certain aspects of strategic stability.

The provisions contained in the treaty represent, on the whole, a balance of the interests of the USSR and the United States, reached on the basis of compromise decisions. The chief objective during the talks, in my view, was the search for approaches which would not give the other side an opportunity to secure unilateral military advantages nor allow our country's security to be reduced. At the same time the constant orientation toward preserving strategic stability, i.e. a situation devoid of preconditions for the outbreak of nuclear war, was exceptionally important. Both sides strove for this.

Back in the early seventies, being concerned to strengthen its own security, the Soviet Union created a nuclear potential comparable with the U.S. potential. Strategic parity and strategic equilibrium were thereby achieved between the USSR and the United States. In speaking of this, I would particularly like to emphasize that we have always endeavored to regard the existence of military-strategic parity between the opposing sides not only as the quantitative equality of nuclear arms or the comparability of their specifications and performance characteristics but also from the viewpoint of the sides' capacity for a nuclear counterstrike which would deprive the attacking side of all the military advantages of inflicting the first strike.

At the same time it was absolutely clear that the levels of strategic nuclear arms which the USSR and the United States had accumulated by the early eighties were excessive. As new and increasingly sophisticated strategic arms were being created, their cost rose—which had a negative impact on the economy. All the more so as the buildup of strategic nuclear potentials was not helping to strengthen security but, paradoxical though this may sound, was undermining it. The threat of a nuclear catastrophe was intensifying, not diminishing. Both sides clearly understood this.

What was the reason for the emergence of military confrontation at superhigh levels? In my view, the cause lay in the choice of the way in which security was to be achieved. It so happened that the sides were building up their nuclear might in a practically unlimited way in the pursuit of security. The results are well known.

The mass media had already reported that today we have 2,500 delivery systems, and the United States 2,222. It must be remarked here that on signing the treaty the U.S. side made its data more precise, and the Memorandum of Understanding now states 2,246 delivery systems (10,563 weapons).

Without any particular arguments the sides reached agreement that the levels of strategic offensive arms must be seriously reduced. It was not at all difficult to set the limits: 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 nuclear charges. But I would describe the whole subsequent course of the talks as a period of dogged, painstaking work to preserve the sides'

existing structures of strategic offensive arms in the process of their future reduction. I believe that this was achieved. This is very important, for a review of the structure of our strategic nuclear forces in addition to their reduction would require big additional expenditure. On, let us say, for example, the building of modern, and very costly, strategic bombers to replace the land-based ICBM's which are to be eliminated.

Thanks to such an approach, the treaty makes it possible, in the final analysis, to strengthen strategic stability appreciably under conditions of reducing strategic offensive arms. After they have been reduced, the temptation to inflict a surprise nuclear strike will also diminish, since the role of a counterstrike is being preserved and the regime envisaged in the treaty for verifying the sides' strategic nuclear arms reduces the likelihood of any surprises—in other words, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict.

[Ponomarev] In this connection could you speak about the correlation of strategic nuclear forces between the USSR and the United States and explain what it will be like after the treaty obligations have been fulfilled?

[Moiseyev] Of the 2,500 delivery systems which we have deployed, 1,398 missiles are sited on land, of which 321 ICBM's are mobile. All these missiles are capable of carrying 6,612 nuclear charges—this is 64.4 percent of all the nuclear charges housed in our strategic offensive arms. Precisely 940 missiles with 2,804 nuclear charges (27.3 percent) are located on submarines. As regards strategic aircraft, we have 162 heavy bombers with, according to the established rules of counting, 855 nuclear charges (8.3 percent). These three kinds of based strategic nuclear arms constitute our strategic triad.

The United States also has a triad of strategic offensive arms. However, the distribution of delivery systems is somewhat different there. Precisely 1,000 ICBM's with 2,450 warheads (23.2 percent) are deployed on the ground, and there are not yet any mobile missiles in the United States. There are 672 missiles and 5,760 warheads (54.5 percent of the total number) on submarines. The strategic air force has 574 heavy bombers and 2,353 nuclear charges (22.3 percent) according to the agreed rules for counting them.

Thus, land-based missiles constitute the basis of our strategic forces. The greatest number of nuclear charges in the United States are sited on submarines. The United States has a considerable advantage in terms of heavy bombers. At the same time we have superiority in terms of land-based missiles.

[Ponomarev] But does such asymmetry make it possible, Mikhail Alekseyevich, to say that parity nonetheless exists and the levels of strategic offensive arms are balanced?

[Moiseyev] Yes, this is so. Historically the triad has developed differently in our country and theirs. Because of our geostrategic position we devoted most attention to ground missiles, and the United States, above all, to sea missiles and strategic aircraft. The stability of the situation, as I have already said, is determined not only by quantitative levels but also by the sides' possibility of

inflicting a counterstrike which would be sufficient to undermine the enemy's defense potential. I have already seen articles in the press which base their entire analysis on calculating the correlation in the numbers of strategic offensive arms. I would like to warn against such an error. This is an obsolete approach which has not justified itself. It was this that brought both sides to an unbridled arms race. This mistake should not be repeated today. Although, of course, I do not deny that the number of strategic offensive arms is still an important criterion for assessing nuclear potential. But, nonetheless, the most important thing is a comprehensive approach taking all aspects of the problem into account.

Just such an approach to the problems tackled by the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty was a characteristic feature of it. Its signing—and this, in my view, is the unanimous opinion of all thoughtful observers—is one more step toward a world in which security will be guaranteed by a smaller number of arms and in which the balance of forces will be replaced by a balance of the sides' interests.

[Ponomarev] All this sounds very convincing. Nevertheless, we know that the treaty has met not only with approval and support, it has also met with criticism. People, including critics in our country maintain, for example, that the treaty is bad because it does not remove discrepancies with regard to the total number of weapons on delivery systems, and the United States retains the advantage in terms of this indicator. They also say that we are harmed by the sharp drop in the total throw-weight of Soviet missiles and, above all, the 50 percent reduction in our heavy ICBM's. What could you say about this?

[Moiseyev] During the preparation of the treaty, which was conducted with the greatest care—problems of great importance had to be resolved, too much was at stake—the maximum possible was achieved. Of course, the treaty bears the stamp of the time when it was being drawn up, and it is possible to find certain shortcomings in it. But it is impossible to agree in full with the comments in question.

I will repeat once again—simple arithmetic is not fitting in such a complex matter as the preservation of strategic stability when reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms. Higher mathematics is needed here.

The essence of the matter is that the levels enshrined in the treaty for both delivery systems and charges reliably ensure strategic stability. And as regards criticisms, they are chiefly made because of a superficial and, at times, simply dilettante approach to very complex problems and sometimes even simply for effect.

I will dwell on just one question—that of our RS-20 (SS-18) ICBM's. We have now 308 of them deployed. Yes, it is a formidable weapon, and yet these missiles appeared back in the sixties. A considerable proportion of them are already in need of either replacement or serious modernization. And so, in agreeing to the treaty, we realized that either way some of these missiles would have to be removed from the arsenal. While agreeing to the reduction of 154 RS-20's, at the same time we preserved within the

effective combat strength of our strategic nuclear forces such an important element as heavy ICBM's, which the Americans do not have.

[Ponomarev] Does this mean that it is possible to maintain unequivocally that the treaty signed in Moscow is a considered, balanced document which does not infringe the sides' interests or undermine their security?

[Moiseyev] I believe I have already answered this question to some extent. I can only emphasize once again that we would never have agreed to the treaty if it infringed upon our national security interests. A balance of interests was reached as the result of exceptionally painstaking work, since everyone realized that a mistake would be very costly. Because strategic arms—the basis of the country's security—were being examined. It had long been an historical imperative that the levels should be lowered. But in practice things were proceeding slowly. A tremendous positive role—and I must point this out particularly—was played by the concept advanced by the country's political leadership of the new political course. As a result, during the talks the sides got away from the former absolute mistrust and suspicion. This was a great help.

As regards what the correlation of strategic offensive arms will be like after their reduction, i.e. seven years after the treaty comes into force, it will be within the framework of the set limits: no more than 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 nuclear charges according to the rules for counting them. There is another limitation—there must be no more than 4,900 nuclear charges on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. And the sides are obliged to keep within these limits. Here, however, different versions of the correlation of various types of strategic offensive arms are possible within the framework of the triad of each of the sides and also, naturally, between the sides. In other words, each side will reduce its own arms proceeding from national interests and from the need to preserve the established structure. We intend that the ground-based missiles deployed within the framework of the set limits would remain as the basis of our strategic nuclear forces. At the same time we will preserve the mobile missiles which, as a consequence of their high survivability, are the most stabilizing factor. Incidentally, the number of mobile ICBM's is not limited within the framework of the agreed levels. However, there cannot be more than 1,100 units of nuclear charges on them.

[Ponomarev] In conclusion, Mikhail Alekseyevich, this question—incidentally, our readers frequently ask it in their letters to the editorial office: Will the realization of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty not necessitate additional expenditure? And how will fulfillment of the treaty's provisions affect the fate of personnel in those branches of the armed forces with strategic offensive arms in their arsenal?

[Moiseyev] No, we cannot expect any "peace dividends" in the near future. Of course, expenditure is inevitable. While arms are being reduced and the associated procedure of their elimination is taking place, there will also be spending on this. It is perfectly understandable that it is necessary to have the appropriate technological equipment

in order to eliminate a missile or a launcher. We envisage various kinds of elimination, proceeding from economic considerations and ecological and security demands. Representatives not only of the Ministry of Defense but also of other departments—industrial ministries and other interested organizations—are working on this.

As for personnel, account must be taken of the fact that the treaty's realization is not an action of a moment but a process designed for a lengthy period. Seven years is a considerable time. We already have experience of resolving social questions in connection with the reduction of arms and the armed forces, and it is being enriched and accumulated all the time. Everything will be done to avoid mistakes in this—I will say it bluntly—difficult matter.

In concluding our conversation, I would like to speak of something else. The material benefit from the treaty will initially be hardly tangible. But this is only during the period of active reductions. Subsequently the advantages will be obvious. The number of missiles and missile bases will fall, for example, and in this connection there will be a drop in expenditure on replacing obsolete arms. Land today occupied by military units which are to be reduced will be returned to the national economy. A considerable quantity of motor vehicle and automobile-tractor equipment, various units, and also buildings, structures, etc. will be handed over to the national economy. In the final analysis, it will be cheaper and easier for the country to maintain in combat readiness the Soviet strategic nuclear forces in a reduced form. And security will be greater. This is the main objective.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Defense Minister Yazov Rejects New U.S. Charges on SS-23's

AU3007074191 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
26 Jul 91 p 14

[Report on interview with Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, to IAN parliamentary correspondent V. Ostrovskiy; place and date not given: "Who Is Looking for Sensations?"]

[Text] The Soviet SS-23 missiles were delivered to the USSR's then allies—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR—three to four years before the start of talks on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense, told the parliamentary correspondent of the IAN agency.

D. Yazov stressed that the fabricated accusations of a supposedly illegal transaction and, above all, a Soviet violation of the treaty, which have been raised mainly by the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, are at odds with the reality. He drew attention to the fact that it happened only a few days prior to U.S. President George Bush's visit to the USSR that "someone" accused the Soviet Union of dishonesty.

He pointed out that the American press, apparently in a quest for sensations, reported that these missiles "must

have been fitted with Soviet nuclear warheads after the treaty was signed." The authors of this lie did not even bother to consider the fact that the USSR strictly abides by the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty and therefore could not, nor did it ever attempt, to offer nuclear weapons to other states.

Marshal Yazov said that the missiles in question belong to the above-mentioned governments and have no bearing on the Soviet-American treaty. The accusations leveled at the Soviet side are unfounded and can only be regretted.

FRG Denies Soviet SS-23 Sales Violate INF Treaty

*PM0608090991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jul 91 Moscow Evening Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Accusations Groundless"]

[Text] Bonn, 26 July—The FRG military leadership has moved to distance itself from attempts made by conservative circles in the United States to accuse the Soviet Union of nonfulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles [INF] Treaty, which stipulates the destruction of both states' ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,000 km. The grounds for these accusations were the fact that Soviet-made SS-23 missiles still remain in the possession of the armed forces of several of the countries which formerly belonged to the Warsaw Pact Organization.

"The Soviet Union has fulfilled the treaty," a spokesman for the FRG Ministry of Defense stated in an interview with the newspaper NEUE RUHR ZEITUNG. The SS-23 missiles, in his words, were handed over to the former Warsaw Pact members around 1985; therefore they do not come under the provisions of the INF treaty.

The Ministry of Defense spokesman confirmed that the Bundeswehr currently was in possession of 24 SS-23 missiles which had formerly been part of the armory of the GDR National People's Army. These missiles are in a non-combat-operative state, without warheads or launch mechanisms. They will be eliminated, in the spokesman's words, "in the shortest possible timeframe." He cited one of the causes hindering the speedy destruction of the missiles as "the extraordinary complexity" of neutralizing the rocket fuel, which contains toxic components.

The FRG press is coming out in condemnation of the campaign of accusations against the Soviet Union launched in the United States. There is a group of conservative politicians in Washington who do not want disarmament, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU writes today. At one time they opposed the INF Treaty. And today they want to cast doubt on the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty, which is ready for signing. Such attempts on the part of the "eternal knights of the cold war" today look a complete anachronism, the paper stresses.

Yazov Confirms SS-23's Sold to East Europe

*LD3107165791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1600 GMT 31 Jul 91*

[Text] Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov has confirmed that the Soviet Union sold intermediate range missiles to some East European countries.

The Bulgarian daily ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME quotes Yazov as saying that these missiles, without nuclear warheads, had been sold to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the now inexistent [as heard] German Democratic Republic three or four years before negotiations on scrapping that class of missiles got under way.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Polish Spokesman on Troop Pullout Problems

*PM2907082191 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jul 91 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "How the Talks Are Going"]

[Text] Warsaw, 24 July—The lack of a treaty relating to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland is one of the major obstacles to the establishment of good neighbor relations between the two countries. Government press spokesman A. Zarebski made a statement about this after the country's Council of Ministers examined the question of the presence of Soviet troops in Poland. He expressed the hope that the Soviet side would retreat from its original position at the talks regarding the deadlines for withdrawal and would adopt a timetable close to the one being proposed by Poland.

A. Zarebski went on to say that the Soviet Army's delay in making payments to the Polish railroad company for the transit of troops from the FRG to the USSR, and also the restrictions placed on access to Soviet units on Polish territory for the purposes of ecological inspection are hampering the establishment of a climate of cooperation. He claimed that ecological monitoring carried out at just two airfields occupied by Soviet aviation units revealed that damage totaling 2 trillion zlotys (about \$200 million) had been inflicted on Polish forests.

Meanwhile, as has already been reported, the withdrawal of Northern Group of Forces units and subunits from Poland's Jelenia Gora Voivodship began Tuesday. The first trainload of equipment from the guards tank regiment, which is being redeployed in the Kiev area, left the garrison near the city of Boleslawiec. It is intended to complete the regiment's withdrawal by 31 July, and the last Soviet servicemen will quit this garrison by the end of the year.

Need For More Compromise on Polish Pullout Seen

*PM3007104591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jul 91 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with V. Kopteltsev, deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry administration, by Captain A. Maksimchuk; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Light at the End of the Tunnel"]

[Text] The latest round of bilateral intergovernmental talks on the preparation of a treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Republic of Poland began in Moscow 23 July. The day before, our stringer met with Soviet delegation head V. Kopteltsev, deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry administration.

[Maksimchuk] Valentin Alekseyevich, following the discussion of constructive proposals by both sides at the previous round of talks there was hope that progress would be made....

[Kopteltsev] We have reason to believe that the Polish side is displaying more constructive thinking and a willingness for compromise. Of course, much will depend on future talks, on agreeing the details of the compromises on the main questions—the timeframe for the withdrawal and the solution of property and financial problems. Nonetheless, all in all one can say that the atmosphere at the talks has improved somewhat and has ceased to be depressing and, you might say, hopeless.

In the previous round we examined compromise solutions on the timeframe for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territory. Recently both we and the Polish side have displayed a desire to find mutual understanding on this. It is aided, in our view, by certain changes in the mood of the Polish public, which were apparent during Polish Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski's speech in parliament. On that day many parliamentarians stressed the need for sincere, good-neighborly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

So I think it will be possible to agree on the withdrawal timeframe in the very near future. This will entail the settlement of the main questions of the treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Poland, in particular property and financial questions and the question of passage through Poland for our units from Germany.

[Maksimchuk] There is a fear among a large number of servicemen that they will again be victims of hasty decisions, mainly by personnel of our Foreign Ministry, at the talks with Poland on the withdrawal of our troops, as they were when the treaties with Hungary and Czechoslovakia were concluded. What do you think about this?

[Kopteltsev] I want to stress that servicemen of the Northern Group of Forces should have no cause for concern when it comes to the preparation of the treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. Believe me, the interests of the country and the people, including regular soldiers, are as dear to us professional diplomats as our own interests. The interests of our state, including the Army, will be properly safeguarded.

[Maksimchuk] Valentin Alekseyevich, has progress been made in tackling property and financial matters?

[Kopteltsev] Some progress has been made. The Polish side is with us in principle. It is putting forward reasonably acceptable terms for the sale of movable property and real estate. But the Polish side is also making counterclaims. Primarily connected with ecology, with damage to the environment allegedly caused while the Northern Group

of Forces has been in Poland. There is also the question of repairs to rented facilities, which we have to hand back to the Poles in more or less decent condition.

We have to reach agreement on property and financial matters, there is no getting away from it. Because it is of advantage both to us and to the peoples that the withdrawal of troops and the solution of related issues take place in conditions of real agreement and in a decent manner. Not in conditions of anarchy. Whenever one person tries to take something from another person, both sides suffer.

I am convinced that our delegations will come to mutual agreement, the treaty will be signed, and we will succeed in safeguarding the interests of the Soviet and Polish sides. But this can only be done via constructive dialogue and a willingness to compromise.

Preparations for CFE Implementation Under Way

*91WC0140A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Jul 91 First Edition p 3*

[Interview with Lieutenant General A. Chernyshev, chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District, by Colonel N. Astashkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Inspection in the District"]

[Text] Preparatory work is now under way in the military districts located in the European part of the Soviet Union and also in the Western Group of Forces and the Northern Group of Forces, to ensure implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]. As is known, this document envisages, in particular, the establishment of a military balance at levels lower than heretofore, elimination of the inequality in the correlation of weapons that harm stability and security, and elimination of the potential for launching a surprise attack.

Our correspondent discusses how preparations for implementation of the treaty are going ahead in the North Caucasus Military District with the district chief of staff, Lieutenant General A. Chernyshev.

[Astashkin] Anatoliy Kupriyanovich, how did this work start?

[Chernyshev] In February this year management organs were formed to ensure implementation of the treaty. At the district headquarters, for example, a special section was set up. There are analogous organizations in the large strategic formation. Methodological and training courses were held for the officers assigned to these organs, at which many practical questions were studied. In addition, the USSR National Center To Reduce the Nuclear Danger carried out test inspections here in the way that they will be conducted for real. At this time, all sites to be monitored in the initial scenario have been prepared for inspection. Practical training is now under way to organize on-site inspections.

[Astashkin] What kinds of difficulties are you encountering?

[Chernyshev] You understand that the range of issues is unusual. In order for the people recruited for the work of ensuring implementation of the treaty to carry out their duties successfully, they need a definite specialization. That is, essential skills and knowledge. It is no simple matter to acquire them in a short time. This, perhaps, is the main difficulty.

[Astashkin] Anatoliy Kupriyanovich, how will the activity of the inspection teams themselves be organized at the local level?

[Chernyshev] The sites to be visited by the foreign inspection groups on the territory of the district have already been decided. The time of arrival of inspection teams after they leave their point of departure (Moscow) to any point in the North Caucasus should, according to the treaty, be no longer than nine hours. You can see that the standard is very rigid. Therefore, in order to improve efficiency in the work of the inspection teams we plan to use aviation, road transport, and so forth.

[Astashkin] What will be the actual procedure in an inspection?

[Chernyshev] Everything is set forth in detail in the protocol on the inspections. Let me cite you just two factors. The inspection team may remain at an inspection site for no more than 48 hours. The number of inspectors in a group is not more than nine persons. The main purpose of the inspection is to check the number of weapons and equipment limited by the treaty, as stated in the most recent report, in the actual presence of the objects being inspected. In other words, to confirm in practice the responsibility for stability, trust, and security in Europe as stated by the treaty.

[Astashkin] And what if there is a "misalignment"?

[Chernyshev] These kinds of variations are covered by the treaty, for life does not stand still. For example, some equipment may be in the district, some may be in repair. In such cases, at the pre-inspection briefings the senior people at the site being inspected will report on the number of weapons and equipment that are present at that given moment. And if there is a discrepancy they will explain when and where this equipment is, the means used to transport it, and whether or not it will be located at the inspection site in the future. If there is less equipment, a detailed explanation will be provided of where it is, where it may have been sent, and at what time.

[Astashkin] Along with the inspections there will surely be representatives of the mass media. What provisions are being made for them to do their work?

[Chernyshev] Journalists will receive exhaustive answers to questions relating to the substance of any inspection.

[Astashkin] Is cooperation planned with other organizations and military departments?

[Chernyshev] This kind of cooperation has already been put in place. First, appropriate documents have been drawn up providing for this. Second, we have been meeting directly with representatives of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, primarily the Air Force and the Air

Defense Forces, whose units also fall within the purview of the treaty and are sites to be inspected. Third and last, we have studied the possibility of organizing and conducting inspections also in regions where the armed troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] and USSR Committee for State Security [KGB] are located, in All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR [DOSAAF] training centers, and so forth. It should be said that under the terms of the treaty, MVD and KGB units are not subject to inspections but they may be checked on request, with right of refusal. Accordingly, contact has been established directly with those units and their locations, communications, and notifications have been checked out.

[Astashkin] A final question: Are you confident that the officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and enlisted men who will ensure the work of the foreign inspection teams on the territory of the district will carry out in a worthy manner the task that they face?

[Chernyshev] Unconditionally. During the courses and practical training exercises and talks everyone was convinced that the upcoming measures are not simply an accounting by some particular unit or subunit in the district for its weapons and equipment. It is an account rendered by the country with respect to implementation of the CFE treaty. In other words, we are representing our state here. Hence there is also the measure of responsibility.

We are also aware of the innovative nature of the issue. For the nature of relations between the states party to the treaty have changed in a radical way. Confrontation is being replaced by peaceful coexistence, and we are ready to cooperate actively in this process.

CSBM Inspection of U.S. Forces in Baumholder, FRG

*LD0108012591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1738 GMT 31 Jul 91*

[Text] Moscow, 31 July (TASS)—It was officially reported here today that, in accordance with articles in the 1990 Vienna document on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe, on 25 July the USSR Government asked Germany and the United States if it could evaluate information on the armed forces and the plans for expanding the basic weapons and technical systems in Second Brigade of the Eighth Mechanized Division of the U.S. Army 5th Corps stationed in Baumholder.

The USSR request for the evaluation was granted. USSR Defense Ministry representatives arrived in Baumholder on 30 July and monitored the information given.

WGF Aide on Pullout From FRG Laender Capitals

*PM0408141391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Aug 91 First Edition p 3*

[Report by correspondent Colonel V. Markushin citing Major General I. Podgornyy, first deputy chief of staff of the Western Group of Forces: "Do the Troops Need a Capital Permit?"]

[Text] "Bonn is disappointed" was the headline of an article in DIE WELT concerning the problem of Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany. It concerned, in particular, the fact that the FRG Defense Ministry had apparently expressed dissatisfaction in a special report about the Soviet military leadership's intractability on the question of speeding up the withdrawal of units from the capitals of the East German Laender. By the end of the current year, the newspaper writes, Soviet troops will have left only two of the five such cities and will thus have ignored Bonn's desire for the Western Group of Forces to give priority to leaving the capitals of the new federal Laender.

Major General I. Podgornyy, first deputy chief of staff of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], commented on this situation at the request of your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

"Yes, the German side has indeed expressed the wish that priority be given as far as possible to vacating the capitals. And we are doing all we can to vacate Magdeburg and Erfurt this year. There remain Dresden, Schwerin, and Potsdam—cities where the withdrawal of our troops would create additional very difficult problems if we did not stick to our plan.

"Take, for example, Schwerin. The division stationed there supports the withdrawal of our troops by sea. And it is in general a key link in supporting the group of forces in the north. The withdrawal of that division is simply inadvisable in the immediate term. Or take Dresden, the city where the army command is located. How can you withdraw the command, leaving subordinate formations and units without leadership, including, incidentally, leadership of the withdrawal of those formations and units?

"The impatience of our partners is understandable. But we are keeping to schedule, which ensures that this gigantic redeployment is carried out in a systematic and smooth way. We are acting, moreover, in consideration of the vital interests of Soviet servicemen, the majority of whom simply have nowhere to live in the USSR. And it is in the divisions and army units that this majority is concentrated.

"I do not think that articles like the one carried in DIE WELT will help solve our current problems. The atmosphere surrounding the Western Group of Forces should not be clouded. If confusion arises, this can be discussed in a businesslike manner during the working meetings which have become part of our normal procedure. The next such meeting, by the way, is 21 August."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Conference Discusses Cooperation in Space

LD0508155191 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 5 Aug 91

[By Sergey Sedov]

[Text] Geneva, August 5 (TASS)—Confidence-building and openness regarding outer space should be promoted by the implementation of the rules for civilian and military

satellites, and the setting up of regional "agencies of openness" which would be supplied on the basis of existing agreements on security with photographs made from satellites for analysis and use.

This proposal is contained in a working document submitted by the French delegation to the special committee for the prevention of the arms race in space at a regular session of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

The authors of the project believe that these measures will help restrain the arms race and lessen military danger in outer space. On the one hand, they will facilitate safety of peaceful activity in space, preventing the use of space for aggressive purposes. On the other hand, they will ease the access of all interested countries to space activity, which will promote cooperation in the use of space for economic and technical purposes.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Further on Controversy Over Semipalatinsk Operations

Residents Offered Compensation

LD0408163391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 4 Jul 91

[Text] The Defense Ministry has offered 5 billion rubles to residents of rayons bordering the Semipalatinsk testing ground in compensation for three nuclear tests of over 20 kilotons scheduled there. The Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet decided to hold a referendum on this issue among the local population in August.

Suleymenov, President of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement, called upon the future participants to vote against the issue at the referendum. Five billion rubles is a sufficiently big sum for our country, and I would like to dwell on this information a bit further. Where is the Defense Ministry going to get the 5 billion rubles? They can hardly be obtained as a result of an unplanned privatization of generals' summer houses. As a matter of fact, when the budget of the Defense Ministry for this year was being ratified at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, all its main articles were revealed for the first time. And no such article, mentioning a sum of 5 billion, was mentioned there.

Republic Politburo Statement

LD0608123991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] The final details have been settled concerning the situation surrounding the Semipalatinsk nuclear test ground. The Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee Politburo has published a statement to the effect that the republic's communists favor the unconditional closure of the test ground and its use only for scientific and peaceful purposes. At the Central Committee Politburo session it was stressed that the inhabitants of Semipalatinsk and the adjoining territory of Pavlodar and Karaganda Oblasts have every right to state their unconditional support after 40 years of destructive experiments.

March Urges Closure of Test Site

OW0608234091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1700 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Tuesday, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan published a statement marking the beginning of a national march for closing the nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk (the march began on August 5 and will continue till August 29, when the 40th anniversary of the first nuclear test in Kazakhstan will be marked [no closing parenthesis as received]. The statement confirms adherence to the resolutions of the recent congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan on the unconditional prohibition of nuclear tests and on the closure of the testing ground in Semipalatinsk and its utilization for scientific and peaceful purposes alone.

The statement also says that "over the 40 years of destructive experiments the residents of Semipalatinsk and of the adjacent Pavlodar and Karaganda regions have every right to reckon on state support without any additional terms."

IF [INTERFAX] reports that at a joint meeting, the Central Committee of the republic's Young Communist League and Committee for Youth Organizations backed the action of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement for closing down the nuclear testing ground.

Spokesman Hails Swedish Test Ban Proposal at CD

LD0108152891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1345 GMT 1 Aug 91

[By Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishev]

[Text] Moscow, 1 August (TASS)—The Soviet Union gives a positive appraisal of the new draft treaty on an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests that the Swedish delegation submitted the other day for examination at the Conference on Disarmament [CD] in Geneva. This was stated today at a briefing by Vitaliy Churkin, chief of the information directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

This Swedish draft, the Soviet diplomat noted, takes into account the experience of talks on other types of weapons, in particular chemical weapons, the results of the work of the group of seismological experts, and also a number of proposals from other countries that have been submitted both to the CD and to the conference to examine amendments to the Moscow Treaty of 1963.

"Soviet experts, naturally, will closely study the new Swedish document," Vitaliy Churkin said. "At the same time, one may appraise it even now as yet another important step to solve the problem of a ban on nuclear tests, which is welcomed by the Soviet Union."

Controversy Over Novaya Zemlya Operations Continues

Yeltsin Backs End to Testing

LD0708045991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Excerpts] Boris Yeltsin, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic president, visited Salekhard, Tyumen Oblast, this morning. [passage omitted]

During a brief conversation with Salekhard residents, Boris Yeltsin said that he shares Yalma-Nenets Autonomous Okrug's anxiety over continued nuclear weapons tests at Novaya Zemlya. The Russian president feels it would be best to cease these tests at once. However, the problem cannot be resolved that simply since the military, for instance, opposes the idea of ending the nuclear tests. At the same time, it is necessary to agree to lower the power of the explosion and to try to compensate the damage being inflicted on nature.

Boris Yeltsin arrived in Noyabrsk this evening.

Calls Issue 'Complicated'

OW0608223491 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1700 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] Answering a question on the airfield of Salekhard, during a meeting with residents of this polar city, President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, said he shared general concern about the continuing nuclear tests in Nova Zemlya. He also noted that he had discussed this topic with President Bush and proposed that nuclear tests be mutually terminated in the U.S. and the USSR. The military are against, he said.

The termination of nuclear tests in Nova Zemlya is a very complicated problem. In case such tests continue, said Boris Yeltsin, their yield must be sharply decreased and nature-conservation compensation measures should be taken, so the explosions do not ruin the natural environment.

Correspondent Denied Access

PM0508110591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Aug 91 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Deputies and Press Not Admitted"]

[Text] Residents of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug are alarmed by the proximity of the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. This is promoted by the lack of information about how dangerous the tests are for northerners' health and the environment. In response to public pressure and owing to local soviets' insistence, the military department has for the first time authorized a visit to the test site. The name of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's own correspondent featured on the delegation list, but at the very last minute a cable came from Moscow signed by General Zolotukhin banning USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies, along with mass media representatives, from making the trip. Well, it only remained for my batch of questions to be conveyed via Aleksandr Kuzin, first deputy chairman of the okrug soviet. The answers to these and the personal observations made by the lucky visitors to Novaya Zemlya boil down to the fact that the test site, if I can say this, constitutes an "ecologically clean and harmless production unit." The radiation background does not exceed 10-60 milliroentgens, presenting no danger to health. And roughly 12,000 people live there, including roughly 1,000 children, and they are all quite healthy.

That's all fine. But I wonder: In that case what was the general afraid of? Did he not cast doubt by his actions on the information about the "favorable situation" at Novaya Zemlya?

Issue Raised at Conference in Japan

OW0208150091 Tokyo KYODO in English 1430 GMT
2 Aug 91

[Report by Miu Oikawa]

[Text] Hiroshima, August 2 (KYODO)—Soviet participants attending an antinuclear meeting in this atomic-bombed city said Friday underground experiments using strong nuclear weapons are being conducted on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya.

Sergey Kozlov, Valentin Ivanov, and Leonid Kuchmenyov told KYODO news service that the local government announced two years ago that an estimated 10 to 20 tests are held annually on the island.

The three, teachers at a college in Vorkuta in Komi Republic, are among the 55 foreign guests from 20 nations attending the Japanese Communist Party-backed Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) meeting, which opened Friday.

They said a committee calling for halting the tests was established in the republic and its residents are united in the move.

"The military personnel and scientists from Moscow said the tests pose no danger but hunters have seen reindeer with their fur peeling off, apparently from the radiation," Ivanov said. "We have come to the conclusion that there is no reason why the tests should not also affect humans."

The three, visiting Japan for the first time, said they would like to use their experiences in Hiroshima and Japan for their own movement, which they said has only just begun.

Earlier in the day, Joseph Gerson of the American Friends Service Committee, linked the disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the Persian Gulf war and said atomic bombs should never be used again.

"This year, as we continue to grieve for, and learn from, the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we must also mourn the victims of the recent Gulf war and consider the war's implications for our work," Gerson said.

"The Gulf war has demonstrated the continued commitment of the nuclear powers, and especially the United States, to deploy and to threaten the use of nuclear weapons," he said.

He also said world history is at a turning point and is therefore all the more open to the vision and influence of peace movements based on justice and the abolition of nuclear arms and all weapons of mass destruction.

Reporting on the situations in Europe after the collapse of the eastern bloc, Guido Grunewald of the Germany Peace Society said a massive transfer of resources to the east is necessary to improve its economic and environmental conditions and to help redress the social foundations of ethnic unrest which is making it more violent.

"This is only possible if military budgets are drastically reduced," he added.

Timothy Fitzpatrick from the Marshall Islands reported on the disasters there, especially on children, caused by the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons by the United States.

The U.S., between 1946 and 1958, used Bikini and Eniwetok Islands to carry out 66 atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons.

The Gensuikyo Conference will run until August 4 in Hiroshima and then will move to Nagasaki from August 7-9.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

DPRK Statement on Korean NFZ Discussed

SK3107102091 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 30 Jul 91

[Text] The DPRK put forward a new proposal for converting the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone [NFZ].

Let us see how station commentator (Yevgeny Kristin) sees it:

Not only is the DPRK Government's proposal something that is already been known, but it also contains some new elements such as a (?timetable) for the creation of the nuclear-free zone, its verification, and guarantees.

For example, the proposal envisions that the North and South of the Korean Peninsula reach an agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone before the end of 1992. The joint declaration that the two sides are expected to sign will ban the two states from possessing nuclear weapons, from testing them, from producing them, or from deploying them in the nuclear-free zone, or from transporting the nuclear weapons through the nuclear-free zone, as well as from conducting military exercises relative to this.

According to the proposal, the issue of verification has been raised. It has also been proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union, and China become the coordinating countries regarding the nuclear-free zone. These countries should uproot all the elements that run counter to the purpose of the nuclear-free zone within the period of one year from the date the zone is declared, without fail.

In my personal view, the DPRK's proposal is worth paying (?great) attention to in view of the developing situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the still broader view.

The realization of the proposal will ease the situation in the region that has been regarded as the most tense region in the world.

On many occasions the DPRK Government has stated that U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea pose a threat to the Korean people.

Meanwhile, the United States has on many occasions expressed concern about Pyongyang's nuclear programs. In these circumstances, the creation of a nuclear-free zone will dissipate the existing qualms and doubts and ease the situation.

There is no need to talk about the fact that the proposal will have influence in talks between the North and South.

Not only do nuclear-free zones exist, but they have spread far into other areas. The Antarctic has been declared a nuclear-free zone. The Tlatelolco Treaty has seen the firm establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Thirteen countries in the South Pacific region, the signatories to the Rarotonga Treaty, have also agreed to ban the deployment, invention, production, and purchase of nuclear weapons in their nuclear-free zone.

I believe that a nuclear-free zone is the most desirable and satisfactory means to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the creation of a nuclear-free zone will prop up the effort of the major powers to reduce and abolish nuclear weapons.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Expresses Support for Korean NFZ

*LD0108144391 Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT
1 Aug 91*

[By Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow, August 1 (TASS)—The Soviet Union supports the initiative put forward by the North Korean Government after July 30 calling on North and South

Korea to create a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] on the Korean peninsula and adopt to this end a joint declaration not later than by the end of 1992, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today.

"The Soviet Union supports this North Korea's initiative and believes it could be a subject for a discussion by all states concerned," Churkin said.

"If North Korea and South Korea reach agreement to declare the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, our country, as a nuclear state, will be ready together with other nuclear powers [to] give the necessary guarantees to observe the zone's nuclear-free status," Churkin said.

He also stressed that the Soviet Union pays much attention to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, including by creating nuclear-free zones, and that the problem of nuclear security is vital for the Korean peninsula, since it is overfilled with armed forces and armaments and the military-political confrontation still exists here.

The turning of the peninsula into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction could help overcome the suspiciousness of the Korean sides toward each other, normalise the whole situation in Korea and strengthen the international regime of nuclear arms, Churkin said.

FRANCE

Hades Pre-Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Formed

*PM2907082291 Paris LE MONDE in French
26 Jul 91 p 22*

[Unattributed report: "France Forms Hades Nuclear Missile Brigade"]

[Text] The French Government has just given its agreement to the formation of the Hades pre-strategic nuclear missile brigade as of 1 September. Brigadier General Marie de Cherhe was appointed to command it by the cabinet on Wednesday, 24 July.

This decision is a "first" and it bears witness to France's desire to provide the Army with a pre-strategic nuclear deterrent from 1992. In addition, the Air Force has the same deterrent with the Mirage 2000-N plane and the Navy with the Super-Etendard plane, both armed with the airborne medium-range air-to-surface missile.

The Hades surface-to-surface missile is mounted in twos on a platform, which is an adapted articulated truck and is totally autonomous until the moment of fire. This weapon system will replace the Pluton—a missile mounted on the chassis of an AMX-30 tank—with which five artillery regiments were equipped and that will gradually be withdrawn from service.

For political, financial, and military reasons, the Hades program has been very considerably reduced compared with the plans. Combined in one brigade directly under the control of the Armed Forces chief of staff, unlike the Pluton units, which came under the Army corps, the Hades missiles will arm two units—first, the 15th Artillery Regiment in Suippes (Marne); then the Third Artillery Regiment in Mailly-le-Camp (Aube). In all there will be 20 launchers and 40 missiles, costing 13.5 billion francs [Fr]. Originally the Hades program was for 60 launchers and 120 missiles costing Fr17.5 billion.

The Hades missile carries its nuclear warhead over a distance four times greater (less than 500 km) than the Pluton. But, above all, it has markedly better mobility, invulnerability, ability to penetrate enemy defenses, and diversity in its methods of attack. The explosive warhead—which can reach a power of the order of 80 kilotonnes—can be controlled according to the desired military effect.

The Hades has been criticized several times on the grounds that its range would make it a missile able to strike targets on the territory of states in Europe that are now friendly. However, the president of the Republic has maintained the program. The Hades missile is now the only mobile surface-to-surface missile deployed in Western Europe: Its ability to move according to circumstances and its low detectability make it an instrument of European deterrence, according to its supporters.

Former Chief of Staff on Nuclear Deterrence

*LD3007090191 Paris France-Inter Radio
Network in French 0800 GMT 30 Jul 91*

[Text] The former Armed Forces chief of staff believes France has enough nuclear weapons to ensure deterrence despite the cancellation of the S-45 mobile [as heard] missile system. General Maurice Schmitt added that the debate must now bear on alternative defense systems in the event new generation radars are able to detect nuclear weapons.

GERMANY

SDP Aide Criticizes French Short-Range Nuclear Missiles

*LD2807010491 Berlin ADN in German 1450 GMT
27 Jul 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The SPD [Socialist Democratic Party] disarmament expert Hermann Scheer has described the announced stationing of 40 Hades short-range nuclear missiles in eastern France on 1 September as a "European anachronism." The SPD politician stated in Bonn today that there was no viable security policy justification for this.

Scheer said it was grotesque that on the one hand Franco-German brigades existed while on the other French nuclear missiles were targeted on German territory. He accused the Federal Government of failing to make any serious attempt at prevailing on the French Government to renounce this new nuclear weapons program. Scheer said that demands made for years by the SPD to advocate French participation in nuclear disarmament negotiations "were rejected by the government parties".

He called on the Federal Government to finally support clearly and unequivocally a renunciation of the stationing of the French nuclear weapons.

Bundeswehr Practices for Soviet CSCE Inspections

*AU3007110191 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Jul 91 p 4*

[Guenther Gillesen report: "Bundeswehr Officers Practice Soviet Inspections With Interpreters in British Units"]

[Excerpts] Geilenkirchen—A quarrel broke out in the helicopter with the Soviet pilot. His guests, German officers—observers of a Soviet maneuver in 1990 in accordance with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] rules for "confidence-building measures"—insisted that the pilot stick to the required route to the required destination. On their own maps they had noticed that the flight was taking them in another direction. The pilot denied the accusation. As a result, the German officers demanded that he land. He did; however, after taking off again, the pilot again tried to make for the wrong hill. The Germans demanded that he land again so the matter could be discussed. They threatened to break off the inspection and to note this in the protocol. Finally, the

pilot expressed reservations for reasons of flight safety. How far away was the destination, the Germans asked. Seven kilometers, was the answer. "Then we will walk there," they decided. This, however, was not to the liking of the fat Soviet colonel who was escorting them, and it was a hot day. Suddenly, the pilot ignored his reservations about safety and finally flew to the vantage point his guests had chosen. "Nothing can be done," the German officer says, who has taken part in observing maneuvers for years, "one has to be stubborn! The rules are clear, one must not be diverted, and one must consistently stick to a request that has been granted." One time a Soviet helicopter pilot tried to prevent aerial observation of a maneuver by claiming after a long flight and before reaching the destination that he had to return because otherwise there would not be enough gasoline for the flight home. "We told him to land, let us get out, fly back to fill up his tank, and then pick us up again."

It is taking some time before the rules of "confidence-building" become a matter of course at all large military maneuvers in Europe. The officers of the observation groups must apply them, and the troops that are observed at maneuvers must learn how to deal with them. They must respect the procedures that were developed at CSCE conferences from a small beginning in Helsinki (1973), expanded at the conferences of Madrid (1980-83) and Stockholm (1986), and recently summarized in the "1990 Vienna document." The tendency to deal with military matters as openly as possible thus building "confidence" varies among the CSCE states; since the "revolution" in Eastern Europe, there has been a strong increase there, but the smallest increase has been noted in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

During the first 120 days before arms reduction starts, each state must permit inspection of 20 percent of all storage sites for heavy combat equipment for ground and air forces in Europe as well as a number of "inspections on suspicion," so it can be checked whether its declarations of stocks are correct. During the next 40 months of arms reduction, the quota is reduced to 15 percent a year.

The Soviet Union and the FRG will be the states that will have to suffer most inspections—the Soviet Union because it has far more conventional forces in Europe than any other party to the treaty; the FRG because, as a result of the large amounts of materiel from the old National People's Army, has unexpectedly to reduce far more of its equipment than originally planned; in addition, it must also be the host of all inspection teams that inspect the equipment of the Soviet forces in Germany and of the Allied forces stationed in the FRG. Some 65 percent of all NATO's main weapons systems are in the FRG, and these are included in the treaty; furthermore, there are more than 10,000 items of "TLE's" ("treaty limited equipment"). During the first 120 days the Bundeswehr has to accept a total of 184 inspections on its territory; escort the foreign inspection teams—with a maximum of nine members—and provide vehicles, accommodation, and supplies, while not supporting more than four inspections at a time.

In addition, it must participate with its own inspectors in the inspection of the stocks of heavy weapons in the other partner states. Of course, the friendly states may talk to each other and coordinate their projects. The NATO countries also have the added advantage that they can compare observations.

For this task, the Bundeswehr has established a "verification center" in Geilenkirchen near Aachen, an unusual unit of about 500 men, including 18 colonels and more than 100 majors and lieutenant colonels, as well as captains, sergeants, and interpreters, who are preparing for the additional and new tasks of disarmament control.

For some time NATO allies have been practicing "test inspections" of each other's troops. After all, the troop commanders also have to be prepared for the fact that a team of foreign inspectors will turn up in front of the barracks in the future and request entry. Former Warsaw Pact members are also participating in these "test inspections." Thus, the Bundeswehr has arranged "active" and "passive" inspections with the CSFR and Hungarian forces, and has practiced, for instance, "Soviet inspection" with British units, with interpreters for Russian. All want to gather experience before the treaty is ratified.

In the Bundeswehr verification center, the officers are convinced that any army would have difficulty hiding large amounts of equipment that is covered by the treaty or working with incorrect data. The system of monitoring is so tight and so well equipped with the quick "inspections on suspicion" that attempts at fraud are hardly given a chance. As a result of experiences with the CSCE observer and inspection system, the officers believe that military experts notice very quickly what is going on in a place they are inspecting. Good behavior or attempted resistance can be seen or felt.

Signing of START Treaty Prompts Reactions

Kohl Praises Summit

*LD3107134491 Hamburg DPA in German 1315 GMT
31 Jul 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl described the Soviet-American summit talks as a new era in cooperation between the two superpowers and expressed the view that this will bring Europe and the entire world greater peace and stability. In a statement published today by the Press Office in Bonn, Kohl described the START Treaty and the agreements concluded recently as a "milestone in disarmament."

"I am confident the START Treaty will be followed by further disarmament agreements, including agreements for the further reduction of strategic weapons systems," Kohl stated. The Moscow summit shows that the age of confrontation belongs to the past and that the new order is based on a balance of interests and cooperation. This applies not only to bilateral cooperation, but also to cooperation in the political solution of regional conflicts.

Genscher Hails Accords

*LD0108084991 Hamburg DPA in German 0720 GMT
1 Aug 91*

[Excerpt] Cologne (DPA)—According to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the new partnership between the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, will make possible a new world order of cooperation and reconciliation of interests. In addition, the chance to overcome the division of Europe would present itself, Genscher said this morning on Deutschlandfunk radio. The real historic significance of the START Treaty on the reduction of long-range nuclear missiles, signed yesterday, would only be visible if it were the first step toward further reductions in the strategic arms potential. The Federal Government would press for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons to be achieved now, too, and for conventional disarmament to be continued. [passage omitted]

Other Politicians Comment

*LD3107144991 Berlin ADN in German 1344 GMT
31 Jul 91*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl has welcomed the START Treaty signed today and the other agreements signed recently as a "milestone in disarmament." [passage omitted]

This first step must, however, be followed by further ones, said Alfred Dregger, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary group chairman, "for the arsenals of both nuclear giants are not even being reduced to the starting figures of 1982—the opening round of talks—by START," he said. He called upon Bush and Gorbachev to continue. The aim of START II must be a halving of the arsenals. Following that, the other nuclear powers should be able to participate in START III. Further negotiations to reduce the strategic nuclear weapons potential were called for by the state minister in the Foreign Ministry, Helmut Schaefer of the Free Democratic Party. The disarmament negotiations must not be allowed to lag behind political developments.

Voelker Ruehe, Christian Democratic Union general secretary, evaluated the agreement as an expression of the new beginning in American-Soviet relations. The political affects of the agreement would go beyond weapon and armament technology agreements, he went on to say. [passage omitted]

Effects of Treaty Analyzed

*AU3107134591 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Jul 91 p 3*

[Leo Wieland commentary: "Two Signatures Mark the End of Nuclear Arms Control and the Beginning of Disarmament"]

[Text] Moscow, 30 July—It was a difficult start. For almost 10 years, "those who count the peas," the foreign ministers and presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union, conducted negotiations on a treaty for strategic disarmament. The diplomatic haggling became

serious only when the new Communist Party leader Gorbachev came to power in Moscow in March 1985. Yet, even after that the two sides had to come a long way before signing the "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty" (START) this Wednesday at 0330 Moscow time in the snug Vladimir Room of the Kremlin.

Gorbachev and "his" second U.S. President, historic fountain pens in their hands, can now happily look at their images in the crystal mirrors of the tsar. Despite all the credit that has to be given to Gorbachev and Bush, this is the time to recall Reagan. His vision of a nuclear-free world and an antinuclear protective shield, which was commented on both in condescending and disparaging way, has been a decisive impetus. The START Treaty, which is now ready, has not been completed despite the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) but rather because of Reagan's "Star Wars," which was expensive and vague, yet certainly taken seriously by the Soviet military. As the presidents sign the nuclear pact in Moscow, the U.S. Senate in Washington will begin its debate on what is to become of the remaining shrunken SDI program and in what way even a rudimentary "umbrella against missiles" is compatible with the old ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty limitation on such defense systems.

Anyway, with their signatures, Bush and Gorbachev are marking the end of traditional control of major nuclear weapons. Previous agreements, such as the two SALT Treaties, were nothing but glamorous accords on increasing arms arsenals in a controlled way. For the first time, START involves real reduction of intercontinental arsenals by about one-third. The number of nuclear warheads that the two superpowers retain provides a sufficient degree of "deterrence." In the event of hostilities, they would still be able to annihilate each other—not to mention the rest of the world—several times within half an hour.

The START Treaty is the third milestone on which has meanwhile become an impressive road of "real" disarmament agreements. The INF Treaty on a so-called zero-option in the sphere of intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, which was signed by Gorbachev and Reagan in December 1987, was the premiere. It codified the elimination of an entire category of nuclear systems. The last SS-20 and Pershing-2 missiles were scrapped only last month. Then, in December 1990 in Paris, the 22 heads of state and government of NATO and the since-disbanded Warsaw Pact signed the CFE Agreement [Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] on reducing conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It stipulates new, lower ceilings for tanks, fighter planes, and artillery, particularly for the USSR. The current START Treaty constitutes the third contribution within four years to the attempt by two "security partners," that are fundamentally still antagonistic, to systematically place strategic stability and the "balance of terror" on a more comforting basis.

After the last of a myriad of "technical" obstacles was overcome in last week's economic summit in London, Bush proclaimed a "good deal." Gorbachev said: "We will

be able to breathe more freely and say that we have moved a bit further away from the threat of a nuclear war." His formula of a "joint victory," which is now being proudly repeated in Moscow, certainly has nothing to do with making a dubious compromise look better. Since there must be no "winners" and "losers" in nuclear disarmament for understandable psychological reasons, each side is careful not to count which side made eventually more or fewer concessions. The way Bush put it, the good deal is "in the interest of the United States." If Gorbachev—along with his generals—shares this view regarding the USSR, then neither side needs to feel at a disadvantage.

The START result is more modest than what had been envisaged at the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985. There, Reagan suggested halving the strategic arsenals, to which Gorbachev agreed in principle. However, the complicated job of fine-tuning after that first "breakthrough" led to a less ambitious result. By the end of the millennium, the United States should cut the number of warheads from about 12,000 to 9,000, thereby reducing by over one-fourth the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, submarines, and bombers. The USSR, some of whose nuclear warheads have an even higher explosive force, will have to reduce its 11,000 nuclear warheads to approximately 7,000 (a reduction of more than one-third).

The most substantial reduction in Soviet arsenals affects the "big" land-based intercontinental missiles, which are regarded as particularly "destabilizing" and, because of their accuracy, as suitable for a possible first strike. These arsenals, including the SS-18 which carries up to 10 warheads, are to be reduced by no less than 50 percent. On the other hand, the United States will retain a certain flexibility in areas in which they are technologically ahead of the USSR, such as for sea- and air-based cruise missiles. Its traditional advantage in the nuclear fleet will not be decisively limited either. This is to be left to future talks on START 2.

U.S. START supporters describe such military facts as advantages and point to the political argument that, at a time when the future of the USSR and its current leadership is highly uncertain, an agreement that appears to be respectable and includes confidence-building verification measures is of particular value. An agreement that, among other things, limits the strategic programs—including the construction of new intercontinental missiles—is of indisputable benefit. Yet the critics argue that the verification measures, particularly for mobile missiles, leave a lot to be desired. Before the agreement is ratified in Congress, this aspect will certainly be thoroughly examined.

Nevertheless, U.S. experts agree on one point: Both superpowers will continue modernizing their strategic systems. Under the umbrella of START and under the impression of budget constraints on both sides, there will be less spent and fewer unpleasant surprises. Former chief negotiator Burt summed things up in a matter-of-fact way in an interview with THE WALL STREET JOURNAL: "The USSR will certainly not become an economic or technological superpower. If things go wrong there and another

group takes over, then its only opportunity to flex its muscles will be in the nuclear arena."

The United States has carefully begun to adapt its strategic nuclear program—from the MX-missiles to the B-2-bombers (Stealth)—to the framework established by the START Treaty. In addition, and out of regard for the new situation in Europe, the United States, before the Moscow meeting, took the numerical restrictions imposed by the agreement into account during its nuclear target planning. The new list, which was accepted by Defense Secretary Cheney, no longer mentions 3,000 formerly "potential targets" in Central and Eastern Europe.

After the ceremony in the Kremlin, experienced and skeptical U.S. senators will hold the complex treaty up to the light and closely study the fine print on inspection and mutual control. The passing of the agreement by the "noble" chamber in the Capitol, which is necessary under the Constitution, rarely takes place without any problems. By pretending to be naive, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Churkin only recently asked why that immediately "before a summit" people in Washington were once again finding fault with the INF Treaty. Secretary of State Baker had asked for information concerning earlier transfers of Soviet SS-23 intermediate-range missiles to Bulgaria, the CSFR, and the former GDR. After all, what Churkin had described as an "old story" sounded the alarm in the State Department. Baker and his superior, Bush, know that the INF Treaty, which was passed by a great majority, must remain a faultless model in order to pave the way for START. In the past few months, the Soviets' reputation as far as agreements are concerned was impaired through the example of the CFE. The sharp dispute over recategorizing conventional army units had delayed the Geneva START talks until the controversy was solved by mutual agreement. Bush passed the CFE Agreement to the Senate on 10 July and asked that it be "swiftly" adopted. The chances for it are not bad. The START package, which will soon follow, will also be carefully, although not unfavorably, reviewed.

Editorials View Summit Results

AU0108132191

[Editorial Report] The Moscow summit meeting is the main topic for editorials in the 1 August editions of the major German dailies.

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German on page 1 carries a 450-word editorial by "W.A." headlined "Light And Shadow." The daily writes that it "is a gratifying development" that "the pace of rapprochement between the two military superpowers has made it difficult for the the arms controllers to keep up, so the results of their painstaking detailed work only appear to be a sort of report of execution." The paper believes that Mikhail Gorbachev is "still far from having created the preconditions that would make assistance in the direction of the market economy sensible." Nor can Gorbachev expect to get "substantial financial aid from the deficit-ridden U.S. budget. He should much rather stake his hopes

on the Western private sector, which, after his considerable optimistic rhetoric, want to see concrete action."

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German on page 3 carries a 700-word Werner Holzer editorial headlined "Hopes Over the Summit." "As different as George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev may be, and as different as their starting positions may be, there is one thing that the presidents of the United States and the USSR have in common: They are much more successful in foreign policy than they are in trying to solve their countries' domestic economic problems." The paper adds that the fact that George Bush only gave his host "good advice for a better economic system and was unable to offer him practical and tangible aid, has something to do with the United States' financial problems, rather than with the Soviet chaos. On the other hand, the American demonstrated considerable sensitivity in Moscow. As far as we can judge as outside observers, he avoided creating the impression by word or gesture that two unequal partners were facing each other." The daily believes that "that was helpful for Gorbachev because his opponents at home are wrongly putting the blame for the country's decline on him."

Regarding the START Treaty, which was signed after eight years of tough negotiations, the paper writes that "some years ago, this would have been a political sensation. However, now even those conservative politicians, who at that time feared the smallest disarmament step as the devil fears holy water, applaud it only half-heartedly." FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU concludes that "for all its economic weakness, the Soviet Union remains a military superpower whose position on international issues is of far-reaching importance. This, and the fact that the United States is less and less inclined to take unilateral action in worldwide conflicts, are behind the remarkable emphasis that George Bush placed on his statements about the future partnership." Summing up, the paper writes that Moscow was "a summit of hope for both sides. They talked with each other without diplomatic disguise and without hurting each other."

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German on page 4 carries a 900-word editorial by Josef Riedmiller, headlined "Gorbachev Remains the Partner." Referring to the fact that only several hours before Bush met with Gorbachev in the Kremlin for the first time, the Soviet president had concluded the Union Treaty with the Russian and Kazakh presidents, the daily writes that Bush could have "taken the new situation into account, but did so only very cautiously," evading Yeltsin's wish "to establish direct relations between Russia and the United States." That shows that "Bush, more than ever before, considers Gorbachev—and not his neighbor in the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin—his partner in Moscow."

Noting that the United States is the only superpower now, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG writes that it is Washington which dictates the "terms under which the USSR may remain one of the great powers. This is particularly evident in the economic area, which is the Soviet Union's weakest spot." While "Bush kept to the line that he

pursued at the London economic summit—no cash for the Soviet Union—there are indications that U.S. business will discover the Soviet market when the rules have been fixed, and if they can be sure that the expected chaos does not come."

Progress in Disarmament Viewed

AU2607131391 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
26 Jul 91 p 1

[Theo Sommer editorial: "The Superpowers in the STARTing Blocks"]

[Text] What takes a long time is not necessarily always good. However, the text of the treaty that George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev will sign in the Kremlin next week will let humanity breathe more easily. For the first time since the beginning of the nuclear arms race, Americans and Soviets have agreed on drastically reducing the number of nuclear weapons with which they can threaten each other with death and destruction. Until now they have pushed their nuclear armament to ever greater heights. Now the spiral of madness is being turned back a bit.

The process of negotiations, which has brought about this reduction of the strategic arsenals, started in the Finnish capital of Helsinki on a gray day in November 1969. It dragged on for 22 years—always overshadowed by international politics (the Vietnam war, the Soviet-Chinese conflict); frequently interrupted because of momentary anger (Afghanistan, counter-armament); characterized by the changing views and insights of the leaders (from Nixon through Ford, Carter, and Reagan to Bush, from Brezhnev through Andropov and Chernenko to Gorbachev). Failure of the talks was often nearer than success and the results remained scant.

SALT I, which was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972, did not bring about disarmament but only imposed upper limits, which were so generous that both superpowers were easily able to build even more missiles. The qualitative arms race was hardly limited, either. At least, a beginning was made. Negotiations on SALT II started within a few months. They dragged on for seven years—at that time, detente had entered a stormy period because of Soviet expansion in Africa and, above all, because of Brezhnev's missile-rattling with the SS-20. In the summer of 1979 in Vienna's Hofburg Palace, however, Carter and Brezhnev signed the treaty that envisaged a parity of arsenals in terms of numbers and was also supposed to brake the race involving technology. The agreement never came into force, however. Obscure reports about the alleged presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba brought the SALT opponents in Washington onto the barricades. When the Red Army intervened in Afghanistan nothing could be salvaged in Congress anymore. President Carter did not even pass the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Nevertheless, both sides adhered to it.

Poker on the Chessboard

In the frosty climate of the early 1980's the disarmament negotiations could not flourish. Both Washington and Moscow followed the slogan of armament. Along the

Moskva and the Potomac, the strategists who relied on superiority—be it by enormous missile calibers or by Star Wars dreams—had the say and thought that a nuclear war could be won. Even though negotiations continued in Geneva as of mid-June 1982—the new label START instead of SALT indicated that now real reductions and not only limitations of strategic nuclear armament were aimed for—a fruitless “poker on the chessboard” (Strobe Talbott) went on. First Mikhail Gorbachev had to enter the Kremlin before Ronald Reagan gave up the stubbornness of his first years in office. At their meeting in Geneva at the end of 1985 they agreed on the admission: “A nuclear war must not be waged and cannot be won.” Even after that four and a half years passed before the agreement was ready for signature.

This is not surprising. Disarmament diplomacy is always a difficult matter as long as there is not a minimum of trust between the parties. What one side considers a sufficient and harmless potential seems to the other side to be an expression of a dangerous striving for superiority. In addition, negotiations are not only held between states but also within each of these states: between the military and civilians; between rivaling bureaucracies; between technical utopists, who—as experts on exotic things—are pursuing their hobbies, and sober cashiers, who have to watch every cent or kopeka; between practical politicians with common sense and strategic scholastics, who replace reality with labyrinthine abstractions; between those who favor armament and those who favor disarmament, every one of whom considers his ideas to be the panacea. It is rather surprising that a treaty is brought about at all in view of these tensions.

What Presidents Bush and Gorbachev want to sing in the Kremlin in the middle of next week should not be deliberately belittled. Even though the original goal of halving the strategic arsenals was not achieved, the result is still noteworthy: reduction of intercontinental missiles by 35 percent (USSR) and 21 percent (United States); reduction of warheads on ballistic missiles by 49 percent (USSR) and 39 percent (United States); limitation of submarines with missiles to 20 on each side; strict regulations for inspections; exchange of information on locations and doctrines of operations. In addition, the Soviets must reduce a large part of their superiority: 50 percent of their heavy—and thus particularly dangerous—SS-18's and half of their megaton tonnage. As little as five years ago this would have been considered a sensation.

Of course, the agreement leaves a lot to be desired. It continues to permit the modernization of strategic weapons. It does not mention nuclear weapons systems in space. It does not demand the scrapping of warheads. It puts the ceiling for cruise missiles at 880 for each side, which is very high. It leaves Russians and Americans in the possession of about as many nuclear warheads as they had in their arsenals in 1982, when the START talks began. Their overkill potential, with which they can eradicate each other and the entire northern hemisphere several times over, remains untouched.

A New Beginning

Still, the agreement is a new beginning. The two nuclear superpowers are practically crouching in the STARTing blocks. This time the beginning might be followed by progress more quickly than was the case after 1972. This may take place in further agreements—START II, START III, START IV—but also through unilateral measures. Both paths may lead to the goal—if not to a totally nuclear-free world, at least to a world with minimum deterrence. Paul Nitze, the old master of U.S. nuclear diplomacy, thinks that a reduction to one-quarter of today's stocks is worth striving for and is practical and sufficient.

It cannot be ruled out that in the future unilateral actions will be more important than agreements that are negotiated by means of diplomacy. The world has seen this in the field of conventional forces and armaments, where within a short time the autonomous decisions of many nations turned everything to waste paper that had been negotiated during 15 years of MBFR talks. Reality steamrolled the diplomats. In the new climate of East-West relations this might also happen in the field of strategic weapons. The new material constraints will increasingly replace the old scholasticism of deterrence and, instead, help the art of using the abacus gain ground. Those who play strategic games with marbles will be replaced with people who are able to handle the counters of the abacus. An epochal change is in the offing.

SALT and START had their value. They were a barometer that showed the relationship of pressure between the superpowers. They served as a litmus paper that indicated the seriousness and reliability of Soviet policy. Occasionally, they were also the saving rope, when ice storms howled through the hostile camps. Neither Moscow nor Washington ever completely let go of the rope. This demonstrated that “solidarity of the two superpowers against total war, whose first victims they would be,” which Raymond Aron far-sightedly defined as early as in 1966. Nobody wanted the ice storms to mutate into a nuclear tornado.

Nuclear disarmament remains on the agenda. This is no longer based on the fear of the formerly often cited “Armageddon,” the apocalyptic final nuclear battle; this has a liberating and inspiring effect. Things must move on, however. The superpowers still have several tens of thousands of nuclear weapons; there are still thousands of nuclear battlefield weapons on German soil, which have long become obsolete; the oceans and space are still arenas of the nuclear arms race.

By the way, how would the two nuclear superpowers want to face the actual dangers of the next two decades, if disarmament were now to get stuck: the spreading of nuclear weapons, carrier missiles, and chemical and bacteriological weapons to this world's Saddam Husayns? The accumulation of dangerous conventional weapons in the hands of any kind of would-be aggressor? How could they themselves convert their military industry to civilian production?

"It is too early to judge," Paul Nitze concluded his memoirs with skeptical restraint two years ago, "whether all the endless negotiations have brought us closer to our dual goal of preserving freedom and creating a solid peace. However, there is no doubt that we, together with Gorbachev, have changed the nature of the game." Today Nitze might formulate his assessment with a bit more optimism. Freedom is on the march, peace has become a lot more secure.

USSR Asked To Resume 'Open Skies' Talks

*LD0208160291 Berlin ADN in German 1504 GMT
2 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] Bonn (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has appealed to his Soviet counterpart, Bessmertnykh, to agree as soon as possible to the resumption of the "Open Skies" negotiations. Writing to the USSR foreign minister today on behalf of the nine member states of the Western European Union (WEU), Genscher says that they could be continued immediately after the summer break. [passage omitted]

Genscher, in his letter to Bessmertnykh, expressed the hope that if there is a positive response from Moscow, "Open Skies" could be concluded by the CSCE review conference in Helsinki in March 1992.

Soviet Army Vacating Meiningen, Other Sites

*LD0508154291 Berlin ADN in German 1002 GMT
5 Aug 91*

[Text] Erfurt (ADN)—The Soviet Army will vacate its sites in Meiningen, Gotha, and Ohrdruf by the end of this year. This was announced in a press release by the defense area command of the Bundeswehr in Erfurt. By that time, the 25,000 soldiers and civilian employees of the 39th motorized infantry division of the Soviet Army stationed at these sites would have left Thuringia. Beginning in August, some 60 railway trains a day will be leaving Thuringia heading either for the Mukran-Klaipeda ferry or directly for the Soviet Union via Poland.

According to the treaty, the Soviet Union is to withdraw its divisions and units from Germany by the end of 1994. Recent information from the defense area command of the Bundeswehr shows that the Soviets had taken away 343,000 tonnes of equipment by 15 July. This represents 77 percent of the total amount of 444,000 tonnes planned for 1991.

Since the beginning of the year, 85,000 members of the Army have left eastern German territory—that is, 56 percent of the 150,000 to be moved. In the past, the Soviet Union had some 380,000 men here.

Discussion of Bundeswehr Reductions, Reorganization

Defense Minister Submits Plan

*LD0608090891 Hamburg DPA in German 0802 GMT
6 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—In connection with the reduction of the armed forces, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg

(Christian Democratic Union) has submitted the most comprehensive deployment plans since the founding of the Bundeswehr. Stoltenberg explained to journalists in Bonn on Tuesday that in the long-term, 116 of the 720 locations in the old laender will be relinquished. Laender and local government have protested against the plan to relinquish 213 locations as provided for in the initial concept of 23 May this year. Four hundred and eleven bases will be either unaffected or reduced by no more than 25 percent. One hundred locations will be reduced after 1994 by half and 93 by more than 50 percent. [passage omitted]

Stoltenberg pointed out that the new personnel strength will necessitate a fundamental redeployment. The intention is initially to station about 310,000 soldiers in the old laender and abroad (e.g. NATO missions and training areas abroad) and about 60,000 in the new laender. By the year 2005, these numbers will be changed to about 302,000 in the old laender and abroad and 68,000 in the new laender. The breakdown figures for the services at the end of 1994 are: army 255,400, air force 82,400, and navy 32,200.

FDP Defense Expert Comments

*AU0508113291 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG
in German 4 Aug 91 p 4*

[Interview with Werner Hoyer, defense expert of the Free Democratic Party, by F. Weckbach-Mara; place and date not given: "Bundeswehr: 370,000 Men Are No Taboo"]

[Text] The Free Democratic Party (FDP) demands a new concept for the Bundeswehr. Werner Hoyer, its defense expert and parliamentary executive secretary, told BILD AM SONNTAG: "The Bundeswehr strength of a maximum of 370,000 was arbitrarily chosen in the disarmament negotiations—German unification was worth it. Politics must now precisely define the tasks of the Bundeswehr in the future and give corresponding orders to the military. Equipment, personnel, and stationing can then be derived from that."

[Weckbach-Mara] What are the new tasks to be like?

[Hoyer] In the future, too, we must be able to defend our own country if necessary and to contribute to settling and defusing conflicts within the framework of the community of peoples. For that we need fewer tanks and fortress-like structures, but we need smaller, mobile units, a greater ability to transfer troops, and more transport facilities in the navy and the air force—also for humanitarian aid, by the way.

[Weckbach-Mara] Instead of the Fighter 90?

[Hoyer] Of course, Germany needs a fighter plane, but it must not blow up all financial dimensions, as the Fighter 90 does, and push away all other important projects.

[Weckbach-Mara] How large and how expensive will the Bundeswehr be in the future?

[Hoyer] The size of 370,000 men is no taboo, but depends on the specific tasks. The citizens are justified in expecting that the all-German military budget of more than 60

billion German marks [DM] in 1990 will be further reduced—after reaching DM52 billion in 1991; for instance, by about DM1.6 billion each year over the next few years.

[Weckbach-Mara] This is possible only if the Bundeswehr does not buy materiel that is too expensive....

[Hoyer] Exactly. Procurement in the Bundeswehr must be tightly checked—both by the Auditing Office and by independent management advisers. Sometimes one might buy newly developed systems better and much cheaper in the supermarket around the corner, as has been shown in the case of radio equipment, telephones, and navigation equipment for the operations in Turkey.

[Weckbach-Mara] Will the old kind of draft remain in force?

[Hoyer] I do not want to throw out the basic principle of the draft nor introduce all kinds of alternative compulsory service; however: More justice concerning the draft is necessary. As a result, we will expand the offer of voluntary alternatives—from the social sphere to the Peace Corps in development aid and to environmental protection. Then

the young men are able to choose freely whether they want to serve in the Bundeswehr or work in another service."

SPAIN

Government Welcomes U.S.-Soviet START Treaty

*LD0108220191 Madrid RNE International
in Spanish 0900 GMT 1 Aug 91*

[Text] The Spanish Government has issued a communique in which it welcomes the successful conclusion of the talks for reducing the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, whose ratification in a treaty marks a new milestone in the more and more fluid East-West relations. Moreover, the Spanish Government expresses its confidence that this initiative will stimulate new arms limitations on a global scale in other spheres—such as conventional, chemical, or bacteriological.

According to the communique, this new achievement in arms control confirms the view long held by Spain that it is possible and desirable to reduce national arsenals without prejudice to national security, establishing at the same time the appropriate mechanisms for verification capable of generating trust and openness.

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